**Rhetoric, Reality and Refugees on the Margins: Remoralising the ethic of care and the European Union (EU) refugee policies: Valletta, 2015.**

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**Abstract**

*‘Refugee’ has become a highly mediatised concept that decisively structures the lives of forced migrants and appear in social and political milieu of many countries. In Europe, there is a major increase in refugee immigration each year. The EU-Africa summit on Migration in Valletta, 2015, announced the creation of an Emergency Trust Fund of 1.8 billion euros aimed at addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons from Africa. One of its defining clauses was to increase scholarships to Africans. In this paper, I examine what an ethic of care could offer to discussions about this policy and the impact of scholarship provisions to Africans. I consider the summit policies from the perspective of the politics of the ethic of care and I conclude by illustrating the tensions and possibilities the politics of the ethic of care may have on the perceptions and actions towards refugees.*

**Keywords: refugees, forced migrants, scholarships, ethic of care, policy, remoralising, Valletta**

***1. Background to European Union Refugee Policy Context.***

Current migration trends have rendered refugees one of the most topical powerful concepts that decisively structure the lives of refugees and asylum seekers. Some derogatory media captions include ‘How to destroy a nation’, ‘Destruction of a sense of belonging’, ‘Asylum seekers hit jackpot’, ‘Africa – World’s begging bowl’, ‘The right to discriminate’, ‘How to colonise Britain’, ‘Foreign Invader’, ‘Africans are less intelligent than Westerners’ (The Independent 2008).‘Tabloid Press stokes up racism against immigrants’ (Workers Power 2007). Such media captions do have a damaging effect on self-esteem of refugees and offer a stereotype view of refugees by subverting a more accurate understanding of who they are and why they are forced to flee their homelands (Cole and Virdee 2005; Fielden 2008). Some members of host communities have emerged with anti-immigration ideologies within the European Union member countries motivated by fear that immigration is out of control ((UNHCR (1993; 1994). Such has been the reactions of governments in Serbia, Hungary, Macedonia, Bosnia, Romania and recently the United States of America concerning the acceptance and resettlement of Syrian, Afghan, Iraqi refugees among others, who have arrived through various borders.

Sweden, which has until today accepted more refugees per head than any EU member country announced border control on its Danish frontier to keep out refugees. Denmark has built a fence on its border with Germany to check the influx of refugees crossing from Germany (a practice that Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia and Macedonia had already carried out on their borders). Denmark has also adopted controversial plans to confiscate items of high monetary value from refugees so as to use the proceeds in caring for the refugees. The European Union has brokered a deal with Turkey to freeze visas for Turkish citizens to travel to EU member states (excluding the UK) for up to three months and to pay 3 billion euros to Turkey in return for Turkey to accept refugees sent back from Greece and other EU countries; as well as for Turkey to increase maritime controls to stem the flow of refugees from Syria. Turkey has already instituted visa for fleeing Syrians crossing into its borders.

In the UK, the House of Lords narrowly approved that the UK should take in more unaccompanied (child) refugees stranded in Europe and immigration into the UK has been judged to have affected the election results for Britain to leave the European Union. When labour shortages are registered, ‘migrants’ become a positive connotation as a welcome group by the host communities (as it is perceived to be the case with Germany that received about one million refugees in 2015) and when unemployment is rising, arguments to restrict immigration and deport those who are not indispensable to the host community as ‘immigrants’ (a negative connotation) become prominent. It is not surprising that the ruling party of the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel suffered setbacks in the Berlin local assembly elections because of her pro-refugee stance.

This raises the contrast between the conception and applicability of the concepts of justice, rights and care. Encouraged by their obligations to uphold various treaty rights on justice and human rights as well as provide care for humans without discriminations, leaders of EU countries have to face stark anti-immigration realities from citizens who are fed up with increase in the presence of refugees in their countries. Because of shifts in perceptions about refugees and the increase in the number of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea as more refugees arrive at European shores, the EU members States met in Valletta, Malta in 2015 to address migration issues with their African counterparts. In this paper, I analyse the main summit policies and discuss them on the basis of two related but distinct themes: using educational scholarships as to empower African youths towards social and economic sustainability and using scholarships as a deterrent to migration. Following this, I lay out the implications of what the politics of the ethic of care can contribute towards discussion around these two related but distinct themes. In the first part of this paper, I start by unpacking the policy context of the EU-Africa Summit in Valletta. I proceed in the second part by elaborating the potential tensions and possibilities that the notion of the ethic of care may have on this policy. I conclude with recommendations on how the politics of the ethics of care can contribute to changing the current perceptions of and actions on refugees.

***2. Contextualising the EU-Africa Summit on Migration: Valletta, 2015***

The European Union has carried out extensive negotiations among member states to set up the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which is aimed at safeguarding the rights of refugees entering the European Union member countries. The CEAS provides checks intended to ensure that the rights of refugees under international law are protected in its member states. Under the system, policies are put in place to provide minimum standards and procedures for processing and assessing asylum applications, and for the treatment of both asylum seekers and those who are granted refugee status. Despite this, there are huge discrepancies on how member countries respond to asylum seekers and refugees’ influx. One of the policy documents of EU response to asylum and refugee crisis is contained in the ‘Dublin System’ in which when an asylum seeker travels through several EU countries, the CEAS allows one EU country to send that person to the first EU country reached by the asylum seeker, so long as that country upholds the rights of asylum seekers. This has placed huge burdens on countries like Greece, Hungary and Italy that are easily accessed by people smugglers and desperate asylum seekers who use boats to reach islands in these countries.

As a result, EU countries along the Mediterranean have borne the influx of asylum seekers from Africa, Iraq, Greece, Syria etc. and this has led to conflicts among EU member states with some calling for a quota system of redistribution of asylum seekers. Most member states have reinstituted border controls at times, endangering the Schengen system of free movement, as well as erected fences along borders, notably in Hungary and Bulgaria, Serbia, Slovakia, Macedonia. To minimize these internal difficulties among member countries, the EU proposed a European Agenda on Migration, which called on the body to take action to prevent further losses of life and to improve conditions for those seeking sanctuary in Europe. One of the steps of the European Agenda on Migration was the EU-Africa migration summit held in Valletta, Malta in 2015.

The EU - Africa Migration Summit held in Valletta, Malta on 11 and 12 November, 2015 and leaders of the European Union member countries met with their African counterparts hoping pledges of financial resources would slow the crossing of refugees from many conflict ridden African countries using the Mediterranean as access to European Union countries. The immediate cause of the summit was the sinking of a boat off the coast of Libya with the loss of over 800 refugees making a desperate effort to reach sanctuary in EU countries. Italy, Greece and Malta faced crisis as the most accessed of entry ports by fleeing refugees. This inflow coupled with unprecedented numbers through Turkey from countries like Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan raised fears among EU nations leading to arbitrarily measures like arrests, mass deportations, raising fences among other measures. The Valletta summit aimed at providing long-term solutions to African countries to stem the flow of refugees. These solutions included job creation, and repatriation of thousands of Africans already in Europe. EU member countries also warned that development aid could be at risk if African countries did not do more to discourage illegal migration to Europe. An Emergency Trust Fund of 1.8 billion euros was launched for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (Valletta, 2015). According to Valletta (2015), the Trust Fund is an innovative mechanism under EU’s Financial Regulation used in the field of development cooperation to pool large resources from different donors to enable a swift, common, complementary and flexible response to the different dimensions of an emergency. The Fund will benefit a number of African countries that encompass major migration routes including the most fragile and most affected by migration. The countries include The Sahel Region and Lake Chad Area: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal; The North of Africa: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt; The Horn of Africa: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

Neighbouring countries of the eligible countries may benefit, on a case-by-case basis, from the Trust Fund projects with a regional dimension in order to address regional migration flows and cross-border challenges. One of the main clauses of the Emergency Fund, which constitutes the focus of this paper, is the increase of education opportunities for African students through scholarships offered to more eligible students to attend universities and professional training in EU countries.

***3. Valletta Summit Policies on Education. Why the focus on Scholarships?***

EU member states adopted five key policy points namely: Development benefits of migration and addressing the root causes of migration and forced displacement; Promoting legal migration and mobility; Supporting the elaboration and implementation of comprehensive national and regional strategies on migration and mobility; Protection of refugees and displaced persons; prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; and return, readmission and reintegration of returnees to African countries of origin. A 1.8 billion euro ‘EU Emergency Trust Fund for the stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa’ was created (Valletta, 2015:1). It is not the focus of this paper to discuss the implications of all the policy points of the summit but rather to examine aspects of these policies that have direct relevance to education.

The summit has as one of its main policies to boost socio-economic development in crisis countries in Africa that were identified in the background above as areas of high migration issues. The focus on this policy was to enable benefiting countries to be able to create job opportunities especially for young men and women. Education was considered as the vehicle for economic and personal development and this enabled EU member states to consider the deployment of an Emergency Trust Fund to assist in ‘stepping up assistance to youth to acquire labour market-relevant skills through education, vocational training, access to digital technologies, while ensuring equal opportunities for young women and men’ (Valletta 2015:3). This comes across as an overtly optimistic outlook on directly impacting on the socio-economic and political realities in the benefitting African countries considering that most of the benefiting countries (for example, Libya, Chad, Congo, Mauritania, Algeria, Sudan – see section on ‘Contextualising the EU-Africa Summit on Migration) have been plagued by wars and conflicts with many educational infrastructures badly damaged, and in some cases beyond repairs (Willman & Knafler 2009). Most of these countries have had to start from scratch to rebuild their educational infrastructure (Castles & Miller, 2003). A majority of the benefitting countries are struggling to cope with high demand for education both in terms of the resourcing of facilities and in terms of the training of qualified professionals (Miller et al. 2005). The negotiation of dangerous migration routes by young people from these countries becomes a cry for help.

The Valletta Summit’s policy on strengthening economic growth and the provision of scholarships is interpreted as that response for the desperate economic, social and educational plight of these young people. The EU member states deemed it necessary to provide more education opportunities to youths from these countries through increased scholarships. Valletta agreed to ‘develop networks between European and African vocational training institutions, with a view to ensuring that vocational training matches labour market needs’ (Valletta 2015:3). This could be considered as a good move in the right direction where the need to create employment opportunities in war ravaged economies is complemented by investments in human and cultural capital which is necessary to sustain the economic sector.

For this reason, the summit’s initiative to ‘support and boost the local information and communication technology sector, including ICT start-up communities and work with them for example, through practical trainings, workshops, mentoring’ (Valletta 2015: 3) could be applauded as a target response to skills shortages among a population of young people with minimal or disrupted education due to wars and conflicts.

The discussion in this section points to the understanding that economic growth goes hand in hand with a good educated work force. Considering that the benefitting African countries were suffering from a depleted work force due to conflicts, wars, AIDS and other factors, the EU member states found the need to provide educational opportunities to youths from these countries in EU countries through increased scholarships. This was justified as a means to meet the summit’s focus on supporting financial education and inclusion of youths in these countries to prevent them from taking dangerous travel routes in the hands of hostile people smugglers. Enhancing the provision of basic services for displaced persons and their communities could be facilitated through increased access to education and vocational training and scholarships were seen as providing such an opening. Duflo (2001); Miguel et al. (2004); Banerjee et al. (2007); Kremer et al. (2009) & Filmer et al. (2014) all argue in their research that scholarships to individuals who do not have reasonable economic opportunities do play and enabling role and could provide local stability and contribute to economic stability. It is important to pursue the EU’s focus on increasing scholarships by further exploring the relationship between scholarships and the impact that could make in the context of the benefiting countries.

***4. Scholarships and its Normative Framework.***

‘We will increase the number of scholarships to African students’ (Valletta, 2015: 3) Scholarships developed from an early practice known as exhibition which is an ancient method to promote education. Exhibition comes from Roman law standing for an endowment for the maintenance of poor scholars, at either school or university (Summerville, 1936). In the 15th Century, Wills of prominent individuals were full of exhibitions and those desirous of becoming pious began the practice of giving exhibitions (Summerville, 1936). Exhibitions were valued by The British Schools of Inquiry Commission of 1867 as a means of bringing the lower-class boy from the country grammar school to university.

In addition, in the latter part of the 19th century, large educational funds were put aside by the state in the hands of Local Authorities to be used for granting scholarships at colleges and universities. Scholarships have developed over time to encourage able children of limited means to obtain an education superior to that of the normal members of their social group. Moon (1930) concludes that scholarships attract a group of freshmen who are superior students when judged by several criteria. Proponents of the scholarship scheme believe that education is a human right, a right to everyone and is for the common good and when it is not provided by the state or is beyond individual reach, generous schemes should step in to make it a possibility for everybody. Such scholarships should be made to either deserving students who cannot go to university or do a specific course because of related costs or to students on the basis of merit, ability or achievement without regard to the financial need of the student. It is supposed, in the EU scholarship policy, that the Trust fund would assist destitute African students who are capable but are hindered by their refugeeness for improved cultural and human access to recognised western universities and to become capable of contributing to nation building on their return to their country of origin. Scholarships therefore become part of the EU’s desire to ‘launch projects to enhance employment opportunities …in East, North and West Africa to enhance the professional skills and employability of young people…’ (Valletta 2015:6)

Theresa May, UK Home Secretary addressing the Conservative Party Conference in 2015 stated: ‘So I don’t care what university lobbyists say: the rules must be enforced. Students yes, over stayers no, and universities must make this happen’ (Morgan, 2015). This comment raises the question whether scholarships to African students still meet the goal of empowering those in need and those who merit them. Britain, like most western countries offering scholarships to African students is becoming increasingly frustrated that these students do not return to Africa after completion of their funded courses. And that raises doubts on the EU immigration policy of increasing scholarships for African students as a way to increase stability and economic opportunities to African countries thereby curbing the outflow of Africans to Europe. Kigotho, 2013) and Nguyen et al. 2008) cast doubts on the return rate of African scholarship holders. Kigotho posits that six out of the ten countries in the world with the highest percentage of citizens living are in Sub Saharan Africa with some of their educated citizens being scholarship holders who have failed to return after completion of their studies.

(See also Hanson 2008; Carrington et al. 1998). Kigothos’ research shows that scholarship holders in the field of health, sciences, engineering and teaching remain in the more affluent countries for better-paid job offers even though they had a commitment to return to their home countries after their scholarship completion. This claim could be strengthened by research commissioned by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in 2010, which concluded that in 1990, Ethiopia has been losing 20.000 professionals annually, and that Africa has lost 75% of its work force to foreign countries. Nguyen et al. (2008) evaluated statistics on the number of Ugandan women who have trained and remained in Western countries and concluded that a country like the United States of America has a shortage of nurses as much as 773 nurses to 100.000population compared to Uganda, which has six nurses to 100.000 population. And if most African students even on scholarship do not return to their respective countries (Kiyotho, 2013; Nguyen et al. 2008), but rather stay on in Europe, or move on to other affluent western countries like Canada, USA, and Australia, how relevant is the policy statement of an increase on education scholarships as a deterrent to refugee outflow from African countries? I intend to approach this through 1) Scholarships as a tool of meeting the educational needs of marginalised people and 2) Scholarships as a vehicle for human capital enhancement in poverty-stricken communities (O’Neill, 1996).

Valletta (2015:6) aimed at ‘promoting mobility of students, researchers and entrepreneurs between Africa and Europe’, which is interpreted as an effort to promote legal migration, and mobility within bilateral cooperation. The summit therefore recognises that some of the youths fleeing from African countries are in search of better education opportunities for better employment prospects. To strengthen this bilateral cooperation on legal migration, EU countries opted to ‘identify as a pilot, one or more professions where participating States commit to make progress on facilitating recognition of skills and qualifications’ (Valletta 2015:6). The policy on scholarships to African youths resonates well with the crisis plaguing most of the countries of the continent. Despite progress in recent decades, a substantial fraction of children in African countries attains little schooling and many adults lack skills that are valued in the labour market (Filmer et al., 2014). In the post-colonial phase, the socio economic and political situation of most African countries has had a huge impact on how education is resourced.

In this phase, a number of factors has blighted the route to development and full education for all in most African countries: most notably, inappropriate systems of education, war, famine, AIDS and poverty (Filmer et al., 2014). The post-colonial picture for many countries was of a legacy of an education system designed to train an elite of students to service the administrative needs of the colonial power (UNESCO 2010a). In most cases, these structures remain inadequate to cope with the realities and the needs of an emerging nation, which needs to educate the majority of students to a good level rather than the minority to a very high level. For this reason, policy makers and academics continue to search for opportunities that can raise educational attainment and learning in poor African countries. That has placed a lot of importance on the value of education scholarships as a means to alleviate the human suffering of such poor developing countries and help to produce a sustainable workforce that can provide economic opportunities and related benefits relevant to the fight against illegal migration (Willman & Knafler, 2009)

Another justification for the strengths of the EU policy on scholarships is the perennial issue of conflicts and wars that has been ravaging much of Africa. Conflicts have had a huge effect on education. In many African countries, the educational infrastructure has been damaged, in some cases beyond repair by fighting (Willman & Knafler 2009). Countries such as Sudan, Congo DRC, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, have had to start from scratch to rebuild their educational infrastructure (Castles &Miller, 2003).There are continual tribal conflicts even in countries where there is reported stability with rampant military coups and dictators determined to die in power. AIDS affects over 25million adults in Africa with some estimates putting rates of infection as high as 28 million. Millions of children are born with or orphaned by the disease (WHO 2009). The effect on education is huge with large numbers of students and teachers infected (WHO 2009; UNESCO 2010a). The value placed on going abroad to obtain an education, far away from disease-ravaged communities, war torn countries cannot be over emphasised, and scholarships are looked at as a medium of sponsorship especially to a population that lives on less than a dollar a day. Scholarships to youths from benefitting countries would provide legal entry routes into EU countries from third country nationals for ‘the purpose of research, studies, pupil exchange, training, voluntary service and au pairing’ (Valletta 2015:7). This effort could help to prevent the loss of life at sea, related organised crimes in the form of migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, which are some of the key policies of the Valletta Summit.

The tremendous hunger for knowledge and education that far outstrips (in most countries) the ability to provide it means that many people remain without education and that can lead to a depleted work force. UNESCO (2009) for example, states that there is a strong demand for education in sub-Saharan Africa, which is reflected in the increase of the gross intake rate from 94.64% to 95.1% for boys and from 83% to 88.4% for girls during the 1990s, and in the growth in the school age population from 58.1 million to 81 million. UNESCO (2009) adds that developments have often proved unequal to demand. For example, in 2000-2001, while Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Uganda, Swaziland and Togo had reached the universal primary school participation objectives (or came close to them) in Angola, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Niger and Tanzania more than half of all school-age-children remained out of school (UNESCO 2009). Reaching universal primary education remains a major challenge for much of Africa. Scholarships, if well applied, could therefore play a role in mitigating these difficulties. The EU member states saw their commitment to ‘double the number of scholarships for students and academic staff through the EU supported ERSMUS+ programme in 2016’ as its contribution to enable African countries meet the unequal demand and supply places in education in their countries.

According to UNESCO (2010b), other key indicators such as the progression to grade six education are also extremely varied. In countries such as Namibia, for example, secondary education rates are relatively high, whereas in countries such as Niger the entry and completion rates for primary education remain low. In general, where statistics are available, increasing numbers of children are entering primary education but still relatively small numbers are completing it (UNESCO, 2008). However, while entry rates are improving, the majority of countries greatly damaged by long civil wars and poverty are still failing to keep enough children in school until Grade 6. At tertiary level, the picture is equally worrying (Miller & Mitchell & Brown 2005). The demand for higher education places is rising at a considerable rate and the majority of countries are struggling to cope with this demand both in terms of the resourcing of facilities and in terms of the training of qualified professionals (Miller et al. 2005). A good number of qualified professionals have fled wars, persecution, relocated to other countries as economic migrants and this has caused a huge brain drain to the African continent (Tebeje, 2010). The triple evils of wars, drain by richer countries of qualified professionals and the prevalence of AIDS have hit the pool of suitably qualified teaching staff at all levels (Hanson 2008). Scholarships become an important vehicle for both the countries and their citizens to acquire an education abroad that is near impossible in the degrading circumstances at home.

Merit-based scholarships have been shown to make a difference in most poor African countries (Filmer et al., 2014; Kremer et al., 2009; Miguel et al., 2004. Duflo 2001, Banerjee et al. 2007).Drawing from this it becomes easier to appreciate that an increase in scholarships was agreed to be an enabling factor that could provide internal stability through education opportunities for the African countries and therefore contribute to better migration management (Valletta, 2015). Although, Amnesty International (2015) argues that the policy on scholarships for African students acts as a bargaining chip for human suffering in Africa where EU affluent countries are intent on simply enlisting African nations as proxy gatekeepers in a one sided border control contract, merit based scholarships have been shown to make a difference in the poorest African countries (Filmer et al., 2014; Kremer et al., 2009; Miguel et al., 2004., Duflo 2001, Banerjee et al. 2007). Duflo (2001) indicates in his research in East Africa that most of the leaders as well as those occupying top positions in public and private sector jobs studied abroad (Europe and the USA) as beneficiaries of scholarships.

Their return to their home country meant that they could be in a position to change the culture of doing things, train more local staff at a cheaper cost and run high profile positions that were often reserved for expatriates at exorbitant wages. Understandably, the policy has just been adopted but not yet with a tested and proven consensus that increased scholarships will reduce human displacement. That is why UNHCR (2015) views the policy as only encouraging the expulsion of people from the only pathways to sanctuary therefore consisting of nothing but hollow words, which do not consider watertight safeguards for human rights of people fleeing persecution. In line with UNHCR, Amnesty International (2015) posits that merit-based scholarships are by their very nature exclusionary because only the gifted and talented would qualify for selection if the process were not damaged by corruption from state officials who are administering them.

The arguments go further to add that many refugees who are under duress and stress from wars, conflicts, persecutions and suffering from trauma cannot meet the merit-based criteria. Drawing on Filmer et al., (2014; Kremer et al., 2009; Miguel et al., 2004., Duflo 2001, Banerjee et al. 2007) it can be argued that merit-based scholarships have been shown to make a difference in most poor African countries, I argue that meritocracy is in line with most African countries’ focus on having the best students and work force trained abroad especially in fields and skill shortages where the African countries have less authority and expertise. The goal is to enable the foreign-trained citizens to acquire the most up to date skills and knowledge to return home and have a significant impact on the remaining majority. It is common knowledge that most universities in the world will recruit the best high performing students and EU countries are likely to fund admission places for the most competitive students.

**5. 1. Understanding the ethic of care**

Cross border migration, conflicts, famine, diseases and poverty in various parts of the world have greatly changed the landscape of human life in recent decades and led to increasing transnational migration (Holton [1998](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)). As a result, various issues and questions on forced immigration and asylum seeking have preoccupied public and educational discourses in the national and international agendas of many countries of the world especially in western countries where sanctuary is often sought. As Corbridge (1993) describes, our lives are radically entwined with the lives of different strangers where there is no logical reason to suppose that moral boundaries should coincide with the boundaries of our everyday community. Consequently, current preoccupations with forced migration and asylum seeking raise an overwhelming concern on the extent to which the boundaries of care can be applied.

Smith (1998 &[2000](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) expands on this concern about boundaries and posits that the ‘positive’ emotion of care forms the basis for an ethic of care in moral philosophy. Introduced by strands of feminism (e.g. Gilligan [1982](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) and extended by communitarians (e.g. Etzioni[1995](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) and other critics of mainstream thinking (e.g. Clement [1996](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true); Hekman [1995](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true); Tronto [1993](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)), the ethic of care ‘raises caring, nurturing, and the maintenance of interpersonal relationships to the status of foundational moral importance’ (Friedman, [1993](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)). Drawing upon the work of Tronto and others, the Dutch political theorist Sevenhuijsen ([1993](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) argues that care is not only fundamentally relational but also needs to be reconciled with justice and democratic concerns; thus, she proposes the notion of caring as a democratic and citizenship issue, an idea that has important practical and political implications on national policies on the plight of refugees in need of protection. The discussion in this paper thus seeks to illustrate the tensions and possibilities that the notion of the ethic of care as a moral, democratic and citizenship value especially in liberal and developed countries may have as an impact on the approach that countries adopt on strangers or others broadly categorised as refugees accessing western borders. The following three questions structure my discussion: what are the contributions and limits of the ethic of care in exploring issues of refugees in our contemporary globalized world? How can the scope of care be extended based on care as an inclusive moral issue? Finally, how can the EU policies in the Valletta Migration Summit especially the policy on scholarships be maximised through the lenses of the ethic of care. In order to approach these questions, I first consider some theoretical debates on the definition of an ethic of care, especially in relation to issues of justice and (in) partiality. Then, I discuss the remoralisation of care on the basis of two related themes: the reconciliation of justice and care, and the rethinking of care on vulnerable humans like refugees. Following this, I lay out some recommendations on how the EU migration summit policy on scholarship could be rethought in order to provide maximum benefits to the vulnerable refugee populations in need.

**5.2. Towards the lenses of the ethic of care**

The ethic of care offers a distinctive challenge to the dominant moral theories – Kantian moral theory, utilitarianism and virtue ethics (Held [2004](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)). Kantian moral theory is seen as a morality of universal principles to which all, taken as free, equal and autonomous individuals choosing impartially, can agree. Utilitarianism is grounded on the idea of maximizing the utility of all taken to be individuals pursuing their own interests; justice is built with the requirement that the utility of each individual is to be seen as of equal importance to that of any other. Thus, actions are right in proportion that they tend to promote happiness and wrong, as they tend to promote unhappiness. Finally, virtue ethics originated in Aristotle's ideas and looks at the role of character in determining what counts as an ethically good life (Cottingham [2000](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)).

The virtues – courage, generosity, affection, truthfulness and the like – are not a matter of isolated acts or decisions, but depend on deeply ingrained habits of mind and feeling. The ethic of care differs from these theories in its assumptions, goals and methods (Held[2004](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true). Among its characteristics is its view of persons as relational and interdependent. Caring relations are especially valued and thus they provide a more satisfying answer to the question of how far we ought to care for others than Kantian moral theory and utilitarianism. As Held writes: ‘Rather than assuming, as do the dominant moral theories, that moral relations are to be seen as entered into voluntarily by free and equal individuals, the ethics of care is developed for the realities, as well, of unequal power and unchosen relations’ (2004, 143). In sum, an ethic of justice focuses on issues of fairness, equality and individual rights, seeking impartiality and universality of principles. The all-important concern about how refugees are treated in the borders and countries of liberal democracies raises questions on the extent of fairness, equality and impartiality and individual rights. As a result, there is an interest on the ethic of care, which focuses on trust, social bonds, cooperation, caring relations and responding to needs.

The ethic of care has gone far beyond its earliest formulations through feminist ethics (Held [2004](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)).Smith ([1998](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true))one of the recent critics of mainstream thinking on the ethic of care, makes a useful distinction that shows how theorizing about the ethic of care has progressed over the years. Smith's distinction is between benevolence, and caring about others, and beneficence, or caring for others. Caring about others is merely the desire to do good or the expression of sympathy and concern; caring for others goes a step further and focuses on doing well or showing active kindness, providing support for their emotional and physical needs and well-being. As Smith ([2000](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) writes, there is moral motivation involved when individuals are induced actively to care for others (i.e. to move from benevolence to beneficence). This moral motivation to care for others – e.g. for refugees and other vulnerable groups– takes various forms. Different individuals may be included in or excluded from the range of ‘us’ and thus are treated as members of our community or as strangers.

Historically, to favour people of ‘our’ community has been an understandable convention that has generally prevailed; care for strangers and especially refugees have been confined to codes of hospitality (Smith [2000](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)). Care for others essentially refers to the ‘felt concern for the good of others and for community with them’, a warmer virtue than the cold calculations of justice, as Baier ([1987](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) argues. Underlying this discussion is a normative tension between an ethic of care and an egalitarian theory of justice. As noted earlier, justice refers to the practice of approaching moral issues with universal principles rather than more local decisions. But is care simply private and particular whereas justice has more universal pretensions? This tension highlights another common dualism: between relativism and universalism or, more precisely, between the abstract Universalist ideal of impartiality and the particularist sentiment and practice of partiality (Smith [2000](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)).

Partiality is expressed in the inclination to favour our dearest (often nearest) people; impartiality is about treating people the same in the same circumstances, irrespective of status, wealth, race, gender or other characteristics. As Smith (2000) explains, while partiality can involve people dear to us who are not necessarily near to us, and while nearness is no guarantee of beneficence, the crucial issue raised is whether geographical proximity is a relevant difference with the moral force to temper wider and perhaps universal humanitarian sentiments based on the recognition that all persons are in some significant way the same or at least very similar. Alternatively, to turn the issue round, are universal similarities sufficient to transcend local particularities? For example, in relation to refugees as individuals who are essentially ‘strangers’, differing positions of power and privilege between care-givers and those strangers create presumptions about people's differences that can be solidified into categories of otherness (Tronto [1993](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)). A major challenge, then, is how to live with strangers who may have different moral claims; or to put this differently: can the conflicting claims of partiality and impartiality be reconciled?

One argument, as pointed out previously, is expressed in the Enlightenment ideal of the impartial formulation of justice – e.g. fair principles and laws for the treatment of all individuals, including others, who are not members of ‘our’ community. However, the expansion of neo imperial powers through the enlarged European Union of 28 member states, the development of the capitalist world economy, and the ongoing exploitation of land and people provide strong evidence for the narrow scope of universalist principles and the categorization and exclusion of others who are ‘different’ (e.g. women, slaves, enemies and foreigners), especially through Enlightenment innovations, such as (restricted) rights of citizenship (O’Neill [1996](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true).).Another argument includes the efforts to extend relations of care to ‘outsiders’ like refugees and treat them morally (Tronto, 1993) on the basis of human similarities, such as the experience of pain and suffering.

For instance, Rorty ([1989](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) has provided a rather narrow interpretation of evidence concerning the rescue of Jews under the Nazis as being mainly dependent on similarities of nationality or profession. Human solidarity, as he argues, is created and contingent rather than based on recognition of the human essence. He writes that solidarity ‘is the ability to see more and more traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race, customs and the like) as unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to pain and humiliation – the ability to think of people wildly different from ourselves as included in the range of ‘us’ (192). However, Geras ([1995](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) provides a wider interpretation and argues that a large majority of rescuers were motivated by the values of equity, care and responsibility that is values that were more inclusive. Geras ([1995](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true).) and Corbridge ([1993](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true).) invite us to empathise with others and put ourselves in their positions – especially those who are disadvantaged like refugees, whose misfortune has been the ‘accident’ of birth in a troubled or poor region like most conflict ridden-African countries. From this perspective, writes Singer ([1995](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true).), ‘we can see that our own sufferings and pleasures are very like the sufferings and pleasures of others, and that there is no reason to give less consideration to the sufferings of others, because they are others’ (222).

In sum, writings on the ethic of care emphasize a relational rather than autonomous conception of the self. As Tronto ([1993](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) explains: ‘humans are not fully autonomous, but must always be understood in a condition of interdependence […] all humans need care’ (162).Therefore, all refugees need care. A feminist ethic of care, in particular, is both a moral disposition and a set of moral sensibilities, responsibilities and practices that arise when care is placed at the centre of human life. But one should not equate the ethic of care with feminist ethics (Held [2004](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)). Tronto (incorporating the work of Fisher) defines care as ‘a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible’ (1993, 103). Robinson ([1999](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) asserts that ‘it is only a narrow, ‘orthodox’ ethics of care – the view of care as essentially a morality for women’ (20). An ethic of care more generally, then, intertwines the universal and the particular: to meet one's caring responsibilities has both universal and particular components. On the one hand, it requires a determination of what caring responsibilities are, in general. It therefore, requires a focus upon the particular kinds of responsibilities and burdens that we might assume because of who, and where, we are situated. (Tronto [1993](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)). For this purpose, Tronto goes so far as to say that care has to be institutionalized because a right to care (like all welfare rights) is linked to social responsibility, not only to individual duty (Silk, 2000).

Nevertheless, even Tronto is not immune to parochialism, as Smith ([1998](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) rightly observes, because she argues that ‘one should care for those around one or in one's society’ (178). Similarly, Noddings ([1984](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) essentially says that we cannot care for people we do not know. Other thinkers (e.g. Ignatieff [1985](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) express concern whether attending to ‘the needs of strangers’ may in fact threaten and eventually ruin the rich states with uncontrolled economic forces and immigration and demands that human rights be guaranteed across boundaries (O’Neill [1996](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)). As O’Neill observes, ‘a background assumption of most affluent lives is that state power will effectively keep most distant strangers more or less in their place and in their poverty’ (1996, 114–5). Perhaps this justifies the position of the EU to contain refugees in their countries through the provision of the 1.8 billion euros Emergency Fund to volatile African countries and through the increase in scholarships to African students so that they can study in European countries and return home to rebuild their countries. This is not just what O’Neill (1996) refers to as keeping ‘most distant strangers more or less in their place and in their poverty’ (114) but it also means that opportunities for increased human capital are provided to a selected and capable few whose return to their countries can have a generative impact and promote economic growth.

In most European countries or the western world, there is an increasing armoury of technologies of control and exclusionary policies that are mobilized to keep refugees out of European countries (Nyers[2003](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true); Heilman, 1995). These include detention facilities and prevention of access to work, education, healthcare and housing as well as forceful repatriation. Public discourses and news media hostility towards refugees play a crucial role in circulating the idea that these groups pose a threat to the well-being and security of a state. Once the other is constituted as a threat to ‘our’ sense of national belonging, then ‘we’ learn to desire and demand ‘their’ exclusion from the sphere of human values, civic rights and moral obligations (Papastergiadis [2006](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true).; Tyler, 2006).

Most Schengen countries are considering border control with Denmark, Sweden, Hungary, considering border checks. Containing the flow of refugees in their country of origin seems to be an effective policy through the emergency fund and increase scholarships. EU member countries also see this as an opportunity towards curbing the number of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea caused by people smugglers and risky routes to European shores.

Returning, then, to the issue of how far an ethic of care can go, it becomes obvious that this is not simply an issue of norms and values (i.e. the moral problem of otherness) but of power relations and privilege. This provides a solid starting point for remoralising care as an inclusive and humanitarian practice.

***6. Implications and Conclusions***

Two related themes are discussed in this section as a response to the limits of the ethic of care identified earlier. These themes are the reconciliation of justice and care as an inclusive impartial moral value. Both themes are important in extending the scope of care and its practical and political implications on the lives of strangers like refugees. Smith (2000) has argued that a reconciliation of the tensions between the conflicting claims of justice and care is important, if a sense of empathetic engagement is to have any implications for the quality of collective social life of vulnerable or marginalised people in need. As he explains, in many western states the absence of such a sensibility creates the stark marginalization and exclusion of many vulnerable groups, especially refugees who depend on the very western communities for care and protection. Therefore, it is not difficult to see how the ethic of care that rejects the false dichotomy between justice and care can have substantive implications for the everyday lives of marginalized groups like refugees. Citing Barry ([1995](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true).) and O’Neill ([1996](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)), Smith argues that impartial justice and Gilligan-inspired care can be reconciled in that they function at different orders or levels of moral deliberation – there is a set of rules of justice at the general level, but there is also room for care in shaping one's life. Justice is about seeking supporting institutions and policies that reject injury and suffering so that caring activities are enabled. The EU refugee policies of a 1.8-billion-euro fund and increased scholarships to African students may seem inadequate but this is a step in the right direction where justice and care are reconciled.

A similar response is posited by Tronto ([1993](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) and Clement ([1996](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)): in their writings, justice is connected to care, solidarity, compassion and empathy. Both justice and care, it is argued, are involved in how people live their lives. Both are about the inclusion of different perspectives on situations; justice cannot be reduced to care and vice versa, for each is required for the other. Thus, justice connected to care does not accept the status quo unquestioningly, but seeks progressive change ‘on the basis of an enlarged and continuously enlarging moral sphere that seeks to respect and engage the largest number of moral viewpoints possible’ (Gleeson and Kearns [2001](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)). Recognition of value pluralism (Berlin [1990](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true); [2002](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)), however, does not mean the abandonment of general principles or the rejection of progressive policy change that has real effects on the inclusion of marginalized groups (like refugees) in society.

For example, a focus on care could provoke policy changes about the justice of the treatment of refugees. In this way, care and justice are not seen as competitors, but as allies in the formation of democratic and inclusive practices and policies. As Clement ([1996](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) asserts, care helps us recognize our justice obligations to others (regardless of whether they are close or distant from us). Thus, the capacity to empathize with others who suffer requires something more than a simple focus on relationality (found in feminism and communitarian discourses); it requires renewed political economies and institutional arrangements grounded in justice. This is to advocate a concept and practice of an enlarged and constantly enlarging justice through the reconceptualization of an ethic of care. An ethic of care, then, expands the consideration of justice obligations to others, a process that produces new and unexpected moral imaginaries of ‘caring communities’ (Gleeson and Kearns [2001](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)).

Furthermore, in exploring the relational aspects of care and the question of how far we should care, Sevenhuijsen ([1998](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) examines the ethic of care as a principle of modern citizenship and suggests that care can be seen as providing a more universalistic set of ethical principles for public life rather than being defined as intensely personal. Thus, drawing together different strands of the ethics of care, a new remoralisation of care, that is, care as an inclusive moral issue (Kabeer [2005](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) is utilized in conjunction with notions of caring as a humanitarian practice (Sevenhuijsen[2000](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true); Tronto [2001](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)). This reconceptualization highlights the right of each citizen to be able to give and to receive care. More specifically, Knijn and Kremer ([1997](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true).) argue that citizenship should be reconceptualised so that every citizen will be a caregiver sometime in their life: all human beings were dependent on care when they were young, and will need care when they are ill, handicapped, frail or old. Care is thus not a women's issue but a moral humanitarian issue. Although this approach to caring as a humanitarian practice is clearly contextualized within the boundaries of modern nation-states and citizenship which reflects winners and losers in the political game (Tronto [2001](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)), there is no reason why human beings should be responsible (as care-givers) only to those with whom we share citizenship rights (or have shared understandings).

Both Knijn and Kremer's as well as Tronto's accounts do not unseat the image of the citizen within classical definitions of citizenship in modern nation states. However, Card ([2002](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) argues that human rights are above any responsibility connected to citizenship rights, the point being that those to whom one may be accountable (morally or legally) need not be members of one's own legal community. So western states need not only care for their citizens but to those in need like refugees and this comes across as a fundamental human principle.

Morris ([2001](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) also makes an appeal for an inclusive ethics of care built on the concept of human rights. As she writes: ‘We need an ethics of care which is based on the principle that to deny the human rights of our fellow human beings is to deny our own humanity … Most importantly we need an ethics of care which, while starting from the position that everyone has the same human rights, also recognizes the additional requirements that some people have in order to access those human rights’ (15). Clearly, such an ethics of care differs from the ethics of care proposed by feminist moral philosophers working in the tradition of Gilligan, Noddings and Tronto (Fine [2007](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)). For Morris, an ethic of care is a measure of justice based on access to care as a human right. The political recognition of caring – that is, the practice of caring as political citizenship (see also Kershaw [2005](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) – raises the issue of rethinking the meaning(s) of the politics of care. For instance, caring as a democratic practice forms the basis for an approach that rejects the discrimination of individuals (refugees and others) by those in authority (policymakers, immigration officers, etc.) on grounds of their ethnicity. This approach creates openings for a public dialogue that recognizes the visible labour contributions that refugees make to the prosperity of many European countries, as opposed to the lack of rights and recognition accorded to them by the state (Fortier [2005](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true), Zembylas, 2010). An active political discussion about the changing nature of care opens up a number of possibilities within which to develop renewed institutional policies and practices concerning immigration.

At the same time, the recognition of the contribution of marginalized groups like refugees is closely bound up with questions about care. Tronto ([2001](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) suggests a number of issues that need to be addressed at the public level: how does a society define caring needs (‘the politics of needs interpretation’, as Fraser ([1987](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2010.516636?scroll=top&needAccess=true)) calls it, for whom, and how those needs are linked to demands for justice? How do power and privilege shape care demands and address the moral problem of otherness? All in all, fair treatment and care for fellow human beings are not dependent on traditional perceptions of justice entitlements. Rethinking care and rights, Tronto argues, involves what it might mean to assert a citizenship right; this requires extending definitions of social rights as well as describing the rights to care or not care.

Returning to the policy of increasing scholarships to African students from these countries, I acknowledge the existence of counter arguments of many authors and Human Rights Groups, which conclude that scholarships and monetary aid packages to African countries could be counterproductive. Whilst acknowledging that the increase in scholarships may not be a smooth policy ride, I however posit that the development aid and increased scholarships could be made to become a long-term policy trend revaluated and improved upon thereafter. The ultimate aim of development aid should be to eradicate poverty; to support social, economic, political and environmental progress of a developing country over a relatively long period. Scholarships as aid are not being used here to subordinate the ultimate goal of poverty eradication and reducing inequality. Secondly, some of the concerns of the scholarship scheme could be minimised by rolling these out to UNHCR camps where refugees are temporary lodged or resettled. This will mean that refugees have better chances of accessing these funds and schemes without their ‘repressive’ governments able to discriminate their access to these schemes. Finally, European countries in the EU could directly administer these scholarships so that they are able to ascertain that only those who actually need them become the beneficiaries. This would help prevent the scholarship schemes from being misused by people in authority to the benefit of their family members. The Summit asserts that some of the scholarship schemes would be administered through the ERASMUS+ programme, which allows donor countries to develop selection criteria, decide the implementation mechanism.

To conclude, the summit seems to make an effort in the direction of Geras (1995) and Corbridge (1993) who invite humans to empathise with one another especially those who are disadvantaged like refugees. And as Singer (1995) earlier suggested, ‘we can see that our own sufferings and pleasures are very like the sufferings and pleasures of others, and that there is no reason to give less consideration to the sufferings of others, because they are others’ (222). Tronto (1993; 2001) sustains this line of reasoning further by stating that care should be institutionalised because a right to care (like all welfare rights) is linked to social responsibility and not only to individual duty.

These authors all agree on care as inseparable from human nature and this leads to the conclusion that the politics of the ethic of care could provide useful guidance on how humans, countries and political blocs like the EU could interrogate their policies and approach to refugee crisis. Cohen and Manion (2000:40) consider ‘research as a tool for advancing knowledge, promoting progress and enabling humans to relate more effectively to their environment, accomplish their purposes and resolve conflicts.’ An interrogation of the policy context of the EU-Africa summit on migration, 2015 within the context of care provides a platform for further political debates on how to relate to the ever-increasing refugee crisis affecting Europe and the world. Agreeing to use initiate an increased scholarship scheme that would enable the mobility of students and university staff between Europe and Africa; encourage joint research projects, work towards mutual recognition of academic qualifications and professional certificates and strengthen partnerships and ‘brain circulation’ through increased scholarship schemes for Africans

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