Cawley, Anthony (2025) National Economic Vulnerabilities, Performative Effects, and the Framing of International Credit Rating Agencies in Irish Political Discourse. Irish Political Studies. ISSN 0790-7184 (Accepted for Publication)
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Abstract
International credit rating agencies, through assessing sovereign creditworthiness, can affect countries’ borrowing conditions on international capital markets, particularly at times of economic crisis. Governments, in turn, may align decisions, actions, and policies to the agencies’ rating criteria to gain favourable access to international financing to fund budget deficits. This article draws on a Frames Analysis of Oireachtas speeches to examine the embedding of rating agencies in Irish political discourse at three points of national economic vulnerability: the financial crisis, Brexit, and the Covid-19 pandemic. The study suggests that Irish governments and oppositions privileged the agencies’ discourse and perspectives in their parliamentary framing practices, principally around accountability and legitimation, but also in seeking external (international) validation of Ireland’s economic conditions and political capital. The article argues that Oireachtas discourse reflected the agencies’ potential to act performatively on Irish political actors, influencing the behaviours of governments and oppositions as well as state institutions with public finance and national debt responsibilities.
Item Type: | Article |
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Keywords: | Rating Agencies – Oireachtas – Performative Effects – Accountability – Legitimation |
Faculty / Department: | Faculty of Creative Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities |
Depositing User: | Anthony Cawley |
Date Deposited: | 09 Apr 2025 13:22 |
Last Modified: | 09 Apr 2025 13:22 |
URI: | https://hira.hope.ac.uk/id/eprint/4642 |
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