Coverage of bombings for political advantage: Turkish on-line news reporting of the 2016 Ankara attacks

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Abstract

On 17 February 2016, a suicide bomber blew himself up, killing 28 people and injuring another 61 in the “heart” of Turkey’s capital Ankara. A few hours after the attack, the Turkish government blamed Salih Neccar from the (mostly) Kurdish- Syrian People’s protection Unit (YPG). Two days later, the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) claimed responsibility and named the bomber as Abdülbaki Sömer a Turkish citizen. The bombing is part of a resumption of violence in Turkey between Turkish government authorities and Kurdish groups. In this paper, we examine how on-line news stories recontextualise the bombing. We assert that news sources multimodally recontextualise the bombing in ways which are advantageous to the news organisations’ owners, political alliances and supporters. By each news source representing their political interests unquestionably positive and opposition unconditionally negative, polarisation in Turkish politics is articulated. This does nothing to solve problems and heal wounds in a time of national crisis.

Keywords

Multimodal critical discourse studies, Turkey, bombing, Kurds, AKP, on-line news

***Introduction***

On 17 February 2016, a suicide bomber blew himself up, killing 28 people and injuring another 61. The target was a bus carrying military personnel in the “heart” of Turkey’s capital Ankara, with state institutions like the Chief of Staff head quarters, Parliament and the Prime Ministry all within 500 metres of the attack. A few hours later, the Prime Minister of the time, Ahmet Davutoğlu blamed the (mostly) Kurdish- Syrian fighting group the People’s Protection Unit, popularly known as YPG (see appendix one for a summary of political/ armed actors involved in the conflict), and the bomber Syrian citizen Salih Neccar. The next day President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also blamed the YPG and warned the US about them, despite the leader of the YPG’s political arm, the Popular Defense Committees’s (PYD) Salih Müslim claiming they did not attack Turkey and they have no knowledge of Salih Neccar. Two days later, when the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) claimed responsibility and named the bomber as Abdülbaki Sömer a Turkish citizen, both Davutoğlu and Erdoğan insisted on a YPG connection, claiming the YPG, TAK and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) are one and the same.

This was one in a number of high profile attacks on people in Turkey since the spring of 2015 blamed on either people associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Kurdish groups. Attacks like the Ankara bombing are part of the resumption of violence in Turkey between government authorities and Kurdish groups. In this paper, we examine how on-line news stories recontextualise the bombing. News stories can be considered as recontextualisations, where one social practice is represented in another. All recontextualisations involve processes of deletion, arrangement of facts, substitutions and additions, producing ideological representations. We assert that news sources multimodally recontextualise the bombing in ways which are advantageous to their owners, political alliances and their supporters. News media in Turkish society have a history of being closely aligned to political interests. In the late nineteenth century, the press emerged as part of the state’s modernisation projects (Kocabaşoğlu 1993, 1). The role of news as a state organ rather than a source of information “set the trend in the Turkish press in the coming years, a trend which is characterised by 'opinion' articles rather than news and information" (ibid., 96). Today, with journalistic professionalism and journalists’ rights weak and the role of the state and powerful businesses with political interests controlling the media, opinion and editorialising is much more common than in the West where objectivity is a more clearly stated goal (Hallin and Mancini 2004). This context results in each news source representing their political interests unquestionably positive and opposition unconditionally negative, articulating discourses of polarisation. This does nothing to solve problems and heal wounds in a time of national crisis.

***Kurdish - Turkish relations***

Kurds are the largest minority group in Turkey composing almost 20 percent of the population. Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the “Kurdish question”, meaning the struggle of Kurds for recognition and the right to live as equals, has been the most important political problem in Turkey (Barkey and Fuller 1998). The Republic’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, aimed to create a modern, secular, western style nation state, including homogenisation policies based on Turkish language and culture. Though Turks and Kurds have been able to claim commonality by identifying themselves as Muslims, secularism has eroded this link between the two groups resulting in Kurdish dissatisfaction (Yıldız 2001). The result has been suppression with violence, arrests, exiles, renaming of Kurdish villages and assimilation policies to repress Kurdish nationalist thoughts, language and culture (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 11 - 14). The Turkish state’s attitude towards the Kurdish issue has been consistent, imposing severe restrictions on Kurds including prohibition of education, publishing or dissemination of news in Kurdish as well as restrictions on cultural activities.

Though resistance to Turkish oppression was witnessed as early as 1921, the PKK is the most high profile Kurdish rights armed organisations in Turkey. Formed in 1984, it consolidated its power vis-à-vis other Kurdish organisations and reached its peak between 1991 and 1993 (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 22). The PKK’s original goal to establish a free and independent Kurdistan has changed since 1995 to one of more autonomy (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 25). Along with PKK attacks, the region has experienced violence as part of daily life including a strong military presence. The conflict has resulted in more than 40,000 deaths in addition to forced evacuations and the destruction of villages by the Turkish authorities (Radikal 2009). There are Kurds who do not support the PKK and there is division among Kurds, however, “the PKK has asserted itself as the main power in the political scene” (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 43).

TAK was formed by the PKK ten years ago. It has chosen a more radical line than the PKK, targetting places where civilian deaths are inevitable, unlike the PKK which attacks targets where civilian deaths are unlikely (Geerdink 2016). It is “semi-autonomous”, meaning it follows its own strategies, deciding which targets to attack, while depending on the PKK for its ideological doctrine and military training (Marcus and Gurcan in Geerdink 2016). Despite these differences, the Turkish authorities see the YPG, TAK and the PKK as interconnected and basically the same (Marcus 2015).

Though in 2009 and 2012, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) initiated a peace process, President Erdoğan in April 2015 announced the end of a two year ceasefire. This announcement coincided with the election campaign for the June 2015 parliamentary elections when Kurdish rights oriented People’s Democratic Party (HDP) decided to run as a party and not as independent candidates. AKP saw this as a risk to its plan to gain a sufficient majority to change the constitution. So throughout the campaign, AKP attempted to discredit HDP to prevent it from passing the ten percent threshold needed to be represented in parliament (Way and Kaya 2016). HDP’s thirteen percent of the vote cost AKP its parliamentary majority. AKP’s unwillingness to form a coalition government and its decision to hold a snap election increased the political tension and its military activities in Turkey’s South-East.

Since the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, the YPG has taken control of significant parts of Syria, fighting against the Syrian army and groups like al Nusra and ISIL (Hevian 2013, 51). It has also gained legitimacy and a reputation as a reliable ally for the West in its fight against ISIL. Though YPG/ PYD is an offshoot of the PKK, sharing the PKK’s Democratic Confederalism model, it denies any organic tie (Hevian 2013, 50-51). The YPG/ PYD aims to form an autonomous administration in the Kurdish regions of Syria and establish a transnational Kurdish government in the liberated parts of western Kurdistan (Hevian 2013, 51-52). This aim has triggered nationalists, Kemalists and Islamists biggest fear of a united Kurdistan stretching from Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria. This fear can be traced to the Sevres Treaty which was signed by the late Ottoman Empire and the allied forces according to which Turkey was divided along ethnic lines. Known as the “Sevres Syndrome”, Turkish political elites’ ideas are shaped by a paranoia of the existence of external and internal forces collaborating with a master plan to disintegrate Turkey (Kutlay 1996, 188). It is in this vein that advances of YPG in northern Syria attracted Turkey’s military response, which has caused tension between the US and Turkey.

***Multimodal Critical Discourse studies and Recontextualisations***

Multimodal Critical Discourse Studies (MCDS) finds its origins in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Halliday’s (1985) functional grammar which assume linguistic and visual choices reveal broader discourses articulated in texts (Kress and van Leeuwen 2001). These discourses can be thought of as models of the World, giving a clear sense of “what view of the world is being communicated through semiotic resources” (Abousnnouga and Machin 2010, 139). The aim of analysis is to reveal what kinds of social relations of power, inequalities and interests are perpetuated, generated or legitimated in texts both explicitly and implicitly (van Dijk 1993). Though MCDS demands a close reading of texts, social, historical and cultural contexts are essential in determining the meaning potential of choices made in texts. MCDS draws out the details of how broader discourses are communicated and how different modes play different roles. Though other modes of communication such as layout and typography are employed in these stories, we focus our analysis on the way the modes of written text and image work to articulate discourses “on a particular occasion, in a particular text” (Kress and van Leeuwen 2001, 29).

This paper examines how the modes of writing and images recontextualise events surrounding the bombings in Ankara, noting that “recontextualisation always involves transformation, and what exactly gets transformed depends on the interests, goals, and values of the context into which the practice is recontextualised” (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999, 96). The transformative strategies of deletions, rearrangements, substitutions and additions are examined in detail (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999, 98). What is *deleted* and included, such as social actors, social practices, passive agency and circumstances, is considered. *Rearrangement* considers the order a text represents a social practice which may “relate to the interests, goals, and values of the context into which the practice is recontextualised” (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999, 97). All texts involve *substituting* social practices for choices in signs. This includes an examination of how social actors and their actions are represented, following the influential work of van Leeuwen (1995, 1996) for written text and Kress and van Leeuwen (2001) for images. Finally, what is *added* to a recontextualisation, such as reactions, purposes and legitimations, is considered here. Reactions represent the private feelings of participants, purpose may be construed differently in different recontextualisations and how a practice is represented can legitimize or delegitimise the practice and/ or social actors involved (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999, 98).

We examine in detail news stories considering these broad categories of transformation in written text and images. This reveals how stories reflect broader ideologies closely associated with the interests of media outlets, but do not articulate an end to the vicious cycle of violence Turkey finds itself in at the moment.

**Sample**

News organisations chosen are from three different political orientations in Turkey, reflecting the variety of perspectives available to readers of on-line news. We chose news from a six day period (17 – 22 February 2016), covering the first news of the event up until the end of daily coverage. *Everensel* published 12 stories on-line, *Sabah* 14 and *Sözcü* 18. Though all stories inform the analysis, in the spirit of MCDS, we do a close multimodal reading of four stories from each newspaper (see appendix two for details). These were chosen as we believe they accurately represent the larger sample, reflecting both similarities and differences in terms of political perspectives between the news organisations. These similarities and differences are investigated in the analysis sections below. Similarily, though there are 24 photographs in the analysis sample of 12 stories, 12 of these are of the scene of the bombing. Some of these are the same across the sample, suggesting the newspapers share the same source. Though these are referred to in the analysis, we concentrate our analysis on those which distinguish coverage between the newspapers.

*Evrensel* started publishing in June 1995. Its slogan is “Labour is universal”, connoting its sympathies for the working classes. The founders of the newspaper stated that they wanted to publish a newspaper to be the “voice of the working class, peasants and all the oppressed” (Güvenç and Güvenç 2014). *Evrensel* states that it takes a Leninist stance in relation to the Kurdish question, believing in self-determination for all oppressed nations (Güvenç and Güvenç 2014). Possibly due to this “non-mainstream” news perspective, its circulation of hardcopy newspapers during our sample was 5607.

*Sabah*, established in 1985, is a pro-government newspaper with a circulation during the sample time of 311,984. After a number of take overs, it was sold in 2007 to Çalık Holding whose CEO is the son-in-law of the prime minister of the time, Erdoğan (Hürriyet 2013).In 2013, it was sold to Zirve Holding owned by the Kalyon Group (BBC 2013). Kalyon’s founder, Hasan Kalyoncu is a long-time personal friend of Erdoğan and contributed to the establishment of AKP (Demirkaya 2013; Biografi 2008). This close relationship has benefitted the Kalyon Group by winning numerous government contracts including the Istanbul metro line and the Taksim pedestrianisation project which led to the Gezi protests of 2013 (Hürriyet 2013a).

*Sözcü* is an anti-AKP newspaper with a circulation of 329, 011 for the time under examination. It is an ardent supporter of Kemalism, which sees Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the symbolic leader and hero of modern Turkey, a champion of secularism, modernisation and closeness with Europe (Mango 1999). Turkey’s political opposition use various aspects of Kemalism as part of their parties’ ideologies. For example, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) embraces a Western outlook and secularism whilst the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) emphasises the Turkish nation and state. Unfortunately, Kemalism and Turkey’s Kurdish minority have not always had the best of relations. According to Yeğen (1999), Kemalism first viewed Kurds as an obstacle to modernization and then as a threat to national unity. *Sözcü* is the predecessor of *Gozcu*, which was closed because it “had become too critical of the AKP government” (Open Source Centre 2008). Presently, *Sözcü* is not owned by any media conglomerate and attracts journalists who experience AKP oppression and censorship (Çetingüleç 2014).

***Evrensel analysis***

*Evrensel* newspaper’s close connections with the Left and Kurdish interests is reflected in news stories which prioritise Kurds and their perspectives, articulating a discourse of Kurdish importance and legitimacy. This is complimented with an anti-government discourse. Though giving Kurds a voice within the Turkish mediascape addresses an imbalance in mainstream media, we argue here by representing the government negatively, the paper is divisive.

Moreso than the other news sources analysed here, *Evrensel* includes a multitude of voices and opinions. Unlike the other newspapers, the government is used as a source sparingly and almost never quoted directly. This virtual deletion from news coverage is ideological. Caldas-Coulthard (2002, 303) notes “Writers who report speech in factual reports are extremely powerful because they can reproduce what is most convenient for them in terms of their aims and ideological point of view”. By rarely using AKP as a source, non-governmental perspectives are reproduced and legitimised while the opposite is true for AKP (Caldas-Coulthard 2002, 304).

Only once in the sample is the government given a dominant voice in a story. This occurs when news broke about the bombing on 17 February. Here, the government is given priority in terms of amount of space and positioning of the story. This dependence on government sources could be due to the lack of other sources at the time of the bombing. All the same, it allows government sources to explain events from their perspective. But unlike the other newspapers, this story also sources the Turkish Military and politicians and spokespeople from CHP, HDP and MHP. Not only is it rare to see HDP used as a source, facts are arranged such that HDP appears before MHP, connoting more importance in standard inverted pyramid news writing style (Brooks, Kennedy, Moen and Ranly 1980).

Deletions, rearrangement of facts, substitutions and additions contribute to an anti-AKP discourse. In our wider sample, AKP is deleted from recontextualisations in six of the 12 stories. In the other six, facts related to AKP appear near the end of stories. For example, in the story E2 (see appendix two to identify which stories are used as sources for each excerpt), it is not until the last sentence that AKP is activated, a de-emphasised story position. Furthermore, the sentence is arranged such that AKP’s assertions are questioned in:

E2: President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and the AKP government hold PKK, YPG and PYD responsible for the attack but PYD co-chairman Salih Müslim denied the allegations.

Here, both Erdoğan and Davutoğlu are represented formally with honorifics, connoting power (van Leeuwen 1996). However, their claims of Kurdish responsibility are “denied” by another politician. A similar sentence structure is noted by van Dijk (1992) when the first part of a sentence used by racists acts as a disclaimer for the second as in “I’m not a racist but…” Here the context is different, but this sentence structure sees AKP assertions undermined by PYD claims. This same arrangement strategy can be seen throughout the sample, such as in story E4 where “government officials” are excluded from the story until the last sentence. By arranging facts as such, the government is de-emphasised.

Within hours after the bombing, the government claimed it had identified the bomber as a terrorist linked to the PYD/ YPG. Political and social commentators found the statement very “convenient”, as it would give Turkey more reasons to continue bombing YPG positions in Syria. *Evrensel* did not cover the government announcement, but covered US Foreign Ministry Spokesman John Kirby’s reaction to AKP’s assertions. Kirby is the sole source. Excluded are any direct or indirect reported speech from AKP. Facts are arranged such that opposition to AKP assertions is accentuated. Consider the story’s first sentence:

E2: As opposed to the statement by the AKP government which has said the Ankara attack was carried out by a YPG member, the US Foreign Ministry said the question of who carried out the attack in Ankara is an open ended question.

The sentence begins by clearly stating opposition to AKP, an addition made to emphasise difference. AKP is represented impersonally as “the AKP government”, denying a point of identificiation and sympathy. Their stance is de-emphasised, represented in a subordinate clause in the middle of a long sentence (van Dijk 1993). On the contrary, the US government is represented at the beginning of the main clause and activated verbally “questioning” the identity of the bomber. The next sentence identifies the government impersonally again while the US is personally nominated and formally named as “US Foreign Ministry Spokesman John Kirby”, connoting authority and allowing listeners a point of identification (van Leeuwen 1996). In Kirby’s reported speech, the US “was not in a position to confirm or deny Turkey’s charge that the YPG was behind the bombing.” Here, again Turkey’s assertions are placed in a de-emphasised end of sentence position, while oppositional voices are activated questioning AKP claims.

The story’s accompanying photograph (image one) also grants the US a point of identification and power, attributes denied to AKP. Kirby appears in a shoulder shot, wearing a suit and tie, connoting authority. Flags and a map suggest he is at a press conference, connoting authority. Facial expressions and hand gestures suggest seriousness while he is activated verbally, symbolising more power than if passivated. Excluded are any shots of AKP politicians in this story or in the sample.



Image one: US point of identification

Substitiutions also play a role in articulating negative discourses about AKP. Consider:

E2: When asked his response to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s written statement after the attack, in which he expressed Turkey’s right to self-defence and pointing to a possible military operation against YPG in retaliation, Kirby said: “Every state has a right to self defence, to protect her citizens, especially if terrorist attacks have taken place on their lands. However, we make a similar call on Turkey as before and we repeat it again to stop shelling the Kurdish fighters’ battle against ISIL, and we warn Turkey not to sabotage large-scale efforts to combat ISIL”.

Here the first sentence is arranged such that Erdoğan is put in a prepositional phrase in a subordinate clause, a de-emphasised position (van Dijk 1993). It is Kirby and his ideas which are emphasised, verbally activated legitimating his stance counter to AKP through direct speech (Caldas-Coulthard 2002, 304). Though Kirby initially agrees with Erdoğan, he undermines Erdoğan’s desire to bomb the YPG. By including lexical choices like “a similar call”, “as before” and “we repeat”, readers are made aware of a history of America’s stance. The imperative “stop shelling the Kurdish fighters’ battle against ISIL” and “we warn Turkey” connote American power while lexical choices like “sabotage large scale efforts” indicates Turkey’s wrong doing. Alternatively, Kirby’s direct speech describing YPG as “one of the most effective forces against ISIL”, legitimates YPG and draws on a pro-Kurdish discourse seen throughout *Evrensel*.

Additions play a key role in representing AKP negatively throughout the sample. Consider:

E3: Xalo said that Turkey’s aim to take PYD and YPG as responsible for the attack is a pretext to conduct an operation against Rojava [Syrian Kurdistan]

Here, no AKP politician is named. Instead the impersonal naming of “Turkey” is used, excluding a point of identification. Furthermore, AKP is de-legitimised through the addition of purpose. Here Kurdish-Syrian politician Hakem Xalo represents Turkey’s “aim” for naming Neccar as the bomber as “a pretext to conduct an operation against Rojava”. Though indeed this may have been the case, this is the only newspaper which included this addition, connoting negativity towards AKP and sympathy towards the Kurds.

 A dominant discourse throughout the sample represents Kurdish parties and interests positively and legitimate. One strategy is deleting agency from negative actions, a strategy noted by van Dijk (1993) when representing negative actions by in-groups. Consider:

E4: According to the TAK statement, the attack, in which 28 people lost their lives, was carried out by Zınar Raperin code named Abdulbaki Sömer…

Here, TAK is arranged at the emphasised beginning of sentence position. Though emphasised, it is not activated killing. Instead the bombing is nominalised as an “attack”, nominalisations used to hide agency and obscure details (Fairclough 2003; van Leeuwen 1995). The person responsible for the bombing is buried in the sentence in a prepositional phrase “by Zınar Raperin code named Abdulbaki Sömer”, de-emphasising his role in the attack. As such, negativity towards the bomber is reduced.

Another strategy notable in positively representing Kurds is through legitimation. Consider the heading “PYD Official: There is no one in Amude with a name Neccar who joined YPG”. Here, and throughout the story, the PYD is the only source of information. The assertion that there is no Neccar is legitimated through the source being an “official”, a case of personal authorisation legitimation (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999, 105). The source is also legitimated within the story through namings, some formal with honorifics such as “Rojova Cizire Canton Legislative Assembly co-chairman Hakem Xalo” connoting power and legitimacy (van Leeuwen 1996). Xalo appears at the beginning of each sentence and represented with power activated verbally telling his perspective on events which are counter to the government’s. Represented as such, he is a legitimate politician, not a leader of a terrorist organisation, as represented in *Sabah* and *Sözcü*.



Image two: PYD legitimacy

This same discourse of legitimation can be seen in the story’s accompanying photograph (image two). In fact, visuals in *Evrensel,* articulate similar discourses to those in written text by excluding AKP politicians and including non-AKP politicians. In this photograph, Xalo is in a demand image connoting strength (Kress and van Leeuwen 2001, 127-128). Though he is represented individually, connoting intimacy, he is not close to us. This suggests he is engaged with us, not as a close friend, but as a legitimate politician. His surroundings are arranged to contribute to this discourse. He sits behind a large wooden desk with a lap top, a mobile phone, papers in neat piles. His hands are crosssed and he looks directly at us with a serious facial expression. He wears a suit and tie, further legitimating him as an authentic politician. A PYD flag as a backdrop and a smaller one on his desk confirm his political persuasion. This representation is unlike *Sabah* which represents PYD in two photographs as a group of masked men in army fatigues, marching forward and carrying guns and a flag.

 Substitutions also draw upon positive Kurdish discourses. In the above story, for example, the YPG is legitimised through activations in almost every sentence. Consider this reported speech by Xalo:

E3: We only defend our country and people. YPG and PYD only defend our people against ISIL and other terrorist organisations.

The pronouns of “we” and “our” create a positive in-group who are activated “defend[ing] our country and people”. These are opposed to “ISIL and other terrorist groups”.

Though not supportive of TAK, *Evrensel* represents them less negatively than the other news sources through exclusions, substitutions and additions. Story E4 is sourced exclusively from TAK, excluding all AKP sources. TAK is activated verbally in the headline “TAK claimed responsibility for the bomb attack in Ankara” and throughout the story. Sometimes TAK is activated positively as in “They reveal the true identity of the perpetuator”. Lexical choices such as “reveal” and “true” connote knowledge and truth. This is quite different from the other news sources who quote government sources announcing TAK’s responsibility. As such, TAK is empowered as a source of information.

 Added to this story are the reasons for TAK’s bombing. These additions are excluded from the other news sources. Consider:

E4: The statement said “this is a revenge action for the people of Cizre who were injured and brutally murdered in their basements. Let this be known that the responsible are those who ordered to burn the injured in these basements. Fascist Erdoğan and his gang should know that by tearing down our cities to the ground and failing to comply with war rules, they ignited a fire that will burn them.

Activations and lexical additions, such as “revenge”, “injured and brutally murdered”, “burn the injured”, “Fascist Erdoğan and his gang”, “tearing down our cities”, and “failing to comply with war rules “ all articulate a discourse of a brutal government and sympathy for “our” Kurdish community. This addition of purpose articulates discourses which legitimise TAK’s ignition of “a fire that will burn them”, “them” being AKP.

***Sabah Analysis***

Events are recontextualised in ways which represent the government as powerful, in control, correct and confident. This is notable in the representation of certainty that the government is correct in blaming Syrian Kurds for the attack. There is a nationalist discourse, though the nationalism is firmly in the hands of Erdoğan and AKP. Furthermore, there is a discourse that not only Kurds, but all political opposition are traitors. As such, *Sabah* again connotes division and hate.

While debate about the identity of the bomber raged in the other newspapers, *Sabah* deleted this debate from its coverage. Instead, it relentlessly emphasised that the bomber was Salih Neccar from the YPG. This contributes to a discourse that the government is strong and correct. Modality plays a key role in these recontextualisations. Consider:

S2: Salih Neccar is a Syrian terrorist who conducted the terrorist attack against the Chief of Staff personnel in the name of YPG. Salih Neccar is responsible for the death of our 28 citizens and 61 injuries, while they were trying to get home after work. The Prime Minister also confirmed that the attack was carried out by Salih Neccar.

Here there is no uncertainty about the name of the bomber and his role due to no modality in the first two sentences, “is” connoting certainty. Certainty is further connoted through personal authorisation legitimation where “the Prime Minister” confirms his identity. Lexical choices such as “terrorist”, “terrorist attack”, “death”, “injuries”, and “attack” represent the bomber negatively against “our” citizens. The additional information of “while they were trying to get home after work” makes clear the bomber is not one of “us” who “get home after work”, but a YPG terrorist.

Substitutions also articulate discourses of certainty and an active government in control. Consider this reported speech by Davutoğlu:

S2: It is clear that the attack is directly linked to YPG. As a result of our surveillance and intelligence carried out since the attack, 9 people are detained.

Again, certainty is connoted in low modality and the lexical addition of “directly linked”. Also, the government is represented in control, detaining suspects “as a result of our surveillance and intelligence”, emphasised at the beginning of the sentence. The pronoun “our” helps identify who is in “our” group, in this case AKP government agencies. In fact, “our” is overlexicalised in Davutoğlu’s reported speech as in “our civil servants and military officials”, “our president”, “our nation” and “our state”. Most contentious here is “our president”. Oppositional parties such as CHP and HDP refuse to name Erdoğan as “ours”. By using “our”, Davutoğlu is excluding many of those who do not support AKP.

Unlke *Evrensel*, *Sabah* highlights AKP’s claims when recontextualising a difference of opinion between the US and AKP. S3’s heading “Davutoğlu’s reaction to the USA about YPG” emphasises the Prime Minister by arranging his reaction at the beginning of the heading while the US and YPG are de-emphasised in prepositional phrases at the end (van Dijk 1993). Deleted from the heading and the sample is the actual statement by the US, something *Eversel* emphasised. Consider:

S3: Prime Minister Davutoğlu gave a briefing after the Ankara attack at the General Staff HQ. Davutoğlu said its the final warning to the USA that supports YPG terrorist organisation.

Here, Davutoğlu is in the beginning of sentence (and story) position, as he is throughout most of the story. He is named formally with honorifics as “Prime Minister Davutoğlu”. Davutoğlu is activated vebally and he “gave a briefing”, an action only those in power can do. Here Davutoğlu gives the US a “final warning”, connoting a relationship where Turkey has power. Powerlessness of the US is further connoted grammatically represented in a prepositional phrase and in the co-text of the “YPG terrorist organisation”.

The story has two pictures, one represents YPG as a terrorist group as described in the *Evrensel* analysis, and the other connotes a discourse of a strong government (image three). Salient, in the centre of the photograph is Davutoğlu in a suit and tie standing behind a lectern. His hands tightly clasp the sides of the furnishing as he is activated standing and speaking in what looks like a news conference. To his right, is a decorated military man in formal attire. He stands and listens, connoting less authority and power than Davutoğlu. Framing the pair are Turkish and Turkish military flags. These compositional choices connote strength and unity of the men acting in the interests of Turkey against terrorists. AKP’s power is further suggested in the integrated caption “A strong reaction to the US”. Below the photograph is the heading “This is our last warning to you”. The lexical choices of “our” and “you” connote division between AKP and the US administration. But the relationship again suggests it is Turkey who is powerful, issuing warnings, something only one with power can do. As such, again government power is suggested.



Image three: AKP strength

Excluded from *Sabah*’s Turkey is YPG legitimacy. The YPG is represented as a “terrorist organisation”, overlexicalised with the word “terrorist” and the name “Salih Neccar”, collocated many times as in “the terrorist is a Syrian national Salih Neccar”, “Neccar is a member of PYD/YPG” and “It is the terrorist YPG which carried out the attack”. Consider:

S3: Since Al-Qaeda and ISIL cannot sit around the table neither can YPG. YPG can only sit with the murderers.

At the time, there were efforts being made to get various Syrian groups to talk peace. Turkey insisted that Syrian Kurds like YPG could not be present. Here, they are equated to “Al-Qaeda”, “ISIL” and “murderers”. As such, they are de-legitimised, a very different representation than that noted in *Eversel*.

 It is not just Kurds who are excluded from *Sabah*’s Turkish nation. Political opposition is framed as a traitorous act. The heading “CHP and HDP attempted to cover up YPG terror” activates the two biggest political opposition parties negatively. This is a powerfully negative representation, though to “attempt” connotes less power than actually succeeding. Furthermore, both groups are in the co-text of negative lexica of “YPG” and “terror”. This story leads with the following sentences:

S1: When Turkey was shaken by the treacherous attack in Ankara, some deputies in particular, and many other people, did not hesitate to show their hostility to the homeland. They acted provocatively to create chaos at times when there is a need for unity and solidarity. After the Ankara attack, in which 28 people lost their lives and 61 were injured, deputies from CHP and HDP in an attempt to cover up the ugly act of YPG terrörist organisation, claimed that the attack was carried out by the Nusra Front and ISIL.

Here, arrangement of facts, substitutions and additions all contribute to a discourse that political opponents are traitors. This excerpt is from the top of the story, emphasising CHP and HDP negativity. In the excerpt’s last sentence, facts are arranged such that “the attack”, death and injuries, “CHP”, “HDP”, “YPG terrorist organisation”, “Nusra Front” and “ISIL” are all in the same sentence. This arrangement is part of a collocative pattern, where these political and armed groups are all represented negatively and against the state (Fairclough 2003, 131). Politicians are represented impersonally as “some deputies”, “many other people”, “they”, and “deputies from CHP and HDP”. These impersonal namings make it easier to treat them as an enemy (van Leeuwen 1996). It is not until much later in the story that readers learn the names of the accused. CHP and HDP are activated negatively in they “did not hesitate to show their hostility to the homeland.” Though “showing hostility” is a negative act, this is an abstraction, used to de-legitimise political opposition (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999). This same strategy is used in the following sentence where “They acted provocatively to create chaos”. Again, what exactly the politicians did is unclear. However, this serves the purpose of representing them negatively, emphasised by the addition that they were acting as such “at times when there is a need for unity and solidarity.” Here, politicians’ statements which question YPG’s responsibility are recontextualised as “showing hostility to the homeland” and creating “chaos”. This addition articulates a discourse of political opponents who are traitorous at worst or against the state at the very least, a discourse suitable for AKP and its supporters.



Image four: traitors

A similar discourse is articulated in the visuals, though more obviously. Aside from images taken from the bomb site, images in the *Sabah* sample represent two sides to a conflict. On the one side is AKP, represented by image three. On the other side are those against AKP including two shots of masked and armed YPG fighters suggesting danger (see above) and an image of HDP parliamentarians smiling suggesting happiness with the bombings. Image four extends the traitorous group to more than just Kurds. From left to right, are face shots of CHP’s Eren Erdem, HDP’s Ferhat Encü and bomber Abdulbaki Sömer. There is no separation between each participant, suggesting closeness. Erdem’s tilted head and sideways glance suggests something sneaky, unlike a full frontal shot. Encü’s raised eyebrows and shocked facial expression are comical, untypical for a politician. And Sömer’s demand image suggests strength, and calleousness. On the right, there is an integrated image of the symbols of CHP, HDP and YPG, connoting sameness (van Leeuwen 2005, 112). Black frames the image, suggesting not just sameness, but evil. Kress and van Leeuwen (2001, 193) identify the bottom of a composition as the “real”, factual and grounded in the everyday. Here, the caption “When the suicide bomber was confirmed to be from PYD, they attempted to cover it up” spans the width of the image, acting as a mediator between the images. This sentence further links the images of CHP, HDP and the bomber lexically as “they” together ar activated negatively “cover[ing] it up”, while certainty is connoted in “confirmed”. Visually and lexically, the image draws on a discourse that any opposition, political or otherwise, is traitorous.

Not surprisingly, TAK is represented negatively, far more so than in *Evrensel*. In the heading “TAK’s dirty trick exposed”, TAK negativity is emphasised, being placed at the beginning of the heading, involved in a “dirty trick”. Arrangement of facts in the story recontextualise the confusion over the identity of the bomber into trickery by terrorist groups. Consider:

S4: Terrorist organisation PKK affiliated TAK’s attempt to clean the name of PKK that is responsible for the Ankara attack, blew on its hands.

What is emphasised is TAK is “affiliated” with the PKK (elsewhere “the PKK’s Syrian sister organisation YPG”) and they are both terrorist organisations. What also is made clear is trickery. The terrorists “attempt” to deceive the public by “cleaning the name of the PKK”. This is another example of an addition of purpose. Moreover, the metaphor “blew on its hands” is used to mean “they were caught out”, drawing on a discourse of trickery but also a lack of success. Unlike *Evrensel*, where TAK is represented activated verbally and legitimate by making statements, here agency is deleted in “a new allegation came forward”, deleting agency and thus representations of power. These tactics all draw upon a discourse of de-legitimation of all opposition and legitimation of AKP and its anti-PKK military policies.

***Sözcü analysis***

Government confusion is emphasised in the coverage of the bombing in *Sözcü*, drawing on a discourse that AKP is incompetent. This assumes the nation is not safe under AKP and in need of a strong state, accentuated by emphasising the seriousness of the bombing and the threat Kurds represent. This suits Kemalist opposition groups who want to wrestle back power from AKP.

AKP is criticised for a number of incompetencies. One criticism is AKP’s lack of intelligence before the bombings. In the story, “Intelligence working after the attack”, the first sentence reads:

Sö1: Intelligence could not prevent the attack but immediately revealed the attacker who exploded himself.

Here, a comparative structure is used to criticise. Negativity is emphasised, arranged at the beginning of the sentence in the activation “Intelligence could not prevent”. Alternatively, the positive is arranged at the de-emphasising end of sentence position. As such, government negativity is emphasised, not the speed of identifying the bomber. Additions throughout the story also suggest the intelligence service is failing the nation with an over-lexicalisation of words and actions associated with failure such as “could not prevent”, “unable to prevent”, “did not prevent”, “failed to prevent”, “a lack of intelligence” and “a failure to evaluate intelligence”. This overlexicalisation severely criticises the state under the control of AKP.

Additions also play a role in undermining the government’s efforts. The bombing:

Sö1: is one of the attacks of a grand scale that it could not be carried out without a pre-investigation and preparation. It seems that either lack of intelligence or failure to evaluate intelligence this attack was not prevented.

Representing the attack as being on a “grand scale” implicitly questions how it could not have been detected. This is emphasised with the addition that it would need “pre-investigation and preparation”. The obvious conclusion for *Sözcü* is that the intelligence service under the control of AKP has failed. Even though there is modality in the statement in the form of “it seems”, the addition of a “lack of intelligence or failure to evaluate” identify the cause of the bombing, again connoting government failure.

Substitutions in terms of how AKP is named prevent the reader from attaining a governmental point of identification. The government and its officials are not personally named in two of the stories and rarely throughout the sample. They are mostly represented impersonally as “Ankara”, “the Foreign Ministry”, “the Foreign Office”, “Turkish Authorities” and “Turkey”. These impersonal representations deny readers a point of identification, a strategy used to represent groups negatively (van Leeuwen 1996). When AKP politicians are named personally, it is in de-emphasised positions such as the last sentence of a story.

Addition of purpose is also used to represent the government negatively. Consider:

Sö2: A diplomat said that Turkish authorities, invited them to appeal for international support, however, ‘they did not present any direct evidence that links YPG to the attack’.

Here we see the addition that the meeting is “to appeal for international support” for AKP’s claims that the bombing is linked to the YPG. However, AKP’s purpose is represented as a failure. In direct speech, a strategy which “legitimizes or evaluates the story being told” (Caldas-Coulthard 2002, 304), the government is activated negatively “not present[ing] any direct evidence”. This claim is legitimated by the source being “a Wall Street Journal report” sourced by “one of the diplomats who participated in the meeting”. The news source is world renowned and the diplomat is from one of the “five permanent members of the UN as well as Dutch and German ambassadors and EU representatives”. All these namings and additional information legitimate claims counter to those of AKP.

 Confusion over the identity of the bomber is also emphasised, again pointing to an incompetent AKP. Sö3’s heading “Confusion over the Ankara attack” alongside lexical choices within the story such as “Question marks”, “unravelled” and “confusion” connote chaos. Arrangement of facts, emphasise not only confusion, but a discourse that the government is wrong. Consider this opening sentence:

Sö3: President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu had stated that the terrorist attack was carried out by Ahmet Neccar who is connected to the PYD/YPG. However, two days after the attack, TAK, a PKK breakaway terrorist organistion, claimed responsibility.

Here Erdoğan and Davutoğlu are emphasised at the beginning of the sentence named formally with honorifics, accentuating their position and power and activated verbally. They are represented stating in the past (“had stated”) the government position. The rest of the story then outlines how their position is wrong using a number of strategies. One is representing uncertainty, seen in the second sentence above. Here, Erdoğan’s and Davutoğlu’s past assertions are countered with more recent claims. Uncertainty is furthered by the following subheading “Question marks” and in direct quotes, “there is a question mark over the identity of the bomber” attributed to the US government. Facts are arranged such that government statements are followed by counter-evidence. For instance, a paragraph where Davutoğlu claims “YPG did it, the bomber is Salih Neccar” is followed by “PYD Leader Salih Müslüm said ‘We did not do it’”, and then a string of claims counter to AKP from YPG, Washington, the Neccar family in Syria and then TAK. Arranged as such, the government argument is represented as not only weak but against the knowledge of most other players involved.

Lexical choices also play a key role in undermining the government. Five days after the bombing, confusion continues to be represented in:

Sö4: The latest investigation revealed that Abdülbaki Sömer came to Turkey from Kobani … The state found out the real identity of the terrorist after the statement issued by the terrorist organisation PKK’s subcontractor TAK.”

Here, “the latest investigation” presupposes there has been more than one. AKP is not activated discovering the name of the bomber, instead “the state” (an impersonal naming with no party affiliations) “found out” the bomber’s identity “after a statement issued” by TAK. This recontextualises the identification of the bomber not as the work of “thorough investigations” through “our surveillance and intelligence” seen in *Sabah*, but as heresay from a “terrorist organisation”. This represents the government as ineffective and weak.

There is also a discourse that the bombing is a national tragedy, far more than seen in the other newspapers. This draws upon a discourse that the nation run by AKP is in danger. There are pages of personal stories of the bombing victims, named as “martyrs”. This is not seen in the other papers. Accompanying pictures are of relatives crying articulating discourses of sympathy for the victims and drawing upon a discourse of the nation under threat. Additions which describe the bombing as a “very serious terrorist attacks”, “killing tens of people” and “is one of the attacks of a grand scale”, emphasise its severity. The bombing described as “the bloody terrorist attack in Ankara”, reminds readers that this attack was “bloody”, inspired by “terrorism” and aimed at the power base of the state. The bombing is represented as an attack on the nation, it “targetted the heart of the state” Furthermore, additions link bomb attacks in Turkey over the previous year such as “Suruç, Ankara Train Station, Sultanahmet and now Ankara Devlet neighbourhood”. This was also not seen in the coverage by the other news sources. By listing these attacks together, a commonality is connoted (Fairclough 2003), further suggesting that the nation run by AKP is under serious attack.

Like the written text, images in the sample connote danger. There are more images of the bomb scene in *Sözcü* than both of the other newspapers. Salient in all these images is the aftermath of the violence – fires, bombed out cars, smoke – with silhouettes and/ or long shots of police and firefighters, connoting less importance for these actors. *Sabah*’s coverage uses the least number of bomb scene photographs and the most number of politician photographs, connoting the importance of politicians. In the meanwhile, *Sözcu* is the opposite, connoting danger and denying politicians points of identification. Furthermore, images of coffins and victims are unique to *Sözcu* which add to the sense of danger. Image five is also unique to *Sözcü*. This photograph appears with the caption “Ankara bombing identification begins”. Here, chaos and danger are connoted. There are numerous anonimous social actors activated in a variety of activities. Salient is a man holding a yellow and red sheet covering something. Excluded is the contents of what is under the cover. Also salient is a group of people examining more evidence. Their backs are to the camera or/ and they look at the ground. All these choices suggest the actors are not important. Instead, it is the sense of danger suggested by their actions of examining, recording, collecting and covering. Less salient, are more actors engaged in a range of activities suggesting a lack of order. Some comfort others, a woman points while people move in all directions. Adding to the confusion is a lack of uniforms. Some people wear white bibs which connote being a part of some kind of team, some wear jackets, while most are in casual clothes and some have ruck sacks similar to what a tourist may carry. Excluded from the photgraph is police and investigators in uniform and police tape to seal off the crime area. Together, these compositional choices connote confusion, disorganisation and danger.



Image five: danger

Unlike the written text, images clearly connote how the nation can become stronger in this time of crisis: a strong military. This is a cornerstone of Kemalism. In image six, we see a long shot of flag-draped coffins. Unlike the stories and accompanying photographs of weeping relatives, here nationhood, unity and strength of the military is articulated. Excluded are faces, sadness and weakness. Salient through size and colour are Turkish flags, connoting the nation. Soldiers are represented in a group activated together walking and carrying coffins in a dignified ritual. They wear identical uniforms connoting anonimity, teamwork and unity (Machin and van Leeuwen 2005). This representation is contrary to the chaos connoted in image five. The team over the individual is further connoted by having their backs turned away from the viewer offering no symbolic contact and point of identification. Non-uniform civilians are seen to the right of the image also grieving, symbolically showing unity with the military. As such, the nation is united in its grief, not weak and emotional but dignified and strong through unity.



Kurdish groups are represented negatively, drawing upon a discourse that AKP’s nation is under great threat. Unlike *Sabah* which represents all opposition and Kurdish groups as the same, in *Sözcü* new threats are represented, increasing the danger level in Turkey. Consider:

Sö1: This attack carried out by YPG is the first legal evidence from the point of view of Ankara to prove that YPG/PYD is a terrorist organisation. Ankara is now in a position to present the intelligence reports and legal evidence to the USA, who previously refused to accept the connection between the YPG and the PKK.

Here, “the first legal evidence” accentuates newness in the co-text of “terrorist organisation”. Though YPG was not responsible for the bombing, YPG becomes part of a discourse that the nation is in trouble. This position is legitimated by lexical choices of “evidence” and “intelligence reports” which are to be presented to the US. By adding this information, the story uses authority legitimation, the US seen as a power in the region which has great authority (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999). The US is activated negatively in “refuses to accept”, connoting there is an inevitable fact which needs to be accepted, unlike “the US sees no connection”. This addition makes the threat to Turkey more real. Elsewhere, unlike *Sabah*, *Sözcü* distinguishes between Kurdish fighting groups as in “the PKK break-away TAK terrorist organisation” which “operates independent of Kandil [a short form for the PKK]”. As such, the discourse that Turkey is under a great new threat alongside more established ones is articulated.

Threat is further articulated through an over-lexicalisation of Kurdish fighters and groups in the co-text of “terrorist organisation”, “terrorist”, “bomber”, “terrorist attack” and “attack”. The PKK has a “ringleader” in “PKK ringleader Cemil Bayık” and the YPG has a “comandership”. While a “comandership” is impersonal and connotes military affiliations, a “ringleader” has much more negative connotations associated with a gang or unruly group, unlike the honorifics used for the other organisations. They are also not legitimate. Unlike *Evrensel*, which used a statement from TAK as its source, *Sözcü* deletes agency in “the bomber is said to be”. By denying agency, power and legitimacy are witheld.

Despite no agency in some cases, TAK’s negative actions connote power in others. It “has taken responsibility for the Ankara attack”, “revealed the name, birthplace of the terrorist and circulated a photo”, “claimed responsibility”, “carry out terrorist attacks”, and “has carried out many bloody terrorists attacks”. They are also represented as untrustworthy in their actions, Sömer activated in “He intentionally misspelled his name!” “Intentionally” is added to the negative activation to misspell, giving the action the purpose to deceive. Though it may be the case that he misspelt his name in order to throw the authorities off his track, this is an addtion which connotes deception. These recontextualisations give the impression that the PKK are not the same as TAK, though together they are a serious threat to the nation.

***Conclusion***

As multimodal communicative artefacts, these on-line stories recontextualise events in ways which are of benefit to their owners and political affiliates, whilst articulating division within Turkey. *Evrensel* stories articulate discourses in line with itsMarxist views including self-determination for the oppressed. These views mostly exclude AKP, and when it is represented this is very negative, whilst all Kurdish groups are unconditionally supported. Even the US is included, though what is prioritised is a disagreement with AKP. Both written text and visuals articulate similar discourses, with visuals key in legitimating Kurdish groups. These stories recontextualise events into simple binary opposites, noted in Western film, where such basic structures point to wider issues and anxieties present in society at particular times (Wright 1975). As such, division is connoted, not solidarity and compromise.

*Sabah* represents the government as strong, correct and in control. Kurds and political opposition are represented as traitors, legitimating government actions. AKP is represented as correct by excluding all debate about the identity of the bomber. Visuals clearly articulate discourses that all opposition, whether political or armed, are traitorous, working together to destroy the nation under AKP control. These recontextualisations directly benefit not only the government but the owner of the news source, Hasan Kalyoncu Kalyon. By representing the government positively, Kalyon ensures a continuing flow of government contracts. By representing all opposition as traitors, Kalyon leaves little discursive room for its readers to consider anything but support for AKP.

*Sözcü* blames the government for chaos in Turkey. Danger is emphasised. The newspaper connotes the need for a strong state, one run not by AKP. Kurdish groups are a threat to Turkish sovereignty, again drawing on a need for a strong state. Visuals make clear it is a powerful military which is desired. These recontextualisations articulate Kemalist nationalist discourses, presenting its political perspective on modern Turkey at the expense of political and cultural opposition.

All three news sources offer very different interpretations of events in socially and politically polarised Turkey. Bombings and other terrorist activities are creating an atmosphere of fear and tension, even by modern Turkish standards. Though *Evrensel* stories do give voice to Kurds, it is unconditional and its anti-AKP position is divisive. Likewise, *Sabah* and *Sözcü* express not only their preferences for their respective political views, but also their fear of a united Kurdistan. These breathe new life into the “Sevres Syndrome”, again a very divisive discourse. News stories during these times could follow a less inflammatory tone and try to bridge divisions. Instead, these stories multimodally articulate discourses of division and difference in a time when quite the opposite may be more beneficial to the reader.

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**Appendix One: Turkish and Kurdish Political/ Armed Actors**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Name of Organisation | Abbreviation | Political Affiliations | Key Figures |
| Justice and Development Party  | AKP | Turkey’s ruling political party | President Recep Tayyip ErdoğanPrime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu |
| Republican People’s Party  | CHP | Turkey’s main opposition party |  |
| Nationalist Movement Party  | MHP | Turkey’s nationalist opposition party |  |
| People’s Democratic Party  | HDP | Turkey’s Kurdish rights oriented political opposition party |  |
| Kurdistan Workers’ Party  | PKK | Turkish based Kurdish armed resistance organisation |  |
| Kurdistan Freedom Hawks  | TAK | Turkish based Kurdish armed resistance organisation with some links to PKK | Abdülbaki Sömer, Ankara bomber |
| Kurdish- Syrian People’s protection Unit  | YPG | Syrian based (mostly) Kurdish armed organisation. No organic ties with PKK  |  |
| Popular Defense Committee | PYD | Political arm of the YPG | Salih Müslim |

**Appendix Two: Analysis sample**

Evrensel

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Story no. | Link  | Date of Publication | No. of Images | Headline |
| E1 | <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/272863/ankarada-askeri-servis-araclarina-bombali-saldiri-28-olu-61-yarali> | 17 Feb. 2016 | 3 | Ankara'da askeri servis araçlarına bombalı saldırı: 28 ölü 61 yaralı |
| E2 | <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/272949/abd-ankara-saldirisini-kimin-gerceklestirdigi-bizim-icin-ucu-acik-bir-soru> | 18 Feb. 2016 | 1 | ABD: Ankara saldırısını kimin gerçekleştirdiği bizim için ucu açık bir soru |
| E3 | <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/272945/pyd-yetkilisi-amudede-ypgye-katilan-neccar-soyadli-biri-yok> | 18 Feb 2016 | 1 | PYD Yetkilisi: Amude'de YPG'ye katılan Neccar soyadlı biri yok |
| E4 | <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/273015/ankaradaki-bombali-saldiriyi-tak-ustlendi> | 19 Feb 2016 | 1 | Ankara'daki bombalı saldırıyı TAK üstlendi |

Sabah

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Story no. | Link  | Date of Publication | No. of Images | Headline |
| S1 | <http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/02/18/chp-ve-hdp-ypg-terorunu-perdelemeye-calisti> | 18 Feb 2016 | 3 | CHP ve HDP, YPG terörünü perdelemeye çalıştı |
| S2 | <http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/02/18/salih-necar-kimdir-salih-necar-hangi-orgut-icin-calisti> | 18 Feb 2016 | 1 | Salih Necar kimdir? Salih hangi Örgüt için çaliştı? |
| S3 | <http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/02/18/davutoglundan-abdye-ypg-tepkisi> | 18 Feb 2016 | 2 | Davutoğlu'ndan ABD'ye YPG tepkisi |
| S4 | <http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/02/19/takin-kirli-oyunu-desifre-oldu> | 19 Feb 2016 | 2 | TAK'ın kirli oyunu deşifre oldu |

Sözcü

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Story no. | Link  | Date of Publication | No. of Images | Headline |
| Sö1 | <http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/gundem/istihbarat-olaydan-sonra-calisiyor-1096922/> | 18 Feb 2016 | 2 | İstihbarat olaydan sonra çalışıyor |
| Sö2 | <http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/gundem/ankaradaki-saldirinin-faili-belirlendi-1096287/> | 18 Feb 2016 | 4 | Ankara did not present any evidence to the diplomats in relation to the YPG connection |
| Sö3 | <http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/gundem/ankara-saldirisi-konusunda-kafalar-karisti-1099628/> | 19 Feb 2016 | 3 | Ankara saldırısı konusunda kafalar karıştı |
| Sö4 | <http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/gundem/salih-neccar-abdulbaki-somer-cikti-1102837/> | 22 Feb 2016 | 2 | Salih Neccar Abdülbaki Sömer çıktı! |