A philosophy to fit “the character of this historical period”? Responses to Jean-Paul Sartre in some British and American philosophy departments, c. 1945-1970.

Rosie Germain[[1]](#footnote-1)\*

Department of Education, Liverpool Hope University, Liverpool, United Kingdom.

**Abstract:** Anglophone philosophers are often associated with rejecting philosophy’s moral guidance function after 1945. This article builds on existing work on Jean-Paul Sartre’s reception in universities to show that, actually, many British and American philosophers embraced moral guidance roles by engaging with his work and that they promoted creativity and choice in society as a result. Sartre first came to philosophers’ attention in the context of post-war Francophilia, but interest in him quickly went beyond the fact that he was French and expanded to include the wider existentialist movement that he was a part of. Sartre had enduring popularity among English speaking philosophers because his philosophy resonated with the older British and American philosophies idealism and pragmatism that, like his, were inspired by Hegel. Sartre’s respondents also valued existentialism because, to them, it made certain Judeo-Christian principles relevant, thus protecting religion at a time when they believed it was threatened with decline and by the advance of specialisation. Anglophone philosophers who were interested in Sartre spread their responses to him through teaching an expanding student population, but also reached the wider public through activism, journalism, broadcasting, and government advisory roles. In doing so, philosophers integrated their interpretations of existential ideas into several aspects of culture in post-war Britain and America.

**Keywords**: cold war, Jean-Paul Sartre, existentialism, Britain, America, university, post-war, specialisation.

This article considers moral philosophers’ responses to French existentialism at Manchester, Oxford, UCLA, and Harvard after 1945. French existentialism was a philosophy of freedom that rose to prominence in post-war Paris.[[2]](#endnote-1) Anglophone philosophers were most inclined to respond to the work of a key advocate of this philosophy, Jean-Paul Sartre, although they also reflected on Simone de Beauvoir and Albert Camus, who were thought to be a part of the movement. I focus mainly on Sartre’s reception, which stretched across a wide range of British and American universities, and I single out four philosophy departments so as to assess the responses of philosophers who were affiliated to these institutions in depth.[[3]](#endnote-2) The British and American philosophers who engaged with Sartre saw themselves as moral guides and they modified and amplified Sartre’s ideas, embedding them in their models of social improvement. By the 1950s and 1960s, the intersection of Sartre’s new thought, Anglophone academic traditions, and conditions outside of the university such as technological and religious change, prompted these British and American philosophers to make some common arguments. Many of Sartre’s Anglophone philosopher respondents called for individuals to think more seriously about the human moral faculty of choice, the moral direction of society at a time of change, and key moral principles of creativity, freedom, and self-knowledge. These principles dovetailed with those celebrated elsewhere in the sixties counter-culture. Participants in the counterculture and the moral philosophers addressed in this article associated the values of choice, freedom, creativity, and self-knowledge with liberation from prescribed social roles and restrictive moral codes - such values continue to be used in similar ways in contemporary debates about morality.[[4]](#endnote-3) Therefore, a study of Sartre’s reception in Anglophone philosophy departments is not just about the mechanics of how his ideas were taught or written about. It is also about how and why, after 1945, a distinct academic group came to advance a set of values that remain integral to current understandings of morality.

 Research about Sartre’s impact on British philosophers is limited. Martin Woessner is an exception, but he suggests that British philosopher proponents of Sartre were anomalies, existing outside of the mainstream of British academic culture and offering “alternative modes of philosophizing […] if only at the margins.”[[5]](#endnote-4) Sartre’s British respondents were certainly in a minority in philosophy departments, but this article demonstrates that this did not mean that they were at odds with cultures at Oxford and Manchester in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, British philosophers’ sympathy towards Sartre emerged from deeply rooted philosophical interests at these institutions. These interests were Judeo-Christianity and older moral philosophies such as Hegel’s and a movement that he helped to inspire, British idealism.

 Historians’ coverage of Sartre’s impact in philosophy departments across America is more substantial than the coverage of Britain, having been the subject of a book by Ann Fulton. Through trans-national comparison and a focus on UCLA and Harvard, this article develops Fulton’s analysis of the factors that were important to American philosophers’ reception of Sartre. Two of the components of Sartre’s reception in America were the same as in England – the influence of Judeo-Christianity, and of an older moral philosophy that was partly influenced by Hegel, which, in America’s case, was pragmatism. While Fulton concludes that in American philosophy departments “Sartreanism […] suffered because of its hostility to religion,” I show that some of Sartre’s key receivers were actually attracted to him, as well as to Camus, because of the perceived compatibility of their thought with religion.[[6]](#endnote-5) With regards to pragmatism, Fulton shows that Sartre’s thought resonated with this philosophy’s affirmative, action-based emphasis.[[7]](#endnote-6) I support Fulton’s argument by showing that pragmatism was studied or taught by Sartre’s respondents, thus preparing them to engage with Sartre’s own theories of action. Philosophers at UCLA and Harvard were also associated with *Partisan Review* and their interest in pragmatists’ and existentialists’ views on action were heightened by debates connected to this theme in the magazine. By the late 1950s, American philosophers actually expressed preference for existentialism over pragmatism, as they felt that Sartre’s theory of action would be the best at addressing specialisation, one of the key social problems identified in *Partisan Review*.

 The role of religion in Sartre’s reception among philosophers has implications for the histories of post-war secularisation as it demonstrates that philosophers’ embrace of supposedly secular philosophies such as Sartre’s could actually stem from a desire to protect religion. Catholics in post-war France rejected Sartre’s philosophy because they deemed its atheism irreligious.[[8]](#endnote-7) Yet while Sartre and Camus both identified as atheists, they saw affinities between their own work and religion.[[9]](#endnote-8) When interviewed on 2 August 1947 in the popular British magazine *Picture Post*, Sartre agreed that his philosophy might be rightly labelled a “religion of freedom.”[[10]](#endnote-9) Camus’ *The Stranger* was first translated into English in 1946, and in his preface to the 1956 American University edition of this work, Camus referred to Meursault, its unfalteringly honest protagonist,as “the only Christ we deserve.”[[11]](#endnote-10) British and American philosophers associated with the universities under review endorsed a liberal, non-doctrinal, Judeo-Christianity that was divorced from supernaturalism. They also often mixed references to the bible with references to Sartre’s work in their own writing.[[12]](#endnote-11) These Anglophone philosophers therefore saw a harmony between Sartre and Camus’s work and religion where Catholic French reviewers did not. Philosophers were by no means unique in their tendency to simultaneously endorse Judeo-Christian and secular thought after 1945. Non-philosopher public intellectuals in the UK and US also advanced models of morality that emerged from a mixed source-base that included secular psychology and Judeo-Christianity. Such professionals in the UK included the psychiatrist R. D. Laing, journalists for the counter-cultural magazine *International Times*, or religious leader John Robinson, and in the US they included the psychologist Abraham Maslow and Rabbi Liebman – both of whom wrote best-selling self-help books.[[13]](#endnote-12)

 Yet some philosophers did not just draw on secular and religious work; they also blurred the boundaries between the two. It was common for philosophers to celebrate the aspects of Judeo-Christianity that they thought were compatible with existentialism, and thus, in their minds, with modern ways of thinking, and they appreciated Sartre’s work because it made these Judeo-Christian values popular at a time of perceived religious decline. The values celebrated by both Judeo-Christianity and French existentialism, and deemed to be admirable, were creativity, self-knowledge, choice, and an awareness of the finite nature of human life. At the same time, Anglophone philosophers advocated some aspects of Judeo-Christianity that they felt Sartre’s philosophy of individual freedom overlooked, but that were still needed by modern society. Philosophers in both countries reflected that Sartre’s model of creativity could lead to socially destructive self-assertion if it was not moderated by selflessness – a moral quality that they noted garnered more attention in religious texts and practice, and that should continue to be protected alongside Sartre’s work.[[14]](#endnote-13) Philosophers’ qualified approval of Sartre therefore sometimes served as an endorsement of a new model of Judeo-Christianity that they believed was both compatible with, and needed by, modern society. Philosophers who were not involved in the reception of French existentialism also used secular works to endorse some elements of Judeo-Christianity. Mackenzie Bok has shown that Harvard philosopher John Rawls’s 1971 *Theory of Justice* was an attempt to reconcile secular moral knowledge advanced by Wittgenstein and Piaget with features of life deemed desirable in the bible: love, community, and redemption.[[15]](#endnote-14)

 Idealism could be as important as religion in providing a brake on British philosophers adopting Sartre’s model of creativity in its original form, as it channelled anti-revolutionary sentiment that stemmed from the 1860s to the 1950s and 1960s. British idealists held that rule following was as important as creativity in a moral society. As a consequence, one idealist acolyte in Britain in the 1960s, Dorothy Emmet, tempered Sartre’s ideas about creativity with equal emphasis on the importance of conforming to pre-set rules in a moral society. By contrast with some philosophers in Britain, Sartre’s supporters in America were particularly influenced by pragmatists’ emphasis that growth and change in the face of new experience was at the root of morality. The pragmatists’ focus on new experience complemented Sartre’s emphasis on creativity since both involved the rejection of custom. Those American philosophers who were influenced by pragmatism consequently gave less priority to the morality of rule following than some British respondents.

 It may come as a surprise that older models of moral philosophy and religion influenced the responses of academics to Sartre at Oxford and Harvard as these institutions are often linked to a rejection of moral philosophy after the war. The historians Joel Isaac, Tom Akehurst, and Ben Rogers have published work about inter-war and post-war Oxford and Harvard and have focused on “analytic” philosophers there such as A. J. Ayer and Willard Quine.[[16]](#endnote-15) While Quine was at Harvard, and Ayer was at Oxford, they lauded scientific method, analysis of language, logic, and sentence construction, and they regarded guidance on what was morally right as beyond the scope of the philosopher.[[17]](#endnote-16) Recent research on Manchester does not focus on analytic philosophy but rather moral philosophy and emphasizes the work of Samuel Alexander who endorsed metaphysics and moral philosophy, led the philosophy department in the 1920s, and continued to have a strong influence there in the 1930s.[[18]](#endnote-17) With regard to UCLA, historians have paid significant attention to the black power activist Angela Davis, who was employed by the philosophy department in the late 1960s and had trained in moral philosophy at the Frankfurt School.[[19]](#endnote-18) From the historical literature, therefore, Oxford and Harvard appear to be very different institutions than UCLA and Manchester, and this is why these universities were, at the outset, chosen for analysis in this article – so as to show a diversity of response to Sartre.

 In some respects, philosophers’ responses to Sartre live up to expectations raised about these universities in the literature. Manchester philosophy department was led by Dorothy Emmet after the war – a moral philosopher who was interested in Sartre.[[20]](#endnote-19) UCLA attracted a range of moral philo­sophers who were sympathetic to existentialism in the 1950s. By contrast, in 1945, the Oxford trained philosopher, A. J. Ayer publicly rejected French existentialism which he said “has become very largely an exercise in misusing the verb ‘to be’,” and had ended up in “hopeless logical confusion” (*Horizon*, July, 1945). At Harvard, John Wild left the philosophy department in 1960 because, while he had established some courses on existentialism in the 1950s, he felt that his efforts to expand the provision for existentialism and phenomenology further would be frustrated by the growth of logic there.[[21]](#endnote-20) Yet two of Sartre’s most prominent advocates in Britain, Iris Murdoch and Mary Warnock, taught and published on existentialism while they were at Oxford in the 1950s and 1960s, and in 1955 John Wild had in fact successfully established the first course on existentialism at Harvard that, as this article shows, laid the foundations for later such courses to be taught after his departure in the 1960s.[[22]](#endnote-21)

 The explanation for sympathetic responses to Sartre across all four universities sheds light on the shared modes of philosophical enquiry at these institutions that have been overlooked in the historical literature and that, unlike analytical philosophy, endorsed moral guidance. Certainly, Ayer and Quine were influential at Oxford and Harvard, but their interests did not adequately represent the interests of those philosophers there for whom older models of moral philosophy and religion had been influential. It also does not account for the numerous women philosophers who wrote some of the first books about Sartre in England and America, and produced the first English translations of his philosophy. Many of Sartre’s supporters were women academics – a new phenomenon in the twentieth century since women, for instance, could not even graduate from Oxford University until 1920.[[23]](#endnote-22) Whilst small numbers of women occupied the same academic jobs as men after the Second World War, Carol Dyhouse has shown the range of ways that academic women were treated differently than academic men from the early to mid-twentieth century, and were also expected to have different interests than men.[[24]](#endnote-23) Deondra Rose has illustrated a similar tendency to marginalise academic women in America at this time.[[25]](#endnote-24)

 Social constructions of gender difference in Anglo-American universities could work in Sartre’s favour. A. J. Ayer had rejected Sartre’s philosophy for being too emotional, commenting in 1948 that “It is not the habit of Existentialists to concern themselves overmuch with logic. What they strive for and obtain is emotional effect”.[[26]](#endnote-25) However, it seems that it was more acceptable for women to practice a philosophy with associations with emotion than men, particularly at Oxford where, in the 1950s and early 1960s, women were the main importers of Sartre’s thought. Daily life for academic women involved challenging conventions – in particular challenging the convention that academics were male. Iris Murdoch reflected that as an academic woman she had to prove that she was “neither a whore nor a bluestocking”.[[27]](#endnote-26) The American philosopher Hazel Barnes, who translated *Being and Nothingness* in 1956, shared such resilience as a female philosopher, enduring a media review of one of her public lectures that included “such idiotic remarks as ‘her mind was as sparkling as her eyes’”.[[28]](#endnote-27) The introduction of a new moral philosophy such as existentialism was just an extension of what had to be, for Murdoch and Barnes but also most academic women of their time, a habitual boldness.

 Deeply entrenched religious and philosophical concerns and the new gender composition of universities were therefore important factors in Anglophone philosophers’ sustained engagement with Sartre. However, philosophers were initially affected by Sartre’s prominence in Anglophone culture immediately after the war. Sartre’s vogue helped to bring the multi-national existentialist movement, commonly agreed to have started with Soren Kierkegaard in the early 1800s, to prominence too. To explain Sartre’s popularity in the 1940s, its significance for philosophers, and why French existentialism is a good starting point for considering the British and American reception of existentialism more generally, requires us to go back to the Francophilia of the immediate post-war moment.

# The allure of the French and early translations

France’s cultural cachet in Western Europe was high in the inter-war period as it was seen as a centre of modernism and of engaged intellectuals.[[29]](#endnote-28) The country’s stock rose further after the Second World War as its main cultural exports, from the work of Raymond Queneau to French existentialism, were linked to the heroic French Resistance against Nazi Occupation (*Horizon*, November, 1944; *Partisan Review*, Fall, 1945). Interest in France was so great in the 1940s that Arthur Koestler referred to British intellectuals as having “French flu”.[[30]](#endnote-29) Iris Murdoch and William Barrett were two early respondents to Sartre who helped to introduce his thought at Oxford and UCLA respectively, and they too participated in this Francophilia which was reinforced by their work in post-war reconstruction. Murdoch’s love of all things French (from its men to its films) prompted her to go to see Sartre, who was then unknown to her, lecture in Belgium in 1945.[[31]](#endnote-30) Murdoch was passing through Belgium on her way to Austria while working on post-war reconstruction for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).[[32]](#endnote-31) Barrett was stationed in Italy immediately after the war, a country that he stated was culturally desolate when he reported on it in the Winter 1946 issue of the literary magazine, *Partisan Review*. When Barrett wrote about French intellectual trends at this time, his appreciation for Sartre was heightened by his sense that Sartre would help France, which in his view “has always been the cultural exporter to the whole continent” to provide cultural direction to Italy and the rest of war-torn Europe (*Partisan Review*, Winter, 1946).

 Francophile philosophers who participated in post-war reconstruction did not introduce Sartre to American and British audiences alone, but were supported in this endeavour by the Francophile publishers Hamish Hamilton and Alfred. A. Knopf who released the first translations of Sartre and Camus’s fiction. Camus’s *L’ Étranger*, published in translation in 1946 by Hamish Hamilton in the UK as *The Outsider*, and by Knopf in the US as *The Stranger*, was the first of Camus’s and Sartre’s books to be translated and released in both Britain and America after the war. Cyril Connolly wrote the forward to the first British version of *The Outsider*, a result of his profile as a connoisseur of French culture and his links with Hamish Hamilton. Connolly had been convinced of the superiority of French culture since his days at Eton in the late 1910s, and in 1936 referred to English literature as “arse wipe” by comparison with the literature of France.[[33]](#endnote-32) In an effort to transfer French culture to Britain, Connolly founded the literary journal, *Horizon*, in 1939 and this magazine familiarised publishers with Camus’ profile when it provided the first extensive reports on French existentialism in Britain in 1944.[[34]](#endnote-33) It was fitting that Connolly should write the introduction to the first of Camus’s books that were published in England. In America, Alfred and Blanche Knopf (who managed the publishing firm Alfred. A. Knopf) published translations of Sartre and Camus’s fiction and short essays, releasing Sartre’s *The Age of Reason* in 1947, the same year that it was released in Britain. This husband and wife publishing team were so taken with French culture that it was the subject of gentle ridicule by their house guests of the 1940s who remembered that “dinners at Alfred’s are conceived by the host on a high poetic level […] Will you taste the Quiche Lorraine, or the Chaud-Froid […] Have you eaten faisan a l’ananas? Mousse aux fraises, paupiettes de veau? Boeuf a la mode? Poitron soup?”[[35]](#endnote-34)

 Knopf and Hamish Hamilton only translated Sartre’s fiction and plays and this would not have provided enough material for philosophers to use in their classes on existentialism. However, widespread media reviews of Sartre’s fiction triggered the translation of his key existentialist philosophical text, *Being and Nothingness,* which would be necessary for any academic course on existentialism. Knopf’s translation of Sartre’s *The Age of Reason* in 1947 was widely reviewed in the US and by 1948 this had prompted a student to ask Hazel Barnes, a philosophy lecturer at the University of Toledo, Ohio, about the existentialism that they had heard so much about.[[36]](#endnote-35) Barnes was not familiar with existentialism when her student asked about it, and in response she “zeroed in on the three Parisians: Sartre, Beauvoir, and Camus”, researched existentialism more broadly by accessing some relevant texts from bookstores, became a convert, and had translated *Being and Nothingness* by 1956.[[37]](#endnote-36) Barnes taught courses on existentialism for the rest of her career which ended at the University of Colorado in 1986.[[38]](#endnote-37)

 Hazel Barnes’ courses on existentialism did not just focus on Sartre, but her own interest in the movement nevertheless started through her exposure to Sartre’s thought as a result of Francophilia in literary and publishing circles in America.[[39]](#endnote-38) In England Mary Warnock, like Barnes, was also introduced to existentialism for the first time through Sartre’s work. Warnock’s discovery of existentialism through Sartre had an unintended impact on students. In 1960, Warnock published a popular textbook on ethics in which the only chapter dealing with existentialism was on Sartre.[[40]](#endnote-39) Warnock’s textbook was written when she was at Oxford, but in the 1960s it was set on the Ethics course at Manchester with the result that students’ understanding of existentialism there was skewed towards Sartre.[[41]](#endnote-40) It was not until 1970 that Warnock published a book about existentialism that focused on a range of existentialist thinkers and not predominantly Sartre.[[42]](#endnote-41) Thus, in the 1940s and early 1950s, Sartre’s fame broadened the base of philosophers who were familiar with existentialism. Anglophone philosophers’ interest in Sartre could result in them entrenching associations between Sartre and existentialism, but usually resulted in them also promoting the wider existentialist movement in their academic work.

 Other Anglophone philosophers, such as Iris Murdoch and Marjorie Grene were actually already familiar with the broader existentialist movement at the time that they encountered Sartre. Murdoch was interested in Kierkegaard in 1946, and Marjorie Grene had studied with Heidegger in the 1930s.[[43]](#endnote-42) However, they first published about existentialism in works that aimed to contextualise Sartre for audiences that were inquisitive about this famous philosopher.[[44]](#endnote-43) Grene remembered that Sartre’s popularity meant that publishing on existentialism in the late 1940s was one way for her to make money at a time when gender discrimination prevented her from securing an academic job.[[45]](#endnote-44) Sartre therefore did not just introduce Anglophone philosophers to existentialism, but reinforced a concurrent interest in existentialism among philosophers. Sartre’s vogue offered Anglophone philosophers greater opportunities to publish on existentialism than previously, and sometimes resulted in them shifting their focus from other existentialists to Sartre.

 William Barrett is one final example of a philosopher for whom Sartre was an access point to the broader existentialist movement. Barrett remembered that “after the Second World War, the news of Existentialism arrived.”[[46]](#endnote-45) In 1946, soon after Barrett had first discovered Sartre, Barrett depicted him as a cultural hero who launched existentialism to the masses, but followed this in 1958 by publishing a wide ranging book on existentialism of which Sartre was only a part (*Partisan Review*, Spring, 1946).[[47]](#endnote-46) Even in cases like Barrett’s, it remained common for writers to acknowledge Sartre as the individual who had brought existentialism to prominence and as the jumping off point from which they sought to demonstrate the longer history of existentialism. “Now that French existentialism as a popular movement […] is safely dead” commented Barrett in 1958 “we can see it is […] a small branch of a very much larger tree.”[[48]](#endnote-47) The fact that Sartre was credited with bringing existentialism to fame not only spread an impression of Sartre’s importance (if not superiority within the existentialist movement), but reflected the reality that, for many philosophers, Sartre provided the opportunity for them to start publishing on existentialism.

 Ultimately, Franco-philia and involvement in post-war reconstruction was fleeting and insufficient reason for philosophers to teach and publish about Sartre and existentialism after their initial excitement. Philosophers’ sustained engagement resulted from the intellectual climate in Anglophone philosophy departments, their view that they should be socially engaged, and their anxieties about what they perceived as some of the moral problems facing modern Western societies. The wider context of the Cold War in the 1950s and early 1960s legitimized reflection on what it meant to be “free”, and Sartre’s philosophy of freedom provided ample scope for reflection on this issue. Regardless of British and American politicians’ and other prominent figures’ public statements that Western capitalism secured freedom, several philosophers used Sartre and Camus’ philosophy to show that British or American individuals were neither effectively mobilising their freedom, nor using it responsibly.[[49]](#endnote-48) These contextual factors within and outside the university raised the perceived value of Sartre among philosophers and resulted in them moving away from seeing him as peculiarly French in the first years after the war, to assimilating his ideas into British and American culture. By the 1950s and 1960s, philosophers naturalized Sartre by making connections between his work and that of British and American philosophies, by embedding his work on to philosophy courses and in their own writing about what British and American society should look like in the future. It is to Sartre’s philosophy and philosophers’ responses to it at Manchester, Oxford, and UCLA and Harvard, that this article now turns.

# Sartre’s philosophy

Sartre was part of a generation of French philosophers who trained at the *École normale supérieure* in Paris in the 1920s and 1930s. Here, Sartre came under the influence of Henri Bergson’s ideas of free-will, and Kant’s notion that our understanding of the external world is filtered through experience.[[50]](#endnote-49) Sartre was also inspired by phenomenology, and, like most phenomenologists who were led by Edmund Husserl, Sartre saw himself as working scientifically because the scientific methods of observation and description were central to his writing.[[51]](#endnote-50) The degree to which Sartre’s philosophy was “unscientific” as compared to that of the analytic philosophers is therefore perhaps less than his “analytic” critics assumed, but this is not the focus of this article which is more concerned with the morally directive qualities of Sartre’s work, and those aspects that appealed outside of France.

 Aspects of Sartre’s moral system that were derived from Hegel resonated in Britain and America. Sartre encountered Hegel, in part, via Alexandre Kojève, a French philosopher who was born in Russia. Kojève’s ideas became popular after he delivered philosophy seminars in Paris at the *École pratique des hautes* *etudes* in the 1930s, and Sartre was particularly responsive to three ideas that were discussed in these Paris seminars.[[52]](#endnote-51) The ideas that appealed to Sartre centred on Kojève’s interpretations of Hegel’s ideas which Kojève conflated with Heidegger’s, and that Kojève based on his reading of chapter 4 of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807*)*.[[53]](#endnote-52) Firstly, Sartre was influenced by Kojève’s understanding that Hegel placed the individual and their choices at the centre of human reality.[[54]](#endnote-53) Secondly, Kojève’s view that Hegel placed awareness of one’s freedom to create self at the root of human action was important in Sartre’s work.[[55]](#endnote-54) Thirdly, Sartre sympathised with Kojève’s assessment that Hegel endorsed the possibility of moral progress through human action.[[56]](#endnote-55) These ideas were present in Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness* (transl. 1956) and his popularisation of this work, *Existentialism and Humanism* (transl. 1948), both of which famously explored the ideas through the concepts of “bad faith” and “anguish”, and attracted attention from Anglophone philosophers.[[57]](#endnote-56) Sartre argued that “anguish” felt in the face of human responsibility to create individuality and society often made humans turn away from such choice in “bad faith”, and that moral societies should enhance choice and creativity.[[58]](#endnote-57) Sartre’s celebration of choice and creativity was of particular interest to the philosopher Dorothy Emmet who was based at Manchester University.

# Manchester University

The Oxford trained philosopher Dorothy Emmet was the head of the Manchester philosophy department from 1946 to 1966.[[59]](#endnote-58) Emmet first set extracts from Hazel Barnes’s translation of Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness* alongside the work of other philosophers on a compulsory ethics module at Manchester in 1961.[[60]](#endnote-59) Extracts from Barnes’ translation of *Being and Nothingness* were included in the Walter Kaufmann anthology of existentialism, *Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre* (1956), that was on the set reading for this 1961 ethics module. Mary Warnock’s work about Sartre continued to be set on this ethics course after Emmet’s departure from the university in 1966.[[61]](#endnote-60) Sartre’s *Nausea* was also set along with other philosophers’ work on the *Introduction to Philosophy* course after 1965 and into the 1970s.[[62]](#endnote-61) Contemporary stereotypes of both women and Sartre’s philosophy as “emotional”, and women’s habitual boldness in a male academic environment, may go some way towards explaining women’s prominent role in the reception of French existentialism, but its role on Emmet’s development should not be overstated. Emmet’s philosophical orientation grew from a range of influences from Oxford and Manchester that she shared with male academics.

 Emmet’s influences included the work of contemporary sociologists, anthropologists, and older British moral philosophers who often mixed Christianity with their philosophy. In response to such influences, Emmet believed that philosophers should be socially engaged and her interest in Sartre was tied to social issues such as how humans can sustain morality and creativity in a society of increasingly large organisations and specialised roles. As will be shown, Emmet agreed with Sartre that creativity was important in society, but she thought it was not relevant to all contexts and needed to be combined with different human capacities that were stressed by the other intellectuals who inspired her.[[63]](#endnote-62) Emmet’s response to Sartre shows that even though secular moral systems such as Sartre’s were popular in post-war Britain, they were not accepted in their full form. Instead, at Manchester, Emmet modified Sartre’s thought to complement her sympathy towards ideas of rule following, of the importance of social stability, and to Christianity, none of which were Sartre’s priorities.

 Conditions at Manchester were well suited to a moral philosopher like Emmet, and philosophy recruited well. The head of the philosophy department in the 1930s, Samuel Alexander, was known for advocating moral philosophy. Thus the Manchester philosophy department had a different profile than that at the London School of Economics (LSE) where the 2019 LSE website explains that, since 1946, philosophy had been closely linked to scientific method, or at Oxford, which was associated with linguistic philosophy (even by those philosophers, such as Emmet, who had trained there and rejected it).[[64]](#endnote-63) Emmet had published about Kierkegaard in 1937, the year before her arrival as a lecturer at Manchester, and at Manchester this was not seen as odd as Samuel Alexander commented “How I rejoice! For the University because it gets you […].”[[65]](#endnote-64) The fact that Emmet became the head of the philosophy department at Manchester in 1946 is a sign that female philosophers were not necessarily relegated within departments because of their gender or interest in moral philosophy.

 In 1946, philosophy at Manchester secured high enrolment figures partly because its courses were taken by undergraduates in a range of disciplines from history to administration. In 1946, 92 B.A administration students took the general course in philosophy and only one student took single honours philosophy on its own.[[66]](#endnote-65) The Ethics paper was compulsory for all students taking the general philosophy course, and it was here, in 1961, where Sartre’s literature was first set. The number of students taking philosophy courses at Manchester rose across this period in line with general uni­versity expansion.[[67]](#endnote-66) Student growth accelerated after 1960 because the treasury awarded Man­chester increasing money for university expansion, and the Anderson Committee recommendations made university more affordable by recommending that local education authorities provide students with means-tested grants.[[68]](#endnote-67) 124 students took philosophy courses at Manchester in the year 1946.[[69]](#endnote-68) This number had risen to 450 by 1962.[[70]](#endnote-69)

 Emmet’s engagement with Sartre, both when she set students excerpts of *Being and Nothingness*, and published her own ideas about him in 1966, was related to her earlier intellectual experiences at Oxford and Manchester. When Emmet studied at Oxford in the 1920s it was dominated by “realists” whose model of moral disengagement alienated her as well as many of her contemporaries, but she had picked up some alternative moral ideas from idealists.[[71]](#endnote-70) Idealists and Sartre shared an interest in the role of creative action in improving society and Emmet was sensitive to this point of connection. The cross-over between Sartre and earlier British philosophers stemmed, in part, from their shared interest in Hegel’s ideas of the possibility of increasing unity through moral progress that was determined by contextually sensitive action.[[72]](#endnote-71) Emmet was influenced by idealism via A. D. Lindsay who taught her at Oxford.[[73]](#endnote-72) Lindsay was a member of the idealist movement, and a follower of the Oxford Hegelians Edward Caird and T. H. Green.[[74]](#endnote-73) Emmet claimed that Lindsay was one of her greatest influences who gave her “not just preaching” but “a way of thinking”.[[75]](#endnote-74) In written work, Caird, Green, and Lindsay combined responses to Hegel with sympathy towards Christianity and aimed to create Hegelian moral unity in society without revolution.[[76]](#endnote-75)

 Revolution had been considered un-British among many English academics since Macaulay’s Whiggish histories of the 1850s attributed British “success” to incremental change and a robust constitution.[[77]](#endnote-76) The Cambridge historian Herbert Butterfield certainly still advocated this view in the 1940s, as did the Cambridge-trained scientist and industrial growth adviser to the Labour Government, C. P. Snow.[[78]](#endnote-77) British idealists’ non-revolutionary projects included Green’s involvement with school and electoral reform in the 1860s, and Lindsay’s involvement with university reform in the 1940s.[[79]](#endnote-78) In his 1940 religious work, *Two Moralities*, Lindsay drew inspiration from the bible, in particular St. Paul, to argue that non-revolutionary societies required the “two moralities” of creativity (or “grace”), as well as conformity.[[80]](#endnote-79) With regard to conformity, Lindsay wrote that “The law, said St. Paul, is a schoolmaster to lead us to Christ […]. None of us can do without the morality of my station and its duties” and elsewhere in the same book “social life is impossible without a fair assurance that most people will usually keep to the rules.”[[81]](#endnote-80) Lindsay’s idealism, when combined with Emmet’s interest in sociology and in the work of anthropologists such as Max Gluckman, and the fact that Emmet taught many administration students who aimed to become managers, inspired her to identify law and custom as of equal importance for social morality in organisations as individual creativity.[[82]](#endnote-81) Emmet advanced this position in her book, *Function, Purpose and Powers* in 1958, while citing Lindsay’s idealist work, *Two Moralities* (1940).[[83]](#endnote-82)

 Samuel Alexander, who became the chair of the Manchester philosophy department in 1893, had defended the importance of God in everyday human and philosophical reflection in his work *Space, Time and Deity* (1920). Alexander’s work entrenched a culture of interest in religion and moral philosophy at Manchester that was still in force when Emmet became head of the philosophy department in 1946.[[84]](#endnote-83) Emmet’s interest in moral philosophy was also nurtured at Manchester by social scientists such as anthropologists who mingled with the philosophy faculty and with whom she discussed current moral problems raised by sociology.[[85]](#endnote-84) Emmet’s intellectual influences, from both Oxford and Manchester, combined in her 1966 book *Roles, Rules, and Regulations* in which she reflected on how to sustain morality in the modern organisation.[[86]](#endnote-85) Emmet’s earlier experiences determined the purpose to which she put Sartre’s thought in this book, which was to defend organisations in which many people’s lives were disconnected from creativity. In her 1966 book, Emmet also drew inspiration from the bible recalling that “as St. Paul told us, there are diversities of gifts” from rule following “administrators” who “set a high value on stability” to “high originality” anarchists, both of whom need to be respected in successful organisations.[[87]](#endnote-86) Lindsay had drawn on the same aspect of St Paul’s thought in *Two Moralities*.[[88]](#endnote-87)

 Emmet claimed that Sartre’s model of radical freedom was an important reminder that man must not “hide behind his ‘functions’”. [[89]](#endnote-88) However, Lindsay’s idealism had also taught Emmet that “to live in society means, we have seen, that a certain number of reasonably stable functions and expectations can be depended on”.[[90]](#endnote-89) Emmet argued that Sartre’s call for total creativity of all individuals in organisations was not necessarily ethical since institutions were complex social organisations that brought together a range of people with different personalities and aims.[[91]](#endnote-90) For instance, Emmet argued that many workers did not aim to express their creativity at work so should not be forced to, and that constant creative involvement of all workers in all decision-making processes of organisations put immoral pressure on the leaders of these organisations whose freedom and time to act would be curtailed by complete democratic decision making.[[92]](#endnote-91) Emmet therefore reconciled Sartre’s ideas into a defence of the current economic system in which some workers exerted little creativity and rather followed pre-set tasks.

 Emmet did not just temper Sartre’s radical model of creativity in her own philosophy but also in the examination questions that she set students. For instance, in 1962, Emmet questioned Sartre’s emphasis on the need for constant creativity, and called for students to consider whether pre-set rules may in fact be necessary for moral societies:

10. “There is this in common between art and morality, that in both we have to do with creation and invention. We cannot decide a priori what it is that should be done.” Is Sartre correct in this contention?[[93]](#endnote-92)

Emmet had known about existentialism since 1937 when she reviewed a book about Kierkegaard but she did not introduce the subject to undergraduates until the early 1960s at a time when she also registered student interest in the area.[[94]](#endnote-93) Such student interest had developed, in part, as a response to the work of Francophile publishing houses. Yet, when the exam question Emmet asked students is seen alongside her published work, this suggests that she did not just teach Sartre to satisfy student curiosity, but also because his work resonated with philosophies that she was already familiar with. Emmet transferred her view of Sartre that emerged from her pre-existing interests to students. Even if Emmet’s students had not read Green or Lindsay, they were encouraged to consider these philosophers’ viewpoints through her style of questioning and thus to interrogate whether creative action was always better than custom and rule following.

 Emmet left the Manchester philosophy department in 1966, but existentialism continued to have a presence on the undergraduate philosophy course into the 1980s.[[95]](#endnote-94) Emmet’s ideas about business ethics which, as has been shown, were a response to a range of intellectual influences that included Sartre are also used in business and administration text-books today.[[96]](#endnote-95) Mary Warnock’s *Ethics since 1900* (1960) was a set text on the Ethics module at Manchester in 1967 and this book contained a long chapter on Sartre.[[97]](#endnote-96) In this book, Warnock argued that Sartre’s style of engaged moral philosophy was preferable to the detached philosophical style that had dominated in Britain since the inter-war period and that attempted to make ethics “trivial”.[[98]](#endnote-97) The next section looks more closely at how Mary Warnock and Iris Murdoch responded to existentialism during and after their time at Oxford in the post-war period, and why.

# Oxford University

Iris Murdoch and Mary Warnock were Sartre’s supporters at Oxford in the 1950s. Murdoch taught existentialism on a general undergraduate course called Moral and Political Philosophy at Oxford in the 1950s, and Warnock provided guidance to thesis students who studied existentialism in the 1960s.[[99]](#endnote-98) Murdoch joined Oxford as a philosophy tutor in 1948, and Warnock was awarded a philosophy lectureship in 1949, but they left the university in the mid-1960s, with Warnock alone resuming a role there in the 1970s.[[100]](#endnote-99) Along with interrupted academic careers, Warnock and Murdoch, like Emmet, only took up existentialism partially, mixing it with other ideas that they had picked up from Oxford and elsewhere. This may leave the impression that existentialism had an ambiguous relationship with academic philosophy in Britain. However, at Oxford, as at Manchester, Sartre’s work continued to be taught on the philosophy syllabus in the 1970s, and at Oxford it is currently taught on a philosophy module called “Post-Kantian philosophy”.[[101]](#endnote-100) Whilst Murdoch first encountered Sartre in Brussels during a bout of war-time Francophilia, the conditions at Oxford provided her with the potential to extend her interest, and it was from here that, in 1953, she published *Sartre: Romantic Rationalist* – one of the first full length studies written on Sartre in England.[[102]](#endnote-101) Warnock wrote a chapter on Sartre in 1960 and as a result of teaching Sartre and continental philosophy at Oxford soon after this date she went on to publish three books on existentialism (in 1965, 1970, and 1971), and the introduction to the English edition of *Being and Nothingness* by 1976.[[103]](#endnote-102) The social and cultural impact of Murdoch and Warnock’s response to existentialism was also high, reaching beyond the readership of their books on the subject. Therefore, even if existentialism was on the margins in post-war Oxford, the fact that in the 1950s and 1960s conditions there facilitated engagement with Sartre at all was both institutionally and nationally significant.

 Oxford students studied philosophy through the combination degrees PPE (Politics, Philosophy, and Economics) or Literae Humaniores (Philosophy and History). By 1972, there were 268 finals candidates in PPE, and 111 were taking Lit Hum.[[104]](#endnote-103) This made PPE only 2 students shy of the most popular subject in the university (History).[[105]](#endnote-104) Historians usually depict the large post-war Oxford philosophy faculty as a centre of oppressively uniform linguistic analysis.[[106]](#endnote-105) However, from the 1950s until the 1980s, moral philosophy papers were compulsory for third year PPE and Lit Hum students, and papers on advanced logic or linguistic propositions were actually optional.[[107]](#endnote-106) The persistence of traditional teaching styles at Oxford heightened the chance that Sartre might be taught on these moral philosophy modules. After 1945, philosophers continued the tradition of teaching what they wanted so long as it fit into broad themes (such as “moral philosophy”).[[108]](#endnote-107) The questions that appeared in the “Moral and Political Philosophy” papers in the 1950s and 1960s were necessarily general to accommodate the range of topics tutors might teach. For instance, one question on the “Moral and Political Philosophy” paper in 1952 asked students “Has morality a supreme principle?”(1952).[[109]](#endnote-108) In this environment, Murdoch and Warnock could teach existentialism as they became interested in it. The Moral and Political Philosophy syllabus was so flexible that it seems that Murdoch was only asked what she had taught in her lectures for it after she had delivered them. In 1956 Murdoch confirmed that she had been teaching existentialism from 1951-55.[[110]](#endnote-109)

 Modernisation also had a role to play in Oxford academics’ sympathy towards Sartre. The presence of women academics at Oxford was a manifestation of the “modern” in itself, and it seems that female philosophers were more inclined to engage with existentialism in England than men. Mary Warnock had not considered engaging with Sartre until a male academic superior, J. L. Austin, recommended in 1959 that she write about him.[[111]](#endnote-110) It may have been that Austin felt Sartre’s style of philosophy was suitable for a woman, but not for men such as himself who were pre-occupied with the masculine world of linguistic philosophy, although Warnock does not state this in her memoir – in fact she refers to philosophy as a “gender-neutral” subject.[[112]](#endnote-111) Nevertheless, there are other clues that show how the reception of Sartre in England was dependent on women philosophers in the 1950s. Warnock used the example and work of other female philosophers, Murdoch and Barnes, to complete her piece on Sartre. Of Murdoch’s *Romantic Rationalist* (1953), Warnock wrote “I should not have managed without it”, and of course Warnock could not have quoted extensively from *Being and Nothingness* without Hazel Barnes’ 1956 translation of it.[[113]](#endnote-112) Warnock left Oxford in 1966 claiming that she was overburdened with thesis students wanting to study Sartre and, with Murdoch gone, there were few other academics willing to share the load.[[114]](#endnote-113) This suggests that the numerous male philosophers at the institution were less interested than some of the women philosophers had been in existentialism.

 Modernisation at Oxford went beyond the expansion of numbers of women academics there, and Austin may also have suggested that Warnock write about Sartre because he wanted to make Oxford philosophers appear more relevant. Warnock certainly stressed Sartre’s social relevance in the chapter on him that Austin had suggested she write in 1959. In the 1950s and 1960s, concern about the isolation and social irrelevance of Oxford degrees existed at all levels of the university. At the institutional level, the 1959 Chilver Committee decided that compulsory Latin for science graduates was outdated in a modern education system, and as a consequence it was removed as an entrance requirement for scientists at Oxford in 1960.[[115]](#endnote-114) The 1964 internal Franks Inquiry investigated whether the university’s administration, teaching and research methods were suitable for the modern age, and a range of Oxford academics agreed it was not, with the philosopher Stephen Toulmin and historian Arthur Rigg calling for a rapprochement between the sciences and arts within students’ degrees.[[116]](#endnote-115) At the departmental level, in 1960, historian Lawrence Stone criticised Oxford’s insularity and detachment from society.[[117]](#endnote-116) Stone’s longitudinal histories on the spread of literacy and divorce reform in Britain resisted such social retreat since they provided context on two of the key changes of the twentieth century – the rise of mass education and the relaxation of divorce laws.[[118]](#endnote-117)

 Warnock and Murdoch participated in this debate about the relevance of Oxford mores and scholarship and identified existentialism as a way to make philosophy socially significant. In her 1957 review of Hazel Barnes’ translation of *Being and Nothingness* Murdoch reflected that Sartre was more relevant than logical positivists because he educated individuals about themselves – from the value of freedom to the nature of the emotions that consume them.[[119]](#endnote-118) Murdoch concluded therefore that while Sartre was unpopular among analytical philosophers who wrote “brief and meticulous articles”, his “large, unrigorous emotional volumes […] have the last word.”[[120]](#endnote-119) Similarly, in 1960, Warnock depicted Sartre as the modern saviour of philosophy which, in the hands of linguistic analysts and their focus on problems such as “choosing fictitious games equipment” was leading to “the increasing triviality of the subject”.[[121]](#endnote-120) By contrast, Warnock pointed out that Sartre’s emphasis “that each one of us has absolute freedom, and … that he is only what he chooses to be and nothing else […] succeed in defining an outlook which is intelligible and from which (more or less), as I hope I shall show, moral philosophy can be fruitfully pursued.”[[122]](#endnote-121)

 The structure of the philosophy degrees at Oxford and anxieties that the university was out of step with the needs of modern society created the flexibility for academics to teach and research a new philosophy such as existentialism there. However, academics could have used this flexibility to engage with a range of philosophers. Warnock and Murdoch chose to study Sartre seriously because his work resonated with influences that they, like Dorothy Emmet, were exposed to when they were students at Oxford and that were ongoing at Oxford at their point of engagement. One of these influences was Hegel, both through his own work and via British idealism. Both Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* (1821), and idealists such as F. H. Bradley who had been influenced by it, were discredited by influential philosophers such as C. D. Broad, Isaiah Berlin, and A. J. Ayer in Britain in the 1930s and 1940s because their celebration of the state was seen to have influenced fascists.[[123]](#endnote-122) However, Hegel continued to influence British philosophers at Oxford immediately before and after World War II. As in Kojève’s seminars in Paris in the 1930s, several features of Hegel’s thought which featured in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) remained attractive to British philosophers, from his commitment to show what an ethical society looked like, to his analysis of human consciousness, to specific ideas about the individual becoming free through participation in a community.

 Gilbert Ryle, who is better known for criticising Hegel in published work, actually sustained Hegel’s credibility as a philosopher at Oxford in the inter and post-war period.[[124]](#endnote-123) Ryle arranged for the founder of the International Hegel Society, Professor Richard Kroner, to be at Oxford for a year in 1939 and to give a lecture and seminar once a week.[[125]](#endnote-124) In the early 1950s, Oxford philosophy tutor W. H. Walsh published several articles on Hegel, one of which called for greater attention to be paid to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.[[126]](#endnote-125) Murdoch participated in this continuing interest in Hegel, lecturing about him alongside existentialism from 1951-55.[[127]](#endnote-126) In 1957, Murdoch was also familiar enough with the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to identify the areas of overlap between Hegel’s ideas in this work and Sartre’s ideas in *Being and Nothingness*, particularly Sartre’s use of the “Hegelian terminology” of consciousness, self-consciousness, alienation, and being.[[128]](#endnote-127) Warnock also noted the influence of Hegel’s ideas on Sartre, arguing that “the conscious being is referred to by Sartre, borrowing from Hegel, as the being-for-itself.”[[129]](#endnote-128) Warnock felt that the interest of Hegel, British idealists, and Sartre in the role of free choice in human self-creation would inform new philosophies that “include both description of the complexities of actual choices and actual decisions, and also discussion of what would count as reasons for this or that decision.”[[130]](#endnote-129) Interest in Hegel was sustained at Oxford to the end of the 1960s. In 1964, students taking the B. Phil, established by Ryle in 1948, were offered the option to study a module on *The Political Theories of Hegel and Marx.*[[131]](#endnote-130)In 1969, the compulsory PPEpaper for third years, General Philosophy, used the unmistakably Hegelian term, “alienation” in one of the questions that it asked students: “What is it to be alienated?”.[[132]](#endnote-131)

 Murdoch’s interest in Sartre stemmed from interest in religion as well as Hegel. Murdoch’s philosophy tutor, Donald MacKinnon, encouraged her to consider theology as a source of moral guidance in the 1930s, in particular its stress on how emotion can lead to moral insight.[[133]](#endnote-132) MacKinnon became the Norris-Hulse Chair of Divinity at Cambridge in 1960.[[134]](#endnote-133) Throughout his career, MacKinnon was interested in how emotional responses to Jesus’s suffering could spread human selflessness.[[135]](#endnote-134) Murdoch’s schooling had been secular, and she was shamefaced about the interest in religion that MacKinnon had instigated at first, writing to her friend Frank Thompson in 1942 “don’t worry, Jesus won’t get me”. [[136]](#endnote-135) Yet, by 1945, her attraction to Sartre and Camus was fuelled by her belief that “the church is with them still”.[[137]](#endnote-136) Murdoch even stayed in an Anglican Benedictine Abbey upon MacKinnon’s recommendation in 1946.[[138]](#endnote-137) Over the 1960s, Murdoch wanted to protect religious virtues as she was convinced that Christianity’s influence was waning in the face of public incomprehension of spiritual concepts and religious ritual.[[139]](#endnote-138)

 After Murdoch had evaluated the implications of religious decline she declared her conclusions in a 1970 work, *The Sovereignty of Good,* which included three essays written in the 1960s. Murdoch argued, in sympathy with Mackinnon, that Christianity offered an important centre of focus beyond the self, she also identified its role in providing a sense of the unity of life and potential for moral progress, and of the existence of an indestructible good.[[140]](#endnote-139) Murdoch used these functions of Christianity as a criterion against which she measured the usefulness of current philosophies. By using this criterion in The Sovereignty of Good, Murdoch argued that Sartre’s ideas were important because they held up freedom as a good and this was a source of moral progress.[[141]](#endnote-140) Yet, without the assistance of insight from linguistic philosophy, which drew attention to how words’ meanings change when they are connected to others, Murdoch argued that Sartre’s philosophy failed to carry over enough of religion’s functions into contemporary society, neglecting, in particular, the need to focus beyond the self.[[142]](#endnote-141) The emphasis on “self-assertion” that Murdoch said was representative of “the younger Sartre” and “much existentialist thought”, for instance, needed to be combined with “calm” and “loving” in order to promote selflessness rather than selfishness.[[143]](#endnote-142)

 When Murdoch called for existentialism to be combined with other thought systems in order to sustain religiosity in the late 1960s she was no longer at Oxford. Murdoch had been forced to leave St. Anne’s in 1963 because of a mutually obsessive relationship with another female tutor which threatened the college with scandal.[[144]](#endnote-143) Despite Murdoch’s abrupt departure from Oxford, the university had provided her with fifteen years in which, through publishing and teaching, she became an expert on existentialism.

 The impact of the expertise on existentialism that Murdoch developed while at Oxford went beyond this institution and contributed to the relaxation of social mores in post-war British society. For instance, even early on, in a 1950 review of de Beauvoir’s *She Came to Stay* on the BBC *Third Programme*, Murdoch celebrated de Beauvoir’s open discussion about human sexual relations and critique of controlling relationships. In Murdoch’s discussion of *She Came to Stay*, she explained that de Beauvoir, like Sartre, showed that the human predicament was to create value and to respect “other free beings”.[[145]](#endnote-144) The BBC solicited Murdoch’s comments on existentialism in the 1950s, and in her broadcasts, Murdoch supported the BBC’s agenda, established since at least 1945, to find new moral philosophies that might replace cultures of church-going, discipline in education, and sexual restraint.[[146]](#endnote-145) Murdoch also taught at the Royal College of Art from 1963–1967, where she set Sartre and Kierkegaard’s work to students who were at the centre of the counter-culture and who, like the characters in de Beauvoir’s *She Came to Stay*, challenged the sexual restraint of their parents’ generation.[[147]](#endnote-146) Murdoch hoped existentialism would help her students to ground their experimentation and creativity in robust moral reflection, and to understand how changes in lifestyle might be religious because they lead to a unified moral good, presumably, of greater freedom for all.[[148]](#endnote-147)

 While Warnock was not in the midst of the counterculture in the 1960s like Murdoch, she provided moral guidance on new features of society after World War Two. Warnock was a member of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA)in the 1970s. [[149]](#endnote-148) The IBA regulated commercial radio and television, the latter of which was first established in Britain in 1955.[[150]](#endnote-149) Warnock also provided guidance on test-tube babies when she was chair of the 1982 Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology. In the resulting publication The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (1984) , Warnock did not cite Sartre but Hume, W. H. Hart, and, in passing, the Old Testament.[[151]](#endnote-150) To Warnock, these philosophers, as well as Old Testament parable, suggested that so long as harm is not caused to others, individuals require the freedom to make their own choices in a moral society. To Warnock, therefore, the freedom to choose surrogacy, artificial insemination, as well as research using human embryos up to the age of 14 days, was desirable.[[152]](#endnote-151)

 Although Warnock did not refer to Sartre in the 1984  *Report,* in her prior work on Sartre, as I have shown, she rehearsed the arguments about the centrality of choice to the human condition that she would make in relation to Hart. Yet, Sartre did not just reinforce Warnock’s philosophical commitment to choice. Warnock also approved of Sartre’s model of social engagement in the 1960s and saw that few other contemporary philosophers in Britain promoted the moral engagement of the philosopher. “Sartre is most deeply committed”, Warnock argued in 1960, “If there is any typically moral question [advanced by Sartre] it is of the form ‘What, here and now, would be the least phoney thing for me to choose?’.”[[153]](#endnote-152) By comparison, Warnock argued that English philosophy was characterised by “the refusal of moral philosophers in England to commit themselves to any moral opinions”.[[154]](#endnote-153) Among those philosophers who Warnock had studied, Sartre therefore took a particularly important place in validating her decision to become a morally engaged public intellectual.

 Far from being freak occurrences, Warnock and Murdoch’s engagement with Sartre at Oxford, and their interest in his view of the centrality of human choice to consciousness, grew out of pre-existing features of the philosophy department and university in the inter- and post-war period. Warnock, Murdoch, and indeed Emmet, were interested in the similarities between Sartre’s work and that of the idealists and Hegel and this was partly a consequence of the fact that Emmet was taught by an idealist at Oxford in the 1920s, and that aspects of Hegel’s thought were endorsed at Oxford prior to and after the war. Murdoch’s interest in Sartre was driven, throughout her life, by the ways in which his ideas might boost religious ways of thinking in society, and such an interest in religion had been cultivated by her philosophy tutor in the 1930s. On top of this, the flexibility of the philosophy curriculum at Oxford meant Warnock and Murdoch could teach what they were interested in, and university-wide anxiety that Oxford was antiquated made modernisation of syllabi likely in the post-war period.

 Interest in religion and older moral philosophies coloured British philosophers’ engagement with Sartre, and these interests were also present in philosophy departments in America. These factors in Sartre’s reception that were shared by Britain and America, alongside others that were unique to the USA, are the subject of the next section of this paper.

# UCLA and Harvard

The final part of this article considers four American philosophers who worked at either UCLA or Harvard at different points in the post-war period, and taught courses on existentialism there. These philosophers include Hans Meyerhoff, a German émigré who graduated from UCLA with a PhD in philosophy in 1942, and who introduced the first philosophy course on existentialism at UCLA in 1955.[[155]](#endnote-154) Also featured is William Barrett, a permanent philosopher at New York University who taught Meyerhoff’s course on existentialism as a visiting professor at UCLA in 1958.[[156]](#endnote-155) Stanley Cavell trained in philosophy at UCLA in the 1940s and went on to Harvard to teach a philosophy course that was devoted to existentialism in 1968, the first of which type had been introduced there by John Wild in 1955.[[157]](#endnote-156) Both Cavell and to a lesser extent Wild are subjects of analysis. These four philosophers sought to wield their power as intellectuals to bring about social change through challenging bureaucracy and triggering creativity, and used existentialism to do so. Their engagement with Sartre was situated in the context of institution-wide changes at post-war UCLA and Harvard that, in different ways, endorsed moral enquiry. These philosophers’ responses were also influenced by the critique of specialisation that was dominant at Harvard, as well as in a literary magazine that they engaged with, *Partisan Review*. Finally, the philosophers’ interest in Sartre is explained by the impact of two moral systems, pragmatism and Judeo-Christianity, that were promoted in the philosophy departments at Harvard, UCLA and *Partisan Review.* The action-based features of pragmatism and non-supernatural aspects of Judeo-Christianity were most influential. The American philosophers considered here, while indebted to Hazel Barnes’s translation of Sartre’s work, and Marjorie Grene’s early contextual works, were all male, whereas those considered from Britain were all female. The prominence of male philosophers is a result, in part, of the institutions considered in this article – Barnes would have featured more had Colorado been a focus point. However, it is also partly down to the currency of pragmatism in popular culture and the academy in America in the late 1940s and early 1950s, as well as the endorsement of moral philosophy in *Partisan Review*, both of which made moral enquiry a respected avenue for enquiry in America regardless of gender.

 So what was Harvard’s academic identity after 1945 and how might this have affected attitudes to existentialism there? Much has been written regarding the growth of science and scientific method at Harvard in the immediate post-war period. Certainly, the Harvard philosopher who was most interested in scientific method, Willard Quine, received special treatment and, in order to stop him from leaving Harvard in the 1950s, the university offered to give his exchanges with colleagues an equal workload weight as teaching a course.[[158]](#endnote-157) However, institutional changes at Harvard after the war also increased the university’s openness to methods that were perceived to be non-scientific, thus creating a sympathetic environment for Sartre and Camus. As the moral philosophy of Sartre and Camus became popular after 1945, academics at Harvard were creating a new compulsory course for students, a third of which was devoted to introducing the entire student body to moral knowledge. The new course was called General Education and was recommended by the 1945 report *General Education in a Free Society* (or Red Book). The report was commissioned in 1943 by Harvard President, James Conant, who aimed to prevent students from becoming too specialised in their studies, to teach students about the origins of Western Civilization, and to entrench America’s identity as a “free society”.[[159]](#endnote-158)

 The General Education course at Harvard became compulsory for all incoming students after 1949 and students had to take three modules with each one exploring a different type of knowledge.[[160]](#endnote-159) One module had to be a humanities module (theology, moral philosophy, or literature), the second had to focus on social science (including history and sociology), and the third focused on science (biology or physics). Harvard philosophers who were interested in existentialism, including John Wild and Stanley Cavell, taught about it on humanities modules on the General Education course as well as their philosophy courses, thus broadening the audience that this philosophy reached at Harvard beyond those students who only passed through the philosophy department.[[161]](#endnote-160)

 At UCLA, as at Harvard, both scientific method and moral inquiry occupied revered positions after the war. With regards to science, UCLA computer scientists received federal funding to help to develop an early version of the internet, ARPANET, and UCLA computer scientists sent the first official message over the internet (the message was “lo”) in 1969.[[162]](#endnote-161) 1955 saw the opening of UCLA’s medical school, a 16 million dollar venture from where, in 1981, Howard Gottlieb made the first official identification of AIDS in America – something that at that time he labelled “newly acquired immunodeficiency”.[[163]](#endnote-162) However, the arts, humanities, and philosophy departments also expanded at the university, helping to accommodate an increase in university wide student numbers from 17,000 in 1959-60 to 27,500 by 1975.[[164]](#endnote-163) Chancellor Franklin David Murphy (chancellor from 1960-1968) enhanced the arts, and supported the foundation of the Department of Dance at UCLA in 1962 which was the first dance department in the country.[[165]](#endnote-164) The philosophy department also experienced growth. In response to increased student numbers, the philosophy department expanded from having 11 staff members in 1946-47, to 22 in 1966-1967.[[166]](#endnote-165) In terms of numbers of philosophy students, there were 59 philosophy majors at UCLA in 1958, and 1176 students taking philosophy modules as part of a different major.[[167]](#endnote-166) From 1968-1969, 442 students were enrolled on the course on existentialism that Meyerhoff had founded at UCLA in 1955 (*Chicago Defender*, July 17, 1971).

 In the 1960s, successive chancellors of UCLA positioned the university to be at the forefront of civil rights reform, and hoped that its members would act as the moral conscience of the nation.[[168]](#endnote-167) Philosophers who were interested in Sartre and Camus were often politically engaged and drew on existential ideas to articulate what they saw as the morally troubling decline of freedom and creativity in society – the liberal chancellors of the 1960s made UCLA a particularly welcoming university for them. For instance, in 1962 Chancellor Murphy (chancellor from 1960 – 1968) allowed for the creation of a free speech park, named “Hyde Park”, which became the location of public addresses by the first moral philosopher to teach existentialism at UCLA, Hans Meyerhoff.[[169]](#endnote-168) In 1965, following Meyerhoff’s premature death in a car accident, students remembered how, in his activist addresses, he urged them to follow Camus’s example and live an authentic life of freedom and creativity in an increasingly bureaucratic society.[[170]](#endnote-169) The free speech park is now named Meyerhoff Park.[[171]](#endnote-170)

 Chancellor Murphy’s successor, Charles Edward Young (chancellor from 1968 to 1997) reinforced the profile of UCLA, and the philosophy department in particular, as a centre of free speech, particularly through his dealings with the philosophy tutor Angela Davis. By 1970, Angela Davis was teaching the course on existentialism that Meyerhoff had set up (*Chicago Defender*, July 17, 1971). Davis’s interest in existentialism had informed her development as a black power activist.[[172]](#endnote-171) Chancellor Young extended Davis’s contract even though the Regents of the University of California (a faction of whom were led by the then Governor of California, Ronald Reagan) disapproved of Davis’s associations with the Black Panthers and Communist Party and wanted her fired (*Chicago Defender*, July 17, 1971).[[173]](#endnote-172) Thus Murphy and Young endorsed the activism of those moral philosophers whose vision of moral improvement was informed by the subjects that they taught – in this case, existentialism.

 The chancellors of UCLA in the 1960s, and the president of Harvard in 1945 created climates at these universities where moral inquiry could flourish, either because they facilitated political activism that was informed by existentialism at UCLA, or because they introduced General Education at Harvard. Yet the fact that moral philosophers at UCLA and Harvard had opportunities for wider engagement was not the main reason why moral philosophy grew alongside scientific method in these philosophy departments after the war, nor why existentialism was taught there. Philosophers had to have a moral position or philosophy that they wanted to share before the act of sharing it. *Partisan Review* influenced Barrett and Cavell’s development as moral philosophers before their respective time at the UCLA and Harvard philosophy departments, and also influenced Meyerhoff. It is therefore worth reflecting on how this magazine influenced these philosophers’ responses to French existentialism that they would go on to express in the universities they were affiliated with.

 *Partisan Review* was a literary magazine that emerged out of the mostly Jewish circle of New York intellectuals and was founded by William Phillips and Philip Rahv in 1934 with the aim of spreading Marxism and Modernism amongst intellectuals in America.[[174]](#endnote-173) The magazine kept a close eye on literary and political developments in Europe, America, and Russia and was particularly critical of specialisation, and working class alienation in the capitalist workforce (*Partisan Review*, Fall, 1938). By the 1940s, the magazine distanced itself from Stalinism and maintained its interest in European and American culture.[[175]](#endnote-174) *Partisan Review* has been characterised as moving away from left-wing politics after World War Two.[[176]](#endnote-175) However, it was still a voice of radical dissent in the 1940s and 1950s and did not neglect the interests of the working classes but broadened its political focus to social problems that involved the middle and working classes alike. In particular, the magazine intensified and deepened the pre-war criticism of specialisation in society after the war. The attack on specialisation was legitimised by *Partisan Review* contributors’ diagnosis that the crimes of Nazi Germany stemmed, in part, from specialised ways of acting and thinking that were shared by a range of social classes in America. Barrett was co-editor of *Partisan Review* from 1945 to 1955, Meyerhoff was a frequent contributor, and Cavell was an avid reader.[[177]](#endnote-176) As a consequence of their associations with the magazine, Barrett, Meyerhoff, and Cavell were particularly inclined to respond to Sartre in relation to this debate about specialisation.

 French existentialism actually benefitted from a multi-frontal attack on specialisation in post-war America, given that General Education was designed at Harvard to stave off subject specialisation and French existentialism was taught on this course as part of this endeavour. *Partisan Review* journalists’contribution to a climate in which Sartre’s thought was seen as a defence against specialisation, was to define the problems of specialisation in precise ways. Specialisation was criticised in the same way by a range of *Partisan Review* critics. Specialised economic and social systems were seen to encourage the middle and working classes to perform narrow, technical, and thus specialised, tasks in society that distanced them from creativity and the moral direction of their societies. This critique was sustained in the magazine in work such as Hannah Arendt’s 1944 review of Kafka’s *The Trial*. Here, Arendt argued that Kafka’s nightmare society of illogical laws and citizens encouraged to unthinkingly accept them was present in Nazi Germany but was also “adequate to the true nature of the thing called bureaucracy” which was present in many modern societies (*Partisan Review*, Fall, 1944). David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney’s *The Lonely Crowd* also contributed to the critique of specialisation with one reviewer in the magazine agreeing with these authors that Americans were abdicating individual moral responsibility by becoming too reliant on “the approval of other people”. However, the reviewer of the Lonely Crowd felt that its authors’ treatment of the solution, “autonomy”, was not thorough enough (*Partisan Review*, Jan-Feb, 1951).

 Meyerhoff himself also offered an extended criticism of specialisation in a 1948 article about a Romanian doctor at Auschwitz. This female doctor’s medical skills spared her from being murdered by Nazis when the young and old, considered to be of no practical use, were not. She also used her medical training to illicitly perform 3000 abortions on pregnant women at Auschwitz who would otherwise have been murdered. Meyerhoff drew out the abstract principles that underpinned this example of Nazi terror, and all were identifiable in modern America: manmade laws of natural inequality, the valuation of humans in terms of their yield, and disempowering humans from being able to choose how to use their skills (*Partisan Review*, September, 1948). Existentialism, on the other hand, had analysis of human creativity and autonomy at its core. Sartre and other existentialists promoted the very values that *Partisan Review* journalists deemed to be missing in specialised societies. It is therefore unsurprising that, as affiliates of the magazine, Meyerhoff, but also Barrett and Cavell, felt that existentialism posed a particularly effective challenge to specialisation – both in society, and in academic philosophy.

 Barrett’s early reflections on Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness* in *Partisan Review* were certainly inflected by the types of concerns about specialisation that were common in the magazine, particularly anxiety about the implications of unthinking performance of job role. For instance, Barrett endorsed Sartre’s criticism of the waiter who comes to identify his whole self with his job role. Barrett agreed with Sartre that this waiter conceals from himself his power to choose an alternative identity to that held at work, and thus “gives himself up to the mechanism of his function”, sacrificing creativity (*Partisan Review,* Spring, 1946). Barrett carried criticisms of specialisation in society forward in his 1958 book on existentialism. Here, Barrett showed that if existential principles were adopted by Americans it would challenge specialisation. Barrett argued that the “dangers of the atomic age” stemmed from lack of human concern about the moral direction of society. Barrett explained that “we do not ask ourselves what the ultimate ideas behind our civilization are […] we do not search for the human face behind the bewildering array of instruments that man has forged […] we do not dare to be philosophical”.[[178]](#endnote-177) Existentialism, in Barrett’s view, prompted humans to be more introspective and to take responsibility for the type of society that their actions created. In Meyerhoff’s work in the 1950s, he showed that most of the features of specialisation that he identified in Nazi Germany in his 1948 article on Auschwitz were present in modern America and that if Americans used “free choice” and action as Sartre suggested, it would divert American society from the disastrous course it was on (*Partisan Review*, September-October, 1950).[[179]](#endnote-178)

 In Barrett and Meyerhoff’s written reflections on academic philosophy in the late 1950s, they applied a critique of specialisation in society and the workforce that had been bolstered by their work for *Partisan Review*. They argued that the growth of logical positivism was itself an expression of specialisation, since its philosophical practitioners became technicians who set to work on language problems that were removed from moral concerns. Positivists retired from important intellectual work about man’s place in the universe and the moral direction of society, thus, as Meyerhoff put it, losing “the whole world”.[[180]](#endnote-179) Barrett, had a similar concern about the analytic philosopher who “seeks to perfect the weapons of his knowledge through specialization”, has an “extraordinary preoccupation with technique” and is thus “a curious creature who dwells in the tiny island of light composed of what he finds scientifically “meaningful,” while the whole surrounding area in which ordinary men live from day to day […] is consigned to the outer darkness”.[[181]](#endnote-180) Barrett and Meyerhoff were attracted to existentialism because it brought moral reflection back into the “mansions of philosophy”.[[182]](#endnote-181)

 *Partisan Review* articles that, according to its journalists’ own criteria, fought specialisation through broad reflections on man’s relationship with the world also informed Stanley Cavell’s turn away from specialisation in the academy. Cavell remembers that *Partisan Review* played a key role in his intellectual re-orientation from music to psychology, the latter of which he studied at UCLA in 1948.[[183]](#endnote-182) However, Cavell found that specialised scientific method, or what he referred to as “running rats through mazes”, was prioritised by the psychology department at UCLA, so he transferred to philosophy which he felt better matched the interest in non-scientific, and generalised, modes of thinking about the human condition that *Partisan Review* had first aroused in him.[[184]](#endnote-183) Once Cavell settled into the academic discipline of philosophy, he explored a range of different moral philosophies including existentialism.

 *Partisan Review* therefore bolstered philosophers’ interests in particular aspects of moral philosophy – it supported Barrett’s serious interest in existentialism, and its journalists’ articles that dealt with general moral themes initiated Cavell’s interest in moral philosophy. The magazine also provided an outlet for philosophers including Meyerhoff and Barrett to write about moral philosophy. One ideological line in *Partisan Review* after the war was a critique of specialisation and this drew out Barrett and Meyerhoff’s own thoughts on this area when they published in the magazine, and inclined them to consider Sartre’s work in relation to specialisation later on. Links between Nazism and specialisation were strong in the magazine in the 1940s and this was likely to have heightened Meyerhoff and Barrett’s criticism of specialisation in the philosophy department and wider society. As is evident in Barrett, Meyerhoff, and Cavell’s career trajectories, philosophy departments allowed American philosophers to extend their interest in moral philosophy in their academic work, and thus beyond their engagement with this magazine. In particular, the ongoing traction of pragmatic styles of philosophy at UCLA and Harvard facilitated philosophers’ ability and inclination to teach existentialism at these institutions, and to continue to focus on themes – such as human creativity and action – that were popular in post-war debates about specialisation in *Partisan Review*.

 Pragmatism was an American-grown moral philosophy often associated with William James (1842-1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952). The key principle shared by these pragmatists was that human understanding of the world comes through experience and that individual consciousness responds to this experience with choice-based action, thus re-creating the world. These ideas were drawn from a range of disciplines – science (Charles Darwin), law (Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.), psychology (Wilhelm Wundt), and philosophy (Hegel).[[185]](#endnote-184)William James picked up many of these influences from time studying psychology in Germany, and the Metaphysical Club – a discussion club formed in Boston in 1872.[[186]](#endnote-185) Dewey picked such influences up from his philosophical training at the University of Vermont and Johns Hopkins in the 1870s and 1880s, as well as through reading William James’s 1890 work *The Principles of Psychology*.[[187]](#endnote-186) James and Dewey were particularly interested in Hegel’s view of the role of human action in creating change in historically determined contexts.[[188]](#endnote-187) However, James felt that Hegel ultimately undermined the significance of human agency by his idea of the absolute, which in James’s view transcended human efforts.[[189]](#endnote-188)

 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Dewey and James then, like Sartre in the 1940s, focused on the centrality of direct experience and human choice to human understanding and reality. In his 1890 *The Principles of Psychology*, James clarified how humans create meaning and reality through choice when he argued that “every actually existing consciousness seems to itself at any rate to be a fighter for ends, of which many, but for its presence, would not be ends at all.”[[190]](#endnote-189) In 1917, in *Need for a Recovery of Philosophy*, Dewey noted that humans create new meaning through new experiences and that the capabilities of consciousness facilitated this because “the function of the mind is to […] free experience from routine and caprice.”[[191]](#endnote-190) Existentialists, like the pragmatists, emphasized the role of creativity and choice in human reality, meaning, and morality. The similarity of the existentialists’ and pragmatists’ view of humanity stems, in part, from their shared interest in Hegel and the role of the individual in re-creating their environment. Similarities between French existentialism and pragmatism may also have emerged from the fact that Sartre had been indirectly influenced by pragmatism. Sartre’s desire to describe human consciousness as accurately as he could emanated from phenomenology, the founding father of which, Edmund Husserl, had himself been inspired by William James’s earlier use of the descriptive method. [[192]](#endnote-191)

 Pragmatism remained popular in American philosophy departments after the war, as well as at *Partisan Review*. Harvard was a university often considered to be the natural home of pragmatism given that William James was employed there as a professor in philosophy and psychology at the end of the nineteenth century.[[193]](#endnote-192) Undergraduate courses on pragmatism were also taught at Harvard throughout the 1950s.[[194]](#endnote-193) With regards to UCLA, a sign of the philosophy department’s sympathy towards pragmatism is that the chairman of the UCLA philosophy department in the 1950s, Abraham Kaplan, taught a course on William James, John Dewey, and Herbert Mead in this decade.[[195]](#endnote-194) Cavell studied a course on pragmatism at UCLA with philosopher Donald Piatt in 1948, and from this he recalls that he became inspired by a Deweyian way of thinking about “human problems” in terms of “habit”, “experiment”, “will”, and “context.”[[196]](#endnote-195) Hans Meyerhoff taught Dewey on his course on social philosophy, a course that Cavell also took while he was at UCLA in the 1940s.[[197]](#endnote-196) The currency of pragmatism was reinforced by cultural forces outside of the university as the *Partisan Review* circle not only held up principles that were compatible with pragmatism as antidotes to specialisation, these being creativity and action, but actively celebrated pragmatism. For instance, in 1952, James Burnham made his respect for pragmatism clear when, in an article for *Partisan Review*, he commented that Dewey was the “single blossom” in American intellectual life in the inter-war period (*Partisan Review*, May-June, 1952).

 Pragmatism was therefore a live subject of interest for American philosophers at the same time as they encountered existentialism, consequently they often compared the two philosophies. John Wild even taught a course at Harvard that explicitly compared pragmatism and existentialism in 1959.[[198]](#endnote-197) After such comparison between pragmatism and existentialism, existentialism was usually deemed most useful for society as it was seen as a more effective guide to people about how to use choice and action to achieve social change in the midst of over-conformity. Barrett expressed his preference for existentialism over pragmatism in his 1958 work *Irrational Man*. To Barrett, pragmatism was most associated with Dewey and James, and their interest in the influence of context on man’s experience and action Barrett felt to be significant. Yet years at *Partisan Review* had raised Barrett’s concern with specialisation and he believed that existentialists posed a superior challenge to this than pragmatists. To Barrett, Dewey would not combat specialisation because, unlike the existentialists, he failed to inspect some of the deeper roots of human action that humans needed to confront before challenging constraints to creativity. Such roots of action included the feeling of anxiety that precedes choice.[[199]](#endnote-198) Barrett noted that in the fact of choice “lies the fundamental uneasiness, or anxiety, of the human condition, for Sartre” because “man is doomed to the radical insecurity […] of his being”.[[200]](#endnote-199) By comparison, Barrett argued that “Dewey places the human person securely within his biological and social context, but he never goes past this context into that deepest center of the human person where fear and trembling start.”[[201]](#endnote-200)

 In 1959, a year after Barrett’s *Irrational Man* was published, Hans Meyerhoff showed that, like Barrett, his bugbear was still specialization. Writing in *Chicago Review* Meyerhoff identified that Americans existed in “the lonely crowd” and that they were “alienated” from their very humanity, no longer understanding how to reclaim power over themselves and the direction of society.[[202]](#endnote-201) Meyerhoff commented that “no doubt action rather than theory is the appropriate antidote to this critical situation”.[[203]](#endnote-202) Sartre particularly appealed to Meyerhoff because, as he noted, “Sartre’s existentialism […] even more than pragmatism is an explicit theory of action”.[[204]](#endnote-203) To Meyerhoff, what gave Sartre’s theory of action the edge was his unshaking challenge to conformity. Sartre does not “plead for action in conformance with what has always been” but rather “pleads for action and commitments on behalf of possibilities of existence not yet realized […].”[[205]](#endnote-204)

 Meyerhoff was situated in an institution that respected Dewey and his involvement with *Partisan Review* in the 1940s and early 1950s, like Barrett’s, focused his attention on the need to challenge specialisation in society. As a consequence, Meyerhoff was particularly interested in pragmatists’ views on the centrality of action in human existence, since he believed that action would be a key component to the challenge to specialisation. Meyerhoff embraced Sartre’s model of creative action as it seemed to offer a natural extension of the notions of the pragmatists, but also a more direct, radical formulation of action that was fitting for a society in the grip of a worsening crisis of specialisation. By contrast, Dorothy Emmet, who had been influenced by the more restrained notions of human creativity of the idealists in England, expressed greater caution than Meyerhoff over Sartre’s vision of unbridled creativity, and therefore stressed the value of conformity, not just creativity, in the workplace.

 In a 1969 essay, ‘Kierkegaard’s *On Authority and Revelation’*, Stanley Cavell, like Barrett and Meyerhoff, advanced his interest in existentialism because of the central place that existentialism awarded to creative human action in a moral society. Cavell’s study of and interest in pragmatism confirmed his interest in moral philosophy when he was at UCLA in the 1940s, established his interest in the role of change and experience in human morality, and was one of the reasons why he believes that he was awarded a PhD place at Harvard University in the 1950s.[[206]](#endnote-205) Yet, Cavell’s interest in pragmatism was diluted by the time he wrote his 1969 essay and it was existentialism, not pragmatism, that took centre stage. Cavell was concerned that societies without creativity were bad societies. He emphasized the problems in modern societies in which art, film, and literature merely reflected social norms. Rather, artists and moral leaders needed to identify and provide a creative challenge to social problems. Cavell’s essay was primarily about Kierkegaard, who valued the creative and heroic individual who spoke for truth rather than for praise.[[207]](#endnote-206) However, Cavell nodded to “writers in our time, such as Georg Lukacs and Sartre” who, like Kierkegaard, criticised the individual who “instead of getting out of a tension by resolution and action becomes literally productive about the situation”.[[208]](#endnote-207) Cavell therefore sympathised with Sartre because he criticized the individual who reflects the problems and contradictions back to society rather than challenging them through creative action and thought.

 The American philosophers considered here understood existentialism through comparison with pragmatism, and valued the emphasis that both philosophies placed on the need for human creativity and action in a moral society. Yet all three philosophers, either explicitly, as with Barrett and Meyerhoff, or implicitly through Cavell’s choice to focus on existentialism rather than pragmatism in his later writing, favoured certain elements of existentialism. These American philosophers believed that Sartre’s theory of human action that inspected its deep psychological root and potential impact carried particular significance for contemporary society, and might more thoroughly address the moral peril of specialisation than the pragmatists.

 It was not just philosophers’ prior interest in pragmatism that affected their responses to French existentialism, but also their engagement with debates about religion. Interest in religious notions of morality was at a high amongst American intellectuals in the 1950s. High profile moral experts such as Paul Tillich who represented a radical branch of Protestantism, or sociologist-activist C. Wright Mills who existed outside of Christian churches, gave attention to ways that a new identity for religion might be forged.[[209]](#endnote-208) This climate of sustained interest in religion, and the spirt of religious renewal, extended to philosophy departments and *Partisan Review,* and as a result marked the four philosophers’ responses to existentialism. American philosophers were inclined to reject aspects of religions that were similar to the aspects of society that they believed were affected by specialisation. These aspects were usually seen as those that involved bending to authority, or principles such as supernaturalism that, like the laws in Kafka’s *The Trial*, were shrouded in mystery. By contrast, French existentialism’s unrelenting emphasis on human choice, creativity, and human responsibility to use these faculties focused American philosophers’ attention on these aspects of Judeo-Christianity, and to see them, in general, as the most valuable parts of religion for modern society. The American philosophers therefore ended up identifying French existentialism as an endorsement of select Judeo-Christian principles that they felt were compatible with and useful to modern societies in the throes of specialisation, as a part of a remodelled Christianity, or drawing on existentialism alongside religion in moral reflection.

 Respect for religion was embedded at the institutional level at Harvard via the General Education course and French existentialism got mixed up with religion here. While the decision to teach religion and existentialism together lay with those who designed the General Education modules, they were nevertheless expected to produce long survey modules that addressed the roots of Western Civilization and it was inevitable that religion would have a place on these. The point of the course, according to its commissioner, Conant, was also to create a body of knowledge that would entrench America’s identity as a “free society”. The ideal of freedom was at the forefront of Conant’s mind when he co-ordinated planning for the General Education course from 1943 and 1945, as this was a time when America defined itself against Nazi totalitarianism.[[210]](#endnote-209) French existentialism’s prominent place in the media as a modern thought system that endorsed freedom made it a particularly convenient source to deliver the agenda of promoting liberty in America. In the 1950s and 1960s, then, at least four different humanities modules that met the criteria of showing the roots of Western Civilization and entrenching freedom in modern society, mixed reference to existentialism and the bible, and Cavell and Wild taught on two of them.[[211]](#endnote-210)

 Wild explained why secular existentialism should have a place in discussions about religion in the course description for one humanities module he taught for General Education in 1953, “Contemporary Christian Thought and Philosophy”. Wild considered Christianity and secular existentialism together on this module. When Wild claimed the course would “familiarize the student with contemporary movements of religious thought, Christian and secular”, he expressed his view that religious insight did not just come from Christianity.[[212]](#endnote-211) Later, in 1963, Wild tightened the link not just between religion and secular existentialism, but between Sartre and Christianity, when he wrote that Heidegger and Sartre provided better templates for the Christian life than traditional forms of Christianity. Wild’s writing, like Cavell and Barrett’s, showed that he believed that the modern mind required different moral guidance than that provided by older forms of Christianity, and that existentialism made more sense as a source of religious guidance in the modern age, while also reconnecting with a true purpose of Christianity which was to reveal man’s condition to himself.[[213]](#endnote-212) Wild argued that religion should encourage humans to think about the primary conditions of being human and that older forms of Christianity that stressed the supernatural and the “humiliating” need to bend to authority did not do this as well as “the doctrines of Sartre” and “those of Heidegger” who stressed “chance, contingency, and death, and lasting conditions, like temporality, historicity, feeling, choice, freedom, and responsibility”.[[214]](#endnote-213)

 General Education modules provided the opportunity for philosophers to share religious insight with students outside (as well as inside) of the philosophy department at Harvard, and tightened connections between secular existentialism and religion that Wild would go on to develop after teaching on the course. At Harvard after the war the General Education course provided ample space to explore Christianity, but opportunities to spread religious insight across universities at this time were varied, as is illustrated by one of the sources of religious reflection at UCLA. The prominence of religion in civil rights protest meant that Meyerhoff had no qualms in bringing religious reflection to the general student population at UCLA through his own on-campus activism - an anti-Vietnam War speech he delivered at a sit-in at UCLA in 1965.[[215]](#endnote-214) Meyerhoff identified Vietnam as a product of specialisation as he argued that “political experts” who had started the war were simply political technicians, “interested in the technical problems of politics, not the human problems” and thus were incompetent “in the decisive matters of right and wrong”.[[216]](#endnote-215) Meyerhoff’s position that action and a challenge to conformity was the adequate response to specialisation was underpinned by Sartre’s existential theory, and Meyerhoff’s own challenge to the war was bolstered by such theory of action. But for Meyerhoff, Judeo-Christianity worked in conjunction with French existentialism as a moral guide, and in a context in which protest was often intimately linked with religion, he felt comfortable to draw on moral guidance from the Old Testament. Meyerhoff concluded the speech with a reference to Deuteronomy in the Old Testament, “I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore, choose life.” [[217]](#endnote-216)

 It is not surprising that philosophers should have had a prominent role in cultures of religious debate at Harvard and UCLA, since a place for religion was woven into the fabric of philosophy departments there, and it was therefore endorsed as a mode of philosophical enquiry. For instance, Meyerhoff explored religion when he taught a permanent undergraduate philosophy course on ethics and religion at UCLA in 1953-4.[[218]](#endnote-217) Likewise, when Cavell became a lecturer at Harvard in 1963, he taught on a permanent Philosophy of Religion course in the philosophy department.[[219]](#endnote-218) Cavell, like Wild, used broad definitions of religion that encompassed French existentialism and it seems that he was unsure of the implications of this for the future identity of Judeo-Christianity.

 Cavell suggested that religion was partly about a guiding belief in the fundamental nature of being human and thus what responsibility this bestows on humans on how to act. This was certainly one implication of one of Cavell’s examination questions for the Philosophy of Religion course in 1964 where Cavell actively encouraged students to reflect on the similarities between Camus’s belief in the “absurd” and Kierkegaard’s “faith” in the existence of God,

“… the absurd is the contrary of hope” (Camus, p. 26). How does Camus envision “hope” in this remark? (Cp., “The absurd, which is the metaphysical state of the conscious man, does not lead to God”, p. 30). Compare this with Wisdom’s suggestion that the man who believes does not necessarily expect anything the nonbeliever does not expect – “and yet the belief makes a difference”. What difference? And what difference would the acceptance of the absurd make, according to Camus? And, in these terms, what difference Kierkegaard’s faith? […][[220]](#endnote-219)

 By 1969, Cavell explicitly stated his view that religious experience and actors look different than the Judeo-Christian examples of the past but that they still perform religious work. To Cavell, individuals in some groups produced work that “both in production and reception, is to be understood in categories which are, or were, religious”.[[221]](#endnote-220) One religious category that Cavell used was that of the “apostle” and Cavell explained that modern philosophers such as Sartre and some modern artists could be understood as akin to the saints or “apostles” of the Judeo-Christian past as they challenged contradictions and immorality in society rather than conforming with them.[[222]](#endnote-221) Thus Cavell clearly saw that those, including Sartre, who did not conform to immoral societies but offered creative, change-based solutions were carrying on religious work. While Cavell suggested that Sartre was apostle-like, in his exam questions he left it up to students to decide whether a belief in Camus’s absurdity was religious, although he certainly left this as a possibility.

 William Barrett, like Cavell and Wild, incorporated discussion of French existentialism into debates about Judeo-Christianity. Barrett expressed his views on the religious uses of French existentialism in his 1958 work *Irrational Man*, and they were directly influenced by his editorial and journalistic work for *Partisan Review*. This section ends with a discussion of Barrett’s notions of religion in *Irrational Man* because, more than Cavell, Meyerhoff, and Wild’s reflections on religion, Barrett’s received significant exposure, even being read by high school students in the 1960s.[[223]](#endnote-222)

 A range of new interpretations of Christianity were discussed in *Partisan Review* throughout the 1950s including those offered by Paul Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Sidney Hook (*Partisan Review*, March, 1950; January-February, 1954; Winter, 1959). In 1950, Barrett himself participated in a debate about religion that occurred in a five-issue long symposium in the magazine. In his written contribution to this symposium, Barrett explained that he took a range of principles from his editorial work which had involved reviewing many of the articles for it. The two main principles that Barrett claimed that he took from his editorial review were that a “religious revival” was needed but that it would look different from traditional models of Judeo-Christianity in order to fit “the character of this historical period” (*Partisan Review*, May-June, 1950). Supernatural features of religion such as the “trinity”, and “incarnation”, as well as attitudes of “self-righteousness” did not, in Barrett’s view, fit contemporary times (*Partisan Review*, May-June, 1950). When Barrett came to discuss religion and French existentialism in *Irrational Man* in 1958, he used existentialism to do what he said he would do in his 1950 article in *Partisan Review,* which was to express a type of religion that was compatible with the needs and thinking of a society that had “severed the umbilical cord that bound it for millennia to the gods and a transcendent world beyond this earthly world”.[[224]](#endnote-223)

 In 1958, Barrett acknowledged that “from Sartre’s thoroughly secular point of view, the beliefs of religion are absurd”, but he still used existentialism, French and otherwise, as a standard of what religious ways of thinking were acceptable to modern man.[[225]](#endnote-224) Barrett focused attention on those aspects of the bible that aligned with the moral standards of existentialism.[[226]](#endnote-225) According to Barrett, the values that existentialists celebrated were the uniqueness of each individual, human agency and freedom, and human finitude.[[227]](#endnote-226) To Barrett, these principles were most prominent in the Old Testament, particularly in the Book of Job, and thus, while existential ideas were modern, Barrett concluded that they also represented a revival of Judaism, “the features of Hebraic man are those which existential philosophy has attempted to exhume and bring to the reflective consciousness of our time”.[[228]](#endnote-227) Barrett also used the bible to ascertain if it provided any moral direction that Sartre overlooked and that could help to address the problems created by specialisation. For Barrett as for Murdoch, the most important religious aspect that Sartre neglected (but that Barrett noted St Paul did not) was selflessness – or the need to balance the “resolute project of the conscious ego” with the “surrender to the redeeming image of something greater than himself.”[[229]](#endnote-228) Thus the example of Barrett, but also of Cavell and Wild, shows that French existentialism made some elements of Judeo-Christianity particularly popular, while reinforcing the notion that other aspects, particularly those connected to supernaturalism, were outdated. This did not mean that Judeo-Christianity was replaced by existentialism as a source of authority on morality and thought about human being. Barrett specifically noted an aspect of Judeo-Christian thought, selflessness, which must be protected alongside French existentialism, since he believed that Sartre overlooked it. All the philosophers considered here believed that the problems of modern society would be solved by a range of moral resources, and all four philosophers drew on the bible as well as existentialism to hammer out their vision of modern morality.

 Conditions at UCLA and Harvard, at both the level of institution and philosophy department, and the influence of *Partisan Review* led the American philosophers considered here to respond to existentialism in a range of similar ways. They associated French existentialism with pragmatism and religion, and they considered how all three could be used to challenge specialisation, which received particular criticism in the light of the Nazi terror and the Cold War. The emphasis that Sartre placed on choice, creativity, and the responsibility to use these faculties appealed to the philosophers and this focused their attention on similar aspects of pragmatism and religion, even while their prior exposure to pragmatism and religion had increased their readiness to engage with existentialism in the first place. These philosophers used the value-system advanced by French existentialists and existentialists more broadly to celebrate certain similar aspects of religion. However, the American philosophers that have featured in this account did not endorse French existentialism to the exclusion of other sources of religious ideas that were compatible with Judeo-Christianity. This was not least because some understood that Sartre left some important Judeo-Christian ideas out of his philosophy, whether this was the selflessness that Barrett identified, or explicit reflection on the behaviour of apostles as discussed by Cavell.

 The reception of French existentialism among American philosophers was integral to the protection of religious reflection between the 1950s and 1960s, and it contributed to this phenomenon in universities and beyond. The fact that philosophers incorporated existentialism into a critique of current American trends that were generally linked to specialisation also shows that the import of this philosophy in America played an important part in universities functioning as centres of dissent in America at this time. Philosophers’ responses to French existentialism were significant because they spread their views to large numbers of philosophy students, as well as beyond the philosophy department in their written work, activism, and on General Education modules that were all designed to attack specialisation.

# Conclusion

This study of the reception of French existentialism in universities in England and America illustrates more than just the mechanics of how a new philosophy was introduced into higher education curricula after 1945. It also shows that, while Sartre’s French-ness was an initial point of attraction to Anglophone philosophers in the immediate years after the Second World War, by the 1950s and 1960s Sartre’s significance went far beyond the fact that he was French. One of the findings of this article that has relevance for those interested in broad post-war intellectual trends is that in the 1950s and 1960s Judeo-Christianity was a respected source of moral insight among philosophers, and French existentialism was particularly valued because it replicated certain Judeo-Christian ideas. The sources of philosophers’ interest in religion were varied, a testament to the continuing and wide-ranging impact of the bible on intellectuals in post-war Britain and America at a time more often associated with Judeo-Christianity’s decline.[[230]](#endnote-229) In fact the perception of religious decline, something that Sam Brewitt-Taylor has shown was widespread among intellectuals in post-war Britain, actually strengthened some of these philosophers’ resolve to protect aspects of the religion.[[231]](#endnote-230)

 Philosophers came to religion from outside of devotional institutions with the aim of constructing a new morality for the modern age. As they did so, they held a vision of what was acceptable to the modern mind that was partly shaped by the existentialist principles that had been made popular by French existentialism. The aspects of Judeo-Christianity that they identified as compatible with existentialism and modern society, and in need of protection, were largely the same on both sides of the channel: those features that celebrated the individual’s self-knowledge, choice, and creativity. Whilst Sartre and Camus’s philosophy was endorsed because it continued to uphold these religious values, it did not replace Judeo-Christianity as a moral system as both were celebrated in tandem, and Murdoch, Emmet, and Barrett agreed that Judeo-Christianity was actually better than Sartre’s thought in promoting a fourth desirable feature of a moral society: selflessness. Therefore, philosophers actually used French existentialism to reinforce some religious traditions but also to modernise them, and the religious principles that philosophers often identified as useful in the future were those that they felt matched the criteria of existentialism.

 Interest in action-based philosophy was of equal importance as Judeo-Christianity in governing the value that British and American philosophers attached to French existentialism and this may also be of relevance to historians who are concerned with intellectual life in England and America after the Second World War. American philosophers’ views on action-based philosophy was more uniform than that of the British. The contrast with Britain demonstrates that American pragmatism, and to a lesser extent *Partisan Review*, resulted in American philosophers equating action with social change, and deeming such action necessary. Cavell, Barrett, and Meyerhoff were all familiar with John Dewey and William James’s views of the importance of change-oriented action to individual fulfilment, so Sartre’s view that creative action allowed the individual to use their consciousness to the full was almost unremarkable to them. However, action was the focus of all of Sartre’s writing and, in the context of continued concern with specialisation in *Partisan Review,* Sartre’s extended analysis of both the origins and implications of action meant that he was seen to surpass the pragmatists’ own treatment of the issue. To these American philosophers, Sartre and Camus’s reflections on the moral role of creative action, as well as Judeo-Christianity, might serve as an adequate bulwark against specialisation’s destruction of human dignity and freedom in the workplace, international relations, and human minds.

 In England, philosophers’ interest in thought-systems based on creative action could rival that in America, however this did not always lead to sympathy towards such ideas. Mary Warnock and Iris Murdoch were well-versed in Hegel and idealism, if not pragmatism, another of the movements that Hegel inspired. To Murdoch and Warnock, Sartre’s emphasis on freedom to create self and choice was a welcome re-formulation of Hegel’s argument that these were natural features of human consciousness. Both they and Dorothy Emmet applauded philosophy’s return to issues surrounding human creativity and choice as it was an alternative to linguistic philosophy. However, where pragmatism had prioritised active, creative individuals in moral societies, British idealists had not done this without qualification. Some idealists, such as A. D. Lindsay, emphasized that rule following was of equal moral significance as creativity. Dorothy Emmet was influenced by Lindsay, with the result that she expressed caution over Sartre’s model of unbridled creative action, deeming it impractical, and potentially immoral in societies that required a level of organization and predictability. With this said, Emmet still identified creativity as a fundamental human right, just not one that needed to be employed at all times and in all contexts.

 Those interested in what made the sixties unique often refer to curiosity about alternative religions among certain social groups such as hippies, pop stars, or students, as well as their emphasis on choice and human creativity.[[232]](#endnote-231) The legacy of the respect awarded to choice and creativity in the 1960s is felt today and in Britain the choice and freedom of a range of interest groups has recently been enshrined in the 2010 Equality Act.[[233]](#endnote-232) As of 2019, on its website the Human Rights Campaign has called for a similar Equality Act in America that would build on the1964 Civil Rights Act. This article adds academic philosophers to the mix of those social groups who endorsed such “sixties” values after the war, showing in concrete ways how some British and American philosophers came to identify with and promote them after 1945.

 Finally, the article shows linkages between the media, publishers and the university. Academic philosophers were connected to publishers, the BBC, and *Partisan Review*, and all provided positive feedback to intellectuals about the discussion and promotion of this new philosophy of choice and creativity. Trusted Francophile publishers first endorsed French existentialism and raised academic interest in the movement, playing a particularly important role in the first English translation of *Being and Nothingness* which is still widely used today and was produced by Hazel Barnes in 1956. The BBC provided space for Murdoch to broadcast on existentialism and moral freedom, and *Partisan Review* sustained a critique of specialisation that was similar to Sartre’s own views on this issue. The compatibility of the environments of the media with the university made philosophers’ engagement with Sartre more likely. For instance, General Education was introduced at Harvard to combat specialisation, there was flexibility around the curriculum taught at Oxford, as well as an inclination to modernise provision there, and some philosophers at all the universities under review in this article sustained interest in Hegel inspired philosophies and in religion in the inter-war and post-war period. All of these conditions at the universities undergirded an openness to new moral philosophy that was on a par with trends among publishers and the media. For their part, philosophers spread the values of choice and creativity that they honed through engagement with Sartre more widely. They did this through their teaching and published work, as well as social engagement - whether in the form of Meyerhoff’s activism, Murdoch’s broadcasts on the BBC, or Warnock’s involvement with moral regulation of broadcasting and embryo development. These clues about the inter-related sources of change in moral philosophers’ interests may lead to further inquiry about how the network of the media, publishers, and university facilitated shifts in moral knowledge in the 1950s and 1960s. This will bring historians closer to an understanding of the origins of notions of morality in the recent past and present.

**Author biography:** Rosie Germain is a Lecturer in the History of Education at Liverpool Hope University. Her funded PhD project in Modern History, which she completed at Cambridge University, focused on the impact of French existentialism in Britain and America from 1939 to 1970. The project provided new angles on a range of long-term historical processes shared by the USA and UK after 1945 – from the rise of feminism to secularisation. Rosie has previously published on the reception of Simone de Beauvoir’s *The Second Sex* in America.

# Notes

1. \* Email: rosieolga@hotmail.co.uk [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Baert, “The Sudden Rise of French Existentialism”, 619, 620; Baert, *The Existentialist Moment*, 104. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
3. For instance, in Britain Stefan Korner first set Sartre’s Existentialism and Humanism on his Introduction to Logic undergraduate course at Bristol in 1961 University of Bristol, *Faculty of Arts, Prospectus for the Session 1961-62*, 116; in America Charles Hendel introduced a new undergraduate course on Existentialism at Yale in 1954, *Yale University Bulletin, Undergraduate Courses of Study, Fall and Spring Terms, 1953-54*, 149; Ann Fulton’s work shows that philosophers responded with interest to Sartre’s work at universities across the country in the 1950s to 1960s, from Northwestern to Princeton in Fulton, *Apostles of Sartre*, 96-7. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
4. Cohen, *Freedom’s Orator,* 1-4*,* 216; Brick, *Age of Contradiction,* 113-119; Marwick, *The Sixties*; Hoefferle, *British Student Activism*, 4, 77, 122; Wadham et. al., *Blackstone’s Guide to the Equality Act 2010*. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
5. Woessner, “Angst Across the Channel”, 155-156, 159, 170. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
6. Fulton, *Apostles of Sartre*, 138. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
7. Fulton, *Apostles of Sartre*, 3, 55. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
8. Baring, “Humanist Pretensions”, 581-609, 583. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
9. Camus, *“*The Unbeliever and the Christians*”*, 69–74; Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, 27-8. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
10. Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, 56. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
11. Camus, *“*Preface to The Stranger”, 337. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
12. Barrett, *Irrational Man*, 81-105; Cavell, “Kierkegaard’s on Authority and Revelation”, 156, 162-164; Murdoch, “The Sovereignty of Good over other Concepts”, 365, 375, “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’”, 343, 347, 359, 360, 362. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
13. Miller, “R. D. Laing and Theology”, 1–21; McLeod, *The Religious Crisis of the 1960s*, 131; Maslow, *Religions, Values, and Peak Experiences*; Hedstrom, *The Rise of Liberal Religion*, Chapter Six. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
14. Murdoch, “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’”, 338, 343, 346; Emmet, *Roles, Rules, and Regulations*, 210-211; Barrett, *Irrational Man*, 232. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
15. Mackenzie Bok, “To the Mountaintop Again”, 158, 177, 182. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
16. Akehurst, *Cultural Politics*, 5; Isaac, *Working Knowledge*, 22; Rogers, *A Life: A. J. Ayer*, 124-5. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
17. Isaac, *Working Knowledge*, 125 - 157; Rogers, *A Life: A. J. Ayer*, 130-156. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
18. Thomas, “Space, Time, and Samuel Alexander”; Emmet, *Philosophers and Friends*, 62-65. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
19. Barnett, “Angela Davis and Women, Race, & Class”, 13 – 14. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
20. Emmet, *Philosophers and Friends*, 85, 102. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
21. Fulton, *Apostles of Sartre*, 122. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
22. Harvard University Archives, *Announcement of the Courses of Instruction offered by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences for the Academic Year, 1955-56*, 225. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
23. Dyhouse, “Education” 119. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
24. Ibid., 119 – 134. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
25. Rose, *Citizens by Degree,* 11, 15, 116 -7. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
26. Ayer, “Some Aspects of Existentialism”, quoted in Akehurst, “Ayer and the Existentialists”, 243 – 257, 251. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
27. Conradi, *Iris Murdoch: A Life*, 218. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
28. Barnes, *The Story I Tell Myself*, 197. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
29. Collini, *Absent Minds* 252; Nora and Taylor, “America and the French Intellectuals” 325, 325-337; Bradbury, “The Nonhomemade World”, 27-36. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
30. Lewis, *Cyril Connolly: A Life*, 378. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
31. Conradi, *Iris Murdoch: A Life*, 212-215. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
32. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
33. Lewis, *Cyril Connolly: A Life*, 222. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
34. Ibid., 378-9. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
35. Vechten, “Introducing Mr. Knopf or Alfred in a Nutshell”, 117. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
36. Sartre’s *Age of Reason* was reviewed across the US in 1947, as shown in the Harry Ransom Center, The University of Texas at Austin, Alfred A. Knopf Inc. Records, Box 1461.6; Barnes, *The Story I Tell Myself*, 143-144. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
37. Barnes, *The Story I Tell Myself,* 143-144. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
38. Ibid., 143-144, 279. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
39. Ibid., 143-144. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
40. Warnock, *Ethics Since 1900*. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
41. University of Manchester, *Faculty of Arts Prospectus 1967-1968*, 28. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
42. Warnock, *Existentialism*, 1970. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
43. Fulton, *Apostles of Sartre*, 79; Conradi, *Iris Murdoch: A Life*, 233. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
44. Grene, “L’Homme Est Une Passion Inutile”, 167; Grene, *Dreadful Freedom*; Murdoch, *Sartre: Romantic Rationalist.* [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
45. Fulton, *Apostles of Sartre*, 80 [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
46. Barrett, *Irrational Man*, 7. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
47. Barrett, *Irrational Man*. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
48. Barrett, *Irrational Man*, 10. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
49. Engerman, “Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War,” 36; Deighton, “Britain and the Cold

War”, 119 – 120. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
50. Kleinberg, *Generation Existential*, 6-7. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
51. Ibid., 116. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
52. Kleinberg, *Generation Existential*, 131. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
53. Ibid., 68, 72, 83, 131, 135, 150; Poster, *Existential Marxism in Postwar France*. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
54. Kleinberg, *Generation Existentia*l, 93–4, 130–131. [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
55. Ibid., 72–4. [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
56. Ibid., 68, 72, 93-4; Dickey, *Hegel on Religion*, 307-308. [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
57. Barnes, *The Story I Tell Myself*, 150-154. [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
58. For bad faith see Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness,* 82-83; for anguish see Jean-Paul Sartre,

*Existentialism and Humanism,* 31, 52; for the need of moral societies to enhance freedom for all see

*Existentialism and Humanism*, 45, 51-52. [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
59. Emmet, *Philosophers and Friends*, 85, 102. [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
60. Manchester University Archives, F*ACULTY OF ARTS, Prospectus, 1961-62, Prescribed Courses and Books,* 25. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
61. Manchester University Archives, *University of Manchester, FACULTY OF ARTS, Prospectus 1965-66*, 24; *Prospectus 1968-69*, 31. [↑](#endnote-ref-60)
62. University of Manchester, *FACULTY OF ARTS, Prospectus 1965-66*, 24; *Prospectus,* 1971-72. [↑](#endnote-ref-61)
63. Emmet, *Philosophers and Friends*, 89-99. [↑](#endnote-ref-62)
64. Emmet, *Philosophers and Friends*, 4. [↑](#endnote-ref-63)
65. Ibid., 62, 75; Emmet, “Kierkegaard et la Philosophie Existentielle”. [↑](#endnote-ref-64)
66. Manchester University Archives, VCA/7/324, Dorothy Emmet to Sir. John S. N. Stopford (V.C), 22 May 1946. [↑](#endnote-ref-65)
67. Mandler, “The Two Cultures Revisited”, 402. [↑](#endnote-ref-66)
68. Dyhouse, “Education”, 124; Pullan and Abenstern, *A History of the University of Manchester*, 31- 32. [↑](#endnote-ref-67)
69. Manchester University Archives, VCA/7/324, Dorothy Emmet to Sir. John S. N. Stopford (V.C), 22 May 1946. [↑](#endnote-ref-68)
70. Manchester University Archives, VCA/7/400, Dorothy Emmet and A N Prior to the Vice Chancellor, 12 October 1962. [↑](#endnote-ref-69)
71. Emmet, *Philosophers and Friends*, 3, 13-30. [↑](#endnote-ref-70)
72. Richter, *The Politics of Conscience,* 65, 133-134. [↑](#endnote-ref-71)
73. Emmet, *Philosophers and Friends*, 11. [↑](#endnote-ref-72)
74. Mander, *British Idealism*, 160, 280, 535. [↑](#endnote-ref-73)
75. Emmet, *Philosophers and Friends*, 30. [↑](#endnote-ref-74)
76. Lindsay, *The Two Moralities*, 23; Richter, *Politics of Conscience*, 225-7; Lindsay, “Hegel the German Idealist”; Mander, *British Idealism,* 161. [↑](#endnote-ref-75)
77. Stapleton, *Political Intellectuals and Public Identities*, 25-26; Burrow, *A History of Histories*, 353-4. [↑](#endnote-ref-76)
78. Stapleton, *Political Intellectuals and Public Identities,* 170-173; Guy Ortolano, *The Two Cultures*

*Controversy,* 36, 179. [↑](#endnote-ref-77)
79. Kolbert, *Keele: the First Fifty Years*, 58, 104; Richter, *Politics of Conscience*, 105, 344-347, 354. [↑](#endnote-ref-78)
80. Lindsay, *Two Moralities*, 9, 45. [↑](#endnote-ref-79)
81. Lindsay, *Two Moralities*, 21, 35. [↑](#endnote-ref-80)
82. Emmet, *Function, Purpose and Powers*, 249; Emmet, *Philosophers and Friends*, 89-99. [↑](#endnote-ref-81)
83. Emmet, *Function, Purpose and Powers*, 165. [↑](#endnote-ref-82)
84. Emmet, *Philosophers and Friends,* 63, 68, 75-77. [↑](#endnote-ref-83)
85. Ibid.*,* 89–99. [↑](#endnote-ref-84)
86. Emmet, *Roles, Rules, Regulations*, 214. [↑](#endnote-ref-85)
87. Emmet, *Roles, Rules, Regulations,* 210- 211. [↑](#endnote-ref-86)
88. Lindsay, *Two Moralities*, 63-78. [↑](#endnote-ref-87)
89. Emmet, *Roles, Rules, Regulations,* 171. [↑](#endnote-ref-88)
90. Ibid., 155. [↑](#endnote-ref-89)
91. Ibid.,189. [↑](#endnote-ref-90)
92. Ibid., 194, 196. [↑](#endnote-ref-91)
93. Manchester University Archives, *Examination Papers 1961-62: Arts II, UA/21/1*, Question on Ethics (Paper II), 18 June, 1962, 51. The quote is from Sartre’s Existentialism and Humanism, 49. [↑](#endnote-ref-92)
94. Emmet, *Philosophers and Friends*, 94. [↑](#endnote-ref-93)
95. Manchester University Archives, *Faculty of Arts Prospectus, 1980 – 1981*. Sartre’s *Nausea* is on the reading list for *Introduction to Philosophy*. [↑](#endnote-ref-94)
96. Bowie and Duska, *Business Ethics*, 7, 15; Cooper, *The Responsible Administrator*, Chapter Five. [↑](#endnote-ref-95)
97. University of Manchester, *Faculty of Arts Prospectus* *1967- 1968*, 28. [↑](#endnote-ref-96)
98. Warnock, *Ethics since 1900,* 144. [↑](#endnote-ref-97)
99. Literae Humaniores: Reports 1956-1960 FA 4/7/2/13, Letter from Iris Murdoch to LH Faculty, 20 December, 1956; Warnock, *A Memoir: People and Places*, 22. [↑](#endnote-ref-98)
100. Conradi, *Iris Murdoch: A Life*, 288, 469; Warnock, *A Memoir: People and Places*, 15, 21, 120. [↑](#endnote-ref-99)
101. E-mail correspondence with Alan Montefiore 7 June 2008. Montefiore established a course on continental philosophy for philosophy undergraduates at Oxford in the 1970s. This course included reference to Sartre; <https://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/course-descriptions-finals#collapse390591> last accessed 25 March, 2018. [↑](#endnote-ref-100)
102. Murdoch, *Sartre: Romantic Rationalist*. [↑](#endnote-ref-101)
103. Warnock, *Ethics since 1900*; Warnock, *The Philosophy of Sartre*; Warnock, *Existentialism*; Warnock, *Sartre: A collection of Critical Essays*; Warnock “Introduction”. [↑](#endnote-ref-102)
104. Oxford University Archives, Literae Humaniores, reports 1972-3: FA 4/7/2/18. [↑](#endnote-ref-103)
105. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-104)
106. Forguson, “Oxford and the "Epidemic”; Akehurst, *Cultural Politics,* 4, 10-11, 57. [↑](#endnote-ref-105)
107. *Examination Statutes*, 1952 – 1980. Oxford, R. Top. 624a, for 1953 – 1955, 197 – 198; for 1980, 244.; Mary Warnock also recalls that “Morals and Politics” was a compulsory subject in both greats and PPE in the 1950s in Warnock*, A Memoir: People and Places*, 46. [↑](#endnote-ref-106)
108. Harris, “The Arts and Social Sciences, 1939-1970”, 225, 230. [↑](#endnote-ref-107)
109. *Second Public Examination. Honour School of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics., Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1923-1986,* ‘Moral and Political Philosophy’,1952. [↑](#endnote-ref-108)
110. Literae Humaniores: Reports 1956-1960 FA 4/7/2/13, Letter from Iris Murdoch to LH Faculty, 20 December 1956. [↑](#endnote-ref-109)
111. Warnock, *A Memoir: People and Places*, 86. [↑](#endnote-ref-110)
112. Warnock, *A Memoir: People and Places*, 20. [↑](#endnote-ref-111)
113. Ibid., 87; Warnock, *Ethics since 1900*, 149. [↑](#endnote-ref-112)
114. Warnock, *A Memoir: People and Places*, 22. [↑](#endnote-ref-113)
115. Harris, “The Arts and Social Sciences, 1939-1970”, 225. [↑](#endnote-ref-114)
116. Harris, “The Arts and Social Sciences, 1939-1970”, 226-229. [↑](#endnote-ref-115)
117. Ibid., 226. [↑](#endnote-ref-116)
118. Stone, *Road to Divorce*; Stone, “Literacy and Education”. [↑](#endnote-ref-117)
119. Murdoch, “Hegel in Modern Dress”, 149. [↑](#endnote-ref-118)
120. Ibid., 150 [↑](#endnote-ref-119)
121. Warnock, *Ethics since 1900,* 144, 145. [↑](#endnote-ref-120)
122. Ibid., 119. [↑](#endnote-ref-121)
123. Akehurst, *Cultural Politics of Analytic Philosophy*, 23, 26, 33-34. [↑](#endnote-ref-122)
124. Ryle’s criticism of Hegel is cited by Akehurst, *Cultural Politics of Analytic Philosophy*, 1. [↑](#endnote-ref-123)
125. Oxford University Archives, FA 3/3/1/1-3G, Ryle in *The Report of the sub-faculty of philosophy* (February 1939). [↑](#endnote-ref-124)
126. Oxford University Archives, Literae Humaniores, Reports 1956 - 1960, Document number [LH (56) 6] FA 4/7/2/13, W. H. Walsh to “Turpin” as a “Report on the period of office as University Lecturer (C.U.F), W. H. Walsh, 17 December 1955; Walsh, “Philosophical Surveys. X: A Survey of Work on Hegel”, 352-3. [↑](#endnote-ref-125)
127. Literae Humaniores: Reports 1956-1960 FA 4/7/2/13, Letter from Iris Murdoch to LH Faculty, 20 December 1956. [↑](#endnote-ref-126)
128. Murdoch, *Sartre: Romantic Rationalist*; Murdoch, “Hegel in Modern Dress*”*, 146- 150. [↑](#endnote-ref-127)
129. Warnock, *Ethics since 1900*, 121. [↑](#endnote-ref-128)
130. Ibid., 146. [↑](#endnote-ref-129)
131. Examination Statutes: revised to the end of Trinity term 1964, Oxford, R. Top. 624a, 333-342; Warnock, *A Memoir: People and Places,* 45*.* [↑](#endnote-ref-130)
132. University of Oxford: Second public examination. Honour school of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics 1964-1974, Shelf Number Per.2626e.474, “Moral and Political Philosophy”, 1969; Murdoch, “Hegel in Modern Dress”, 147. [↑](#endnote-ref-131)
133. Conradi, *Iris Murdoch: A Life,* 125, 126, 223. [↑](#endnote-ref-132)
134. Ibid., 126. [↑](#endnote-ref-133)
135. Ibid., 126. [↑](#endnote-ref-134)
136. Ibid., 174. [↑](#endnote-ref-135)
137. Ibid., 214-215. [↑](#endnote-ref-136)
138. Ibid., 247-248. [↑](#endnote-ref-137)
139. Murdoch, “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’”, 344 and throughout. [↑](#endnote-ref-138)
140. Ibid., 344 – 347. [↑](#endnote-ref-139)
141. Ibid., 343. [↑](#endnote-ref-140)
142. Ibid., 338, 344 – 348. [↑](#endnote-ref-141)
143. Ibid., 338, 343 - 346. [↑](#endnote-ref-142)
144. Conradi, *Iris Murdoch: A Life*, 456-457. [↑](#endnote-ref-143)
145. Iris Murdoch, “The Existentialist Hero”, 110 [↑](#endnote-ref-144)
146. BBC Written Archives, Caversham, *Talks, Debates, and Discussions*, File 3B, April 1945 – 1946, R51/118/6, The director of talks at the BBC, G R Barnes, called for more talks that considered the potential replacement for churchgoing, thrift, and discipline in society (4 April, 1945); Author Files, Iris Murdoch. [↑](#endnote-ref-145)
147. Conradi, *Iris Murdoch: A Life*, 471. [↑](#endnote-ref-146)
148. Ibid., 471-2, 476-7. [↑](#endnote-ref-147)
149. Warnock, *A Memoir: People and Places*, 160. [↑](#endnote-ref-148)
150. Crisell, *An Introductory History of British Broadcasting*, 84 - 90, 196. [↑](#endnote-ref-149)
151. Warnock, *A Question of Life*, viii, xi, xii. [↑](#endnote-ref-150)
152. Ibid., xii, xiii, xv, 96. [↑](#endnote-ref-151)
153. Warnock, *Ethics since 1900*, 139. [↑](#endnote-ref-152)
154. Ibid., 144. [↑](#endnote-ref-153)
155. UCLA University Archives, *Bulletin: General Catalogue, 1955 – 1956*, 274; Marcuse, *Towards a Critical Theory*, 108. [↑](#endnote-ref-154)
156. UCLA University Archives record series 410 – 412, Philosophy Department, Chair’s correspondence and department meeting records 1930 – 1987, *Report to President Clark Kerr and Chancellor Raymond B Allen for the Year Ending June 30, 1958,* 2. [↑](#endnote-ref-155)
157. Harvard University Archives, *Announcement of the Courses of Instruction offered by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences for the Academic Year, 1955-1956*, 220; *1967-1968*, 344. [↑](#endnote-ref-156)
158. Keller and Keller, *Making Harvard Modern,* 73. [↑](#endnote-ref-157)
159. Griffith, “Freedom and Control in the Undergraduate Curriculum”, 472-475; Conant et. al*, General Education in a Free Society*, viii, x, xiii. [↑](#endnote-ref-158)
160. Griffith, “Freedom and Control in the Undergraduate Curriculum”, 474-5. [↑](#endnote-ref-159)
161. Harvard University Archives, *Announcement of the Courses of Instruction offered by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences for the Academic Year 1954-5*, General Education, Humanities 121, Contemporary Christian Thought and Philosophy, 26; *1963-4*, General Education, Humanities 5: Ideas of Man and the world in Western Thought, 19. [↑](#endnote-ref-160)
162. Dundjerski, *UCLA: The First Century*, 173. [↑](#endnote-ref-161)
163. Ibid., 204. [↑](#endnote-ref-162)
164. Ibid., 132. [↑](#endnote-ref-163)
165. Ibid., 154. [↑](#endnote-ref-164)
166. UCLA University Archives, *Bulletin: General Catalogue*, *1946-7*, 256; *1966-7*, 364. [↑](#endnote-ref-165)
167. UCLA University Archives record series 410 – 412, Philosophy Department, Chair’s correspondence and department meeting records 1930 – 1987, *Report to President Clark Kerr and Chancellor Raymond B Allen for the Year Ending June 30, 1958,* 3*.* [↑](#endnote-ref-166)
168. Dundjerski, *UCLA: The First Century*, 134, 181. [↑](#endnote-ref-167)
169. Ibid., 161. [↑](#endnote-ref-168)
170. UCLA University Archives, *UCLA Daily Bruin*, Nov. 23, 1965, 2. [↑](#endnote-ref-169)
171. Dundjerski, *UCLA: The First Century*, 161. [↑](#endnote-ref-170)
172. Davis, *Autobiography*, 118; Kaplan, *Dreaming in French*, 187. [↑](#endnote-ref-171)
173. Dundjerski, *UCLA: The First Century*, 181-3. [↑](#endnote-ref-172)
174. Barrett, *The Truants*, 11; Biel, “Freedom, Commitment and Marxism”, 225. [↑](#endnote-ref-173)
175. Brick, *Age of Contradiction*, 29-30, 33-5. [↑](#endnote-ref-174)
176. Tomes, *Apocalypse Then: American Intellectuals*, 25. [↑](#endnote-ref-175)
177. Phillips, *A Partisan View*, Chapter 25; Cavell, *Little Did I Know*, 231. [↑](#endnote-ref-176)
178. Barrett, *Irrational Man*, 3. [↑](#endnote-ref-177)
179. Meyerhoff, “The Return to the Concrete”, 27, 37. [↑](#endnote-ref-178)
180. Ibid., 27. [↑](#endnote-ref-179)
181. Barrett, *Irrational Man*, 6, 19. [↑](#endnote-ref-180)
182. Meyerhoff, “The Return to the Concrete”, 27. [↑](#endnote-ref-181)
183. Cavell, *Little Did I Know*, 231, 242. [↑](#endnote-ref-182)
184. Ibid., 231, 242 [↑](#endnote-ref-183)
185. Ormerod, “The History and Ideas of Pragmatism.”, 893, 897, 898, 900, 907; Dykhuizen, “John Dewey: The Vermont Years”, 528, 536. [↑](#endnote-ref-184)
186. Ormerod. “The History and Ideas of Pragmatism”, 895. [↑](#endnote-ref-185)
187. Buxton, “The Influence of William James”, 451-2; Hollinger, “The Problem of Pragmatism”, 90; Dykhuizen, “John Dewey: The Vermont Years”, 528, 536; Ormerod. “The History and Ideas of Pragmatism”,900. [↑](#endnote-ref-186)
188. Ormerod, “The History and Ideas of Pragmatism”, 900; Rockmore, *Hegel, Idealism, and Philosophy*, 71-78; Westbrook, “The Making of a Democratic Philosopher”, 22; Gale, “Naturalism of John Dewey”, 62, 72; Allen, “William James: American Writers 88”, 34-5. [↑](#endnote-ref-187)
189. Allen, “William James: American Writers 88”, 34-5; Rockmore, *Hegel, Idealism, and Philosophy*, 72-74; Wilkins, “James, Dewey, and Hegelian Idealism”, 338. [↑](#endnote-ref-188)
190. James cited in Allen, “William James: American Writers 88”, 20. [↑](#endnote-ref-189)
191. Dewey, cited in Festenstein “John Dewey”, 103 [↑](#endnote-ref-190)
192. Allen, “William James: American Writers 88”, 42 [↑](#endnote-ref-191)
193. Ormerod, “The History and Ideas of Pragmatism”, 898. [↑](#endnote-ref-192)
194. Harvard University Archives*, Announcement of the Courses of Instruction offered by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences for the Academic Year, 1953-4*, 211; *1957-8*, 243. [↑](#endnote-ref-193)
195. UCLA University Archives, *UCLA Bulletin, General Catalogue*, course on pragmatism taught by Donald Piatt 1946-7, 259; course on pragmatism taught by Abraham Kaplan 1955-6, 276. [↑](#endnote-ref-194)
196. Cavell, *Little Did I Know*, 245-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-195)
197. Ibid., 261. Meyerhoff set Morton White’s *Social Thought in America* (1949) on this course, which includes extensive discussion of Dewey. [↑](#endnote-ref-196)
198. Harvard University Archives, *Announcement of the Courses of Instruction offered by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences for the Academic Year, 1958-9*, 248. [↑](#endnote-ref-197)
199. Barrett, *Irrational Man*, 17. [↑](#endnote-ref-198)
200. Ibid., 219. [↑](#endnote-ref-199)
201. Ibid., 17. [↑](#endnote-ref-200)
202. Meyerhoff, “The Return to the Concrete”, 38. [↑](#endnote-ref-201)
203. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-202)
204. Ibid., 37. [↑](#endnote-ref-203)
205. Ibid., 37. [↑](#endnote-ref-204)
206. Cavell, *Little Did I Know*, 251. [↑](#endnote-ref-205)
207. Cavell, “Kierkegaard’s On Authority and Revelation”, 163. [↑](#endnote-ref-206)
208. Cavell, “Kierkegaard’s On Authority and Revelation”, 163. [↑](#endnote-ref-207)
209. Geary, “‘Becoming International Again’”, 725; Tillich, *The Courage to Be*; Paul Tillich was on the front page of *Time*, 16 March 1959. [↑](#endnote-ref-208)
210. Conant et. al, *General Education in a Free Society*, X. [↑](#endnote-ref-209)
211. Harvard University Archives, *Announcement of the Courses of Instruction*, “Humanities 121. Contemporary Christian Thought and Philosophy” taught by John Wild, *1953-4*. Wild compares secular existentialism with the “religious thought of Kierkegaard”, 25-6; “Humanities 5: Ideas of Man and the World in Western Thought” taught by Stanley Cavell, *1963-4*. On this course, Cavell compares the New Testament with Camus, 19; “Humanities 4: Ideas of Good and Evil in Western Literature”, taught by Assistant Professor Hugo and Dr Rhinelander, *1952-3*. The Book of Job is compared with Camus’s *The Plague* on this course, 19; “Humanities 125, New Testament Thought and the Mind of Today”, *1957-8* Professor Buttrick. Sartre’s thought is compared with the New Testament on this course, 21. [↑](#endnote-ref-210)
212. Harvard University Archives, *Announcement of the Courses of Instruction*, “Humanities 121. Contemporary Christian Thought and Philosophy” taught by John Wild, *1953-4*. Wild compares secular existentialism with the “religious thought of Kierkegaard” [↑](#endnote-ref-211)
213. Wild, “The Rebirth of the Divine”, 154. [↑](#endnote-ref-212)
214. Ibid., 169; Wild, “Christian Rationalism”, 55, 63. [↑](#endnote-ref-213)
215. Brick, *Age of Contradiction*, 153 – 154. [↑](#endnote-ref-214)
216. UCLA University Archives, Meyerhoff, *“*The Experts and Vietnam”, 2. [↑](#endnote-ref-215)
217. Ibid., 3. [↑](#endnote-ref-216)
218. UCLA University Archives, *UCLA Bulletin, General Catalogue, 1953-4*. [↑](#endnote-ref-217)
219. Harvard University Archives, *Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Courses of Instruction*, Philosophy 190, Philosophy of Religion,1964, 300. [↑](#endnote-ref-218)
220. Harvard University Archives, HUC 7000.28, 150 of 284, *Social Sciences: Final Examinations* January 1964, Philosophy 190. Philosophy of Religion, 100. [↑](#endnote-ref-219)
221. Cavell, “Kierkegaard’s On Authority and Revelation”, 162. [↑](#endnote-ref-220)
222. Ibid., 162-5. [↑](#endnote-ref-221)
223. Cotkin, *Existential America*, 144 [↑](#endnote-ref-222)
224. Barrett, *Irrational Man*, 12-13, 20-21, 217-8. [↑](#endnote-ref-223)
225. Ibid., 90, 232. [↑](#endnote-ref-224)
226. Ibid., 81-105, 232. [↑](#endnote-ref-225)
227. Ibid., 17, 79-80, 201-202, 217, 219, 226-227, 233. [↑](#endnote-ref-226)
228. Ibid., 69. [↑](#endnote-ref-227)
229. Ibid., *2*32. [↑](#endnote-ref-228)
230. Petigny, *The Permissive Society*, 3; Brown, *Religion and Society*, 2, 5, 10, 11. [↑](#endnote-ref-229)
231. Brewitt-Taylor, “The Invention of a ‘Secular Society’?”, 328, 347, 349. [↑](#endnote-ref-230)
232. McLeod, “The Religious Crisis of the 1960s”, 206, 223; Petigny, *The Permissive Society*, 182, 233, 235; Brown, *Religion and Society*, 248, 258-267. [↑](#endnote-ref-231)
233. Hepple, “The New Single Equality Act in Britain”, 11 – 24.

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