How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes

Pantsios, Archontis and Polachek, Solomon (2017) How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes. Atlantic Economic Journal. ISSN 0197-4254 (Accepted for Publication)

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Abstract

The “joint costs” model states that increasing union and firm strike costs leads to fewer strikes. This paper shows that strike incidence need not decrease when joint strike costs increase. The innovation is to raise union and firm joint strike costs in an asymmetric way. The results indicate that increasing either party’s strike costs can have ambiguous effects on strike incidence. This ambiguity explains why higher strike costs need not always lead to fewer strikes, and thus accounts for the mixed success observed in studies that empirically test the joint costs model with strike incidence data.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information and Comments: The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11293-017-9539-5
Keywords: Strike Activity, Joint Strike Costs, Game of Chicken
Faculty / Department: Faculty of Business, Law and Criminology > Liverpool Hope Business School
Depositing User: Archontis Pantsios
Date Deposited: 10 May 2017 10:25
Last Modified: 07 May 2018 00:15
URI: https://hira.hope.ac.uk/id/eprint/1953

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