China’s aid modalities of human resource development in Africa and an exploration in Tanzania: Differences and recognitions

In Working Group ‘Co-operation in Training: New Versions of Human Resource Development (HRD) with the New Development Partners?’

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Abstract

This paper talks about the modalities of Chinese human resource development (HRD) support to Africa, and the case of Tanzania. Since the hold of FOCAC from the new century, China has engaged a lot in the field of student scholarship, short term training, school building, Confucius Institute and university cooperation in Africa. The fieldwork in Tanzania also found the practice evidence of most of these approaches. The practice featured in some ways which are quite different from the Western aid modalities- it is not professional aid; it is not keen on direct budget; and there is a trend of one-to-one institutional cooperation. Although Tanzanian people in the field interviews are not quite interested in talking and comparing about those differences, they did show a willing to know and experience China’s education and training based on their different feeling towards China. It is hard to put this Chinese aid into any emerged aid model, which may motivate people to think wider about the meaning of education in the current global political economy.

1. FOCAC and its promises on education

Since the 2006 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) announced a strengthened relationship between China and Africa, there has been increasing interest about what that may mean for the forms and consequences of Chinese aid. Under this context education has been considered as a part in the FOCAC policies. Chinese government made an emphasis on government scholarships, vocational and applicable technological education, training and language teaching (FOCAC, 2006), and these educational actions are closely related with other principles on China’s policy - as China has a view of human resource and social development that covers education, health, culture and people-to-people exchange and collaboration (King, 2007: 338).

The FOCAC is held every three years since 2000, representing a more systematically framed partnership between China and Africa. In June 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao stressed that the Chinese Government would endeavour to shape a new Sino-African partnership based on long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit, and On 12 January 2006, the Chinese government released China’s African Policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2006) which declared the country’s future aims and practice plans in Africa, and also made the specific field of practice clearer. Education as a part is included into the African Policy and each FOCAC Action Plans.

Look back to the 2006 and 2009 (the latest) FOCAC pledges and what they have promised and achieved (which will be shown in the following table), it could be seen that, Chinese government has kept making effort on education and also on how expand the impact of their educational support to Africa. The key changes and progress between 2006 and 2009 FOCAC could be listed as follows: (1) 2006 Beijing Action Plan (BJAP) decided to build 100 rural schools for Africa, and this has been achieved by 96 schools until 2009; the plan of building ‘rural schools’ was transferred to ‘build 50 China-Africa friendship schools’ in 2010-2012 in 2009 Sharmel Sheikh Action Plan (SSAP); (2) Increasing number of government scholarships were promised to be given to Africa, and
The number of scholarship recipients increased by 700 year-on-year both in 2007 and 2008 and by 600 in 2009 (ibid); (3) Training was mentioned in both FOCAC plans as part of HRD as well as education- China has trained over 10,000 African professionals in various fields under the African Human Resources Development Fund (AHRDF) by 2006, and said in 2009 that until the end of 2009 the government would have ‘trained for African countries over 15,000 professionals in business, education, health, science and technology, culture, agriculture, poverty reduction, customs, quality inspection, telecommunications, environmental protection, maritime affairs and media’ (FOCAC, 2009b); the SSAP promised to increase this number, to train 20,000 people in various sectors between 2010-2012 (FOCAC, 2009a). It was emphasized in the educational field that China would make ‘intensify efforts to train teachers for primary, secondary and vocational schools in Africa, and help African countries train 1,500 school headmasters and teachers over the next three years since 2010 (ibid); (4) Continue to promote the development of Confucius Institutes (CIs). It was said in 2009 implementation that 23 Confucius Institutes or classrooms have been opened in 16 African countries including Egypt, Benin, Botswana, Togo, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Kenya, Liberia and Rwanda, helping African countries with the teaching of the Chinese language (FOCAC, 2009b), but the number of the institutes has not been promised on 2009 SSAP (FOCAC, 2009a); (5) New plan on university cooperation emerged- 2009 SSAP proposed the implementation of the ‘20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education’ to establish ‘a new type of one-to-one inter-institutional cooperation model between 20 Chinese universities (or vocational colleges) and 20 African universities (or vocational colleges)’ (FOCAC, 2009a).

It could be more proper to talk about Chinese educational aid to Africa under a wider range – the HRD support, as the training plans are not only within the formal university education (for academic degrees) range, but also within a wider conception of education, particularly the short term training. Thus this paper would like to call all these modalities as Chinese HRD aid to Africa, and this paper wants to make two point more clearly: firstly, the modalities of Chinese HRD aid we examined in Tanzania (related to the FOCAC pledges); and secondly, the key features especially the different features Chinese aid has from the Western aid. Finally it may give some implication when we think about it more deeply, in terms of the logic of donors.

2. Overview of China-Tanzania HRD practice under the FOCAC pledges

A fieldwork was conducted in Tanzania as an empirical part of my PhD study. Semi-structured interview was chosen to collect different people’s perception of Chinese aid. These participants include officials from Tanzanian ministries and Chinese embassy in Dar es Salaam, as well as institutional leaders in Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT), Dar es Salaam University College of Education (DUCE) and Benjamin Mkapa High School. DIT has a long history of cooperation with Chinese embassy in Dar es Salaam and the institute has quite a few lecturers trained in China; DUCE was negotiating with Chinese embassy for establishing a Confucius Institute at the fieldwork
time; and the Mkapa School has a Chinese Culture Centre (more like a library) with books and pictures donated by China.

The table below shows the general situation of China-Africa educational cooperation and the overall practice or practice planned in Tanzania, as well as the practice particularly investigated in my fieldwork. The general modalities of the Chinese aid in Africa, as summarised from both documentary resources and my fieldwork data, include (1) government scholarship, (2) short-term training, (3) cultural exchanges, (4) Confucius Institute, (5) school building and donation, (6) teacher secondment, and (7) university cooperation.

Chinese government does not provide details of the financial commitment or amounts it promised to African countries on each of these approaches. This unclarity may be for three reasons. Firstly, as we will show below, China’s aid does not come in the form of cash, or cost calculable projects. The dominant aid modality is scholarships and no figures are available on the cost of each scholarship, for instance, university income for overseas scholars. In effect, only the cost of building is easily obtainable, and this is shown in the table below. The second reason is the more general one that Chinese aid delivery channels are fragmented across several government ministries or institutions. The main authority is the Ministry of Commerce, but various other governmental bodies such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Chinese Embassies, and the State Council are involved in the decision making process (Pehnelt, 2007: 2; Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, 2009: 19). Thirdly, according to Pehnelt (2007: 2), as well as the problem of fragmentation, analyzing the size and quality of China’s aid program is not a trivial task because of a fundamental lack of transparency.

In the educational field, aid and cooperation plans are always carried out by Ministry of Education and Ministry of Commerce, in accordance with Chinese Embassies and authorised Chinese universities. The amount budgeted for China-Africa cooperation on higher education and research programmes since 1995, is 10 million RMB (about 1.53 million USD) budget, within which 60%-70% is for staff and 30%-40% for teaching facilities (PKUCAS, 2005: 28). The FOCAC pledges showed the numbers of the commitments, for instance, scholarships and schools that China promises (which can be seen in the following table) but not the financial statistics. In terms of scholarships, figures recently published by the China Daily show that China increased the total finance of government scholarships to 6.5 billion RMB in 2010 (about 0.99 billion USD) which includes the finance for African students (China Daily, 01/02/2010). Summing the living cost component (the only cash delivered to students) of each scholarship enables us to make a rough calculation of the level of investment involved. The allocations are 1,400 RMB for undergraduate students monthly, 1,700 RMB for master students monthly, and 2,000 RMB for PhD students monthly (ibid). This adds up to about 72,000 RMB (about 11,076 USD) for the living cost of a PhD study and 61,200 RMB (about 9,415 USD) for a Master study (both are 36 months) in China.¹ More specifically, as we see in the Table

¹ The tuition fee, accommodation fee and some travel grants are paid by Chinese government. The cash in the above calculation are given to students for living and study.
below, China planned to allocate 72 scholarships to Tanzanian students in 2011. If we assume that the average cost of these may be close to the cost of the Masters support, 1,700 RMB monthly, that adds up to a total of around 1,468,800 RMB (about 225,969 USD) per year for scholarship support to Tanzania.

Table: China's HRD aid to Tanzania related to the general situation

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<tr>
<th>Aid approaches</th>
<th>General situation (FOCAC pledges)</th>
<th>Tanzanian situation</th>
<th>My fieldwork</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Government scholarship</strong></td>
<td>Achieved 4,000 by 2009 and aim to 5,500 by 2012 (FOCAC, 2009b)</td>
<td>Main approach, keep 100 Tanzanian students in China every year under ‘Cultural Agreement’ and some extra numbers as a ‘follow up of FOCAC 2006’ (Embassy of the PRC in the United republic of Tanzania, 2009a); Chinese universities and colleges will enroll 72 Tanzanian students for bachelor, master and doctor degrees in 2011 (Xinhuanet, 2011)</td>
<td>In Tanzania, officials from both of Chinese Embassy in Tanzania and Tanzanian Ministry of Education confirmed and introduced this way (as the main approach of Chinese educational aid) and its procedure</td>
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<td><strong>Short-term training</strong></td>
<td>Annual training for educational officials, heads and leading teachers of universities, primary, secondary and vocational schools in Africa (FOCAC, 2006)²</td>
<td>Not showed specifically on official documents</td>
<td>This way was also confirmed and introduced by officials in Chinese Embassy. Principal of DUCE attended a short term training in China in 2007; In China, ZINU lecturers showed me their three-year training summaries</td>
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<td><strong>Cultural exchanges (related education)</strong></td>
<td>The FOCAC pledges included ‘to promote cultural exchanges’ (FOCAC, 2006; 2009a); and</td>
<td>Cultural Agreement between China and Tanzania (the implementation programme has been signed every four years; latest one is for 2009-2012); Mkapa Cultural</td>
<td>The principal and secretary of Mkapa School showed me the room and donated books of Chinese Culture</td>
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² It was added in the 2009 SSAP that, there would be 200 middle and high level African administrative personnel on MPA programs in China in three years; China would help African countries train teachers for primary, secondary and vocational schools and train 1,500 school headmasters and teachers over the next three years (FOCAC, 2009a).
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<td>planned to hold the FOCAC Culture Forum in future in 2009 Action Plan</td>
<td>Centre has been reported frequently on Chinese media</td>
<td>Centre</td>
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<td><strong>Confucius Institute</strong></td>
<td>Up to October 2010, there were 21 CIs in 16 African countries, and 5 Confucius Classrooms in 5 African countries (Hanban, 2010)</td>
<td>Planned but not yet built in Tanzania; Nanjing University of Information Science &amp; Technology (2009) indicated the prospect of establishing CI in University of Dar es Salaam (UDES) in 2009⁵</td>
<td>In DUCE, it was confirmed by the principal that a CI plan was in the draft stage between DUCE and Chinese Embassy but not established yet⁴</td>
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<td><strong>School building and donation</strong></td>
<td>Planned to build 100 rural schools in 2006-2009 and set up 96 by 2009 (FOCAC, 2009b);⁵ aim to build 50 China-Africa friendship schools by 2012 (FOCAC, 2009a)</td>
<td>Mkapa High School-computers, piano and books donated by China; Msoga Primary School - the first China-aided primary school hailed in Tanzania in January 2011 with total cost of 5 million RMB (about 750,000 USD) (Xinhuanet, 18/01/2011)⁶</td>
<td>The principal of Mkapa School talked about donation from China</td>
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<td><strong>Teachers secondment</strong></td>
<td>Mentioned as an approach by PKUCAS (2005) book but not as a main approach in FOCAC policies⁷</td>
<td>Chinese side provides DIT with two micro-computer teachers (Embassy of the PRC in United Republic of Tanzania, 2008a)</td>
<td>The principal of DIT talked about 4 previous Chinese experts dispatched to DIT, and 2 current Chinese teachers teaching</td>
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⁵ According to Nanjing University of Information & Technology (31/12/2009), the Secretary of the university signed the Memorandum of Understanding with vice-chancellor of UDES, Mukandala, on 14th December of 2009. The two sides showed the interest on building CI. Chinese ambassador Liu Xinsheng also encouraged the university to enter into Tanzania and establish CI.

⁴ This CI should be as same as the one mentioned by Nanjing University of Information & Technology (ibid). DUCE is a constituent college of the UDES.

⁵ The aim was to build 100 rural schools in Africa (in BJAP) (FOCAC, 2006). Up to November 2009, according to FOCAC’s (2009b) ‘Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the Beijing Summit’, the teaching equipment for the 30 schools have been delivered and the construction of 91 out of the 96 schools has started, of which 66 have been completed. Construction of the remaining five will start by the end of this year.

⁶ According to Xinhuanet (18/01/2011), the school was constructed by the Beijing Construction Engineering Group Co. Ltd. Msoga Primary School is one of the three primary schools China promised to build in Tanzania under the action plan of the Beijing Summit.

⁷ The book ‘China Africa Education Cooperation’ (2005) (in Chinese) reviews China-Africa cooperation on education, including the history, performance, problems and prospects. It is edited and written by the Centre for African Studies of Beijing University (PKUCAS), entrusted by the Department of International Cooperation and Exchanges, the Ministry of Education of PRC.
University cooperation

The ‘20+20 Cooperation Plan’; Two MPA (master of public administration) programs for developing countries in Peking University and Tsinghua University with the participation of 42 students from 16 African countries in 2009 (FOCAC, 2009a)

Agreement on the cooperative project of higher education between the Ministry of Education of PRC and the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education of Tanzania was signed in June, 2000 (Embassy of the PRC in the United Republic of Tanzania, 2008b); ‘20+20’ between UDES and East China Normal University

DIT principal spoke about the collaborative project with Xi’an Jiao Tong university on a Highway and Transportation Engineering Laboratory

3. Features and differences?

What we want to get from the above table is not only the diverse modalities of Chinese aid, but also the features which may differ from the Western donors’ action. The conception of ‘aid modality’ here refers to the means and mechanisms by which aid is provided, and how funds and knowledge are transmitted to recipient countries (Ohno and Niiya, 2004: 3).

In terms of the Western context, from the new century, there has been increased use of the term ‘new aid architecture’ (Farrington and Lomax, 2001) which refers primarily to from donorship to ownership, from Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) to Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSP), from project funding to Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAPs), and these are still in the evolution. Later according to Ohno and Niiya (2004: 7), there have been three shifts towards to a new aid modality. The first shift is from ‘stand-alone’ projects to project ‘clustering’, often in the form of pooling funds. The second shift is from structural adjustment operations to General Budget Support (GBS) under the PRSP agenda. Third, some donors, particularly British Department of International Development (DFID), have moved from SWAp to GBS, based on the view that GBS is a ‘preferred’ or more ‘progressive’ aid modality. It is interesting to summarise China’s position and aid modality features within the process of these shifts.

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8 See more explanation in the following section.
9 According to Farrington ed. (2001), a SWAp is the process by which funding for a sector – whether internal or from donors – supports a single policy and expenditure programme under government leadership, and thereafter adopts common approaches across the sector.
The exploration of the fieldwork data helped us find out more evidence about how aid has been and is provided by the Western and Chinese donors. The main differentiating characteristics of China’s aid modality are as follows:

(1) China does not ‘do’ ‘professional aid’. In what has been described as its ‘technocratic frame’ (Kothari, 2005: 443), Western aid is typically delivered through bureaucratised and professionalised consultants and specialist agencies and organisation, often competitive between NGOs, and between countries, and prone to corruption. This is one of the main reasons for criticisms of Western aid. Differently, China has little delegation to, or participation/involvement of local actors, and puts considerable emphasis on direct constructions by Chinese engineers, or direct transferring and sharing its own experience as a developing country. This has been subject to other criticisms, referring to the limiting of learning opportunities for developing countries.

Same in the educational field, when we go back to the problem of the aforementioned financial commitment issue, it can be seen that China does not so concern with evaluating how recipient countries manage the money hence there is much less accountabilities of recipients. There is no central foreign-aid agency (an institute such as DFID of UK), although there is a Department of Aid to Foreign Countries under Ministry of Commerce of the PRC. Beijing often designates different ministries (or, in some instances, provinces) to tackle different projects in different countries (Davis and Woetzel, 2010).

Within this ‘un-professional’ aid relationship, while building schools and offering scholarships are not in themselves special forms of aid approaches (these approaches also can be seen in Western aid), in terms of Chinese aid, these forms are related not with accountabilities but with reciprocities. It is hard to define Chinese schools or scholarships as a kind of project aid, as in the Western idea of project aid, in the sense that ‘the project approach is based on the identification of a specific area of intervention for donor involvement, and the targeted use of funds for specific activities for which the objectives, outputs and inputs required to achieve them have been defined’ (Ohno and Niiya, 2004: 3). China carries out the education and training but does not intervene to evaluate how well they have been implemented. Individual recipients are evaluated by the university educational system when they are in China, but are not required to show they have used scholarships properly to any aid agency in China. The point/motive of China is creating a basis for long term trade and other exchanges.

(2) China is not keen on ‘cash aid’. China does not finance the Tanzanian Ministry of Education or give big amount money to the schools directly. This is also indicated by Brautigam (2009: 124):

… a growing trend in the West, where donors have begun to believe that a relatively well-governed country should be able to make its own decisions about how to use foreign assistance. Although the Chinese are aware of this trend, they are not following it. They rarely give cash aid in any significant amount.
And as she says, don’t mistake the cash aid to be a donation. China also likes donating some goods to schools (such as they did to Mkapa School in Dar es Salaam with the computers and books, etc.). According to Brautigam (2009: 125), the difference is a normal grant-in-kind with a value in Chinese currency, while a cash grant will normally be announced with a value in US dollars. Moreover, donations also make for good pictures in the media, which build a nice image of China in Africa (just as the Cultural Centre and the donated pictures and books do).

There is not yet any evidence of China joining in the trend of moving to ‘new aid modalities’ such as giving money directly to the recipient government with the Western donors who are still the main bilateral and multilateral donors in Africa. In Tanzania, the efforts for educational achievements were made by both national ministries and international (bilateral and multilateral aid) partners/donors. Within a process of seeking aid harmonisation (among donors and between donors and GoT) and reduction of the transaction costs (increasing aid effectiveness) and replication of policies, the aid modalities of Western donors have been moving from project funding to basket funding, and more recently, towards the direct GBS (however each donor has their own plans on aid strategy; for instance, when a pooled fund was established by a group of bilateral donors, DFID had already started general budget).

In the primary educational field, despite some donation of teaching facilities we examined in the fieldwork, it seems China still focuses on building schools – from rural schools to friendship schools, which it also constructs itself; in the higher educational field, China focuses on government scholarship and university cooperation. Again it gives the completed project, not ‘money’ and ‘assistance’. The government is not interested in becoming involved in managing aid flows, but in building a good image of China and a long term relationship with Africa through human resource development support.

In the higher educational field, the fieldwork data in Tanzania clearly showed me that, the most impressive modality of Chinese educational aid is the government scholarships. As shown in the table, government scholarship is also the important part in educational principles in the FOCAC pledges. The exploration of the situation of Chinese government scholarship in Tanzania started from enquiries at the Chinese embassy, as the ‘diplomatic’ characteristic is key and even overhead of the educational issues within this practice. The embassies play a key role in China’s foreign aid policy. They are the main channel of providing aid - embassy staffs negotiate with recipient governments, define the specific requirements, and frequently implement the projects (Pehnelt, 2007: 2).

(3) China likes to build ‘brother’ universities. Continued with Chinese focus on higher education mentioned above, it should be emphasized here that, one important feature of

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10 The ‘brother’ here is used by this paper, just for describing the one-to-one relation between Chinese and African universities. It is a new strategic partnership under the China-Africa ‘win-win’ slogan rather than the previous China-Africa socialist ‘brother’ relationship which meant more about the alignment against the capitalism and colonialism.
Chinese aid modality is a trend towards building one-to-one relationships between universities, either by organising short-term training, or by establishing CIs. The 20+20 Plan in 2009 FOCAC documents particularly emphasised this again. This plan is said to ‘establish a new type of one-to-one inter-institutional cooperation model between 20 Chinese universities (or vocational colleges) and 20 African universities (or vocational colleges)’ (FOCAC, 2009a). King (2010) exactly pointed out this distinctive modality:

A further distinguishing modality of the Confucius Institute and Classroom is that each of these bodies overseas is formally linked to an appropriate university or secondary school in China. This partnership then provides the source of the Chinese co-director of the Confucius Institutes in Africa as well as of the regular and volunteer teachers of Chinese to go to the African university. The Chinese partner can also become the host for the different scholarship and other language visitors to China (King, 2010: 82).

Apart from the scholarships offered by diverse Chinese universities, one-to-one university cooperation plays an important part in enlarging China-Tanzania cooperation. As we have found on ground in Tanzania, DIT has a long history with Xi’an Jiao Tong University (in Xi’an, China) since 1990s. Under the agreement between the PRC and the United Republic of Tanzania in 1991, a collaborative project between Xian Highway University (Xi’an Jiao Tong University, China) and Dar es Salaam Technical College (currently DIT) was set up to develop a Highway and Transportation Engineering Laboratory. In 1993, the laboratory was established through ‘generous assistance’ from China. The main objective of this project was to strengthen the DIT’s highway section by providing equipment, experts and training staff in the field of Highway and Transportation Engineering. Four experts from China were dispatched to DIT to assist their counterparts in technology transfer. The experts helped manage to install equipment in the lab and to teach in the highway engineering field.

The practice that happened after my fieldwork shows a trend of strengthened university cooperation between China and Africa, especially with the involvement of one of the top Chinese universities- East China Normal University (ECNU) (in Shanghai, China) which is collaborating with UDES under the 20+20 Plan. UDES signed Memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Nanjing University of Information and Technology in December 2009; East China Normal University (ECNU) signed cooperation MoU with 3 Tanzanian universities: Nelson Mandela University of Science and Engineering (in Arusha), Tanzanian National Education Research Institute and UDES in March 2010 (ECNU, 05/03/2010); Moreover, ECNU and UDES built one-to-one cooperation under 20+20 plan (Xinhuanet, 28/06/2010).

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11 It was also emphasised in 2009 Action Plan that ‘the two sides proposed to implement a China-Africa joint research and exchange plan to strengthen cooperation and exchanges between scholars and think tanks of the two sides through a variety of ways, such as seminars, mutual academic visits, and joint research projects.’ (FOCAC, 2009)
12 This historical information is from the document given to me by the vice principal of DIT. The document’s title is Support to DIT extended by the Peoples Republic of China to DIT since 2002.”
Above all, Chinese aid appears with the characteristics of ‘un-professional’ with direct ‘project’ (different from the Western project management), not in direct finance but a lot in human resource support such as scholarships, as well as one-to-one university cooperation. It is in a reciprocity system rather than in an aid system. Although it is not under the track of the Western aid towards to the ‘new aid modalities’ as in fact, the term ‘new modalities’ is mainly within the Western context and discourse, it doesn’t mean China still stay the same as it has been. Rather say China is moving to any new modality, it may be more proper to say, China has never been in a traditional logic of aid as Western donors have defined. It is changing in another way, mainly based on China’s development motives and its role in the world. Cash aid or GBS may not be suitable for Chinese reality, thus the support of human resource (the diverse forms of education) appears to be especially important for the China-Africa relation.

4. Recognitions and implications

The three points stated above are within a special Chinese model of aid, or Chinese ‘donor logic’ of aid.\(^{13}\) Whatever what we summarized here, however, are these features realized by people who are related to aid practice? The fieldwork aimed to seek people’s perception of Chinese educational aid, and whether the differences between Chinese and Western aid can be recognized. The result of the exploration showed that, from the side of recipient, actually, the recipients (either an individual who got the Chinese government scholarship before or a leader/lecturer from an institution) are not keen on talking about the differences between Chinese aid and Western aid – the diplomatic politics are far away from their life; however, most of the recipients showed their interests in Chinese scholarships, trainings and CIs, especially, they are interested in how China get the rapid development in recent years and what useful knowledge they can get for personal career or for institutional development and cooperation. From the side of Chinese government, the official people from the Chinese Embassy in Dar es Salaam confirmed the main aid modalities which are as similar as what mentioned on FOCAC policies (this can be seen in the aforementioned table), and stated that China realized the changes of the history and the socialism brothers’ time passed already hence China wouldn’t confront or replace any Western donors’ positions in Tanzania. Some key recognitions of Chinese aid modality are as follows:

Firstly, despite donations and constructions to schools, Chinese government is aware that, rather than providing a big amount of money, one of the best choices more suitable for current capacity of China is the support of human resource - training African people in China with long term study for degrees or short term workshop for skills and experience. The Chinese media likes to use a proverb from Lao-Tzu to describe China’s logic of educational assistance for Africa: ‘Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach him how to fish and you feed him for a lifetime’. Moreover, when both parties depend on

\(^{13}\) According to my PhD thesis, the ‘donor logic’ refers to (or we can say, it is researchable according to) an assemblage of aid categories including ‘what is given’, ‘why aid’, ‘conditions of aid’, modalities/paradigms of aid’, ‘technocratic frame of aid practice’ and ‘aid relationships’.
the fish, the ‘teaching’ approach seems more meaningful. The Chinese choice of aid modality can be seen from the interview of Chinese Ambassador in Tanzania:

For our aid project, the advantage is, we can control the whole process, such as building the national sport stadium or the hospital or the schools. Tanzanian does not have to control the money so we can use the budget very efficiently. We say we devote 0.1 billion, but the money is in Chinese Ministry of Commerce. We have our own construction team and we give Tanzanian the finished product. Normally our speed is incredible for Tanzanian. And on the other hand, compared with Western team, we have less labour cost. … But we have some other problems. In very few cases, we built the things they did not need, and another problem is, how to maintain the product. For example, if we build a hospital for them, then do we also need to offer them the medical materials and even doctors? We then may be involved into more and more issues. So the Western donors may have realised the problem during the recent years, and started to give direct financial support. But China will still maintain this approach at the moment, and see if we can make it more scientific. The old brothers’ relation will be instead by a new relation with more consideration of the market and mutual benefit.

Secondly, the help for HRD in Africa is recognised as an important approach by our interviewees. From the fieldwork data we could see the Chinese scholarships are acceptable, and we also could see a number of returning students who obtained degrees in China now working at a good job in Tanzania. However, there are both positive and negative opinions on the details of the practice, which shows that China still needs to improve its practice such as the quality of higher education. Instead of building a friendly image for African people, for instance, a cultural centre in a high school which is eagerly looking for some donation of school construction rather than ‘cultural friendship’, it is better to work on their urgent needs in education, either the needs for school teaching or construction, or the needs for more communication and strict evaluation in higher education from the African students in China.

The third point is the recognition of the difference between China and the West. It can be seen that the Chinese officials translate their policy claims into practice, and the Chinese media and websites also point to their good performance in the training of African university administrators. Both of these show China providing unconditional and equal support for African countries. However, in the fieldwork we felt while the older generation seems to have more passion in their Chinese friendships through the historical link, the younger generation may not be interested in any political comparison of different donors. Even some current institutional leaders also noted that they would accept any donation from any type of donor, when the resource could be of help. When asked if they know why they choose to study in China or why they want to learn Chinese, or why they feel happy with the workshops taken in China, the answer is they feel related with Chinese – within the activities organised by China, they can get what they are interested in, but maybe cannot easily obtained from the West: some feeling of sharing experience and ideas for development; and some activities which are more like exchange
rather than help. It could be seen that these recognition actually are not directly related to different aid modalities, but related to a different aid relations.

Based on this, it is interesting to see how the so called ‘recipients’, in the traditional aid discourse, are in a kind of way of starting considering themselves as ‘clients’ in the neutral sense of the term when they are dealing Chinese aid. This is maybe the basic reason for these returning students considering the differences between China and the West, as they haven’t felt been donated, but been educated and trained within two countries’ non-postcolonial relation (in which they have seen economic/trade relation between countries rather than accountabilities and responsibilities that tie the donors and recipients). This situation help us consider: we perhaps are entering into a market-based aid, clearer than the so called donors-recipients aid. Moreover, can this different relation, motive and logic basis make a better quality of HRD aid especially producing mutual benefits in a long run? China still needs improvement on its practice. A reciprocity basis can reduce hierarchical feeling, but may also bring quite pragmatic aspiration on trade business rather than the realities of education and training.

Finally, although on the basis of the main arguments of this paper and my PhD study, I have been able to show that China’s aid modality may have some differences from the Western aid, this conclusion is reached on the basis of an assumption of the ‘normality’ of the Western framework or logic of aid. It is very hard to frame China into any Western modality type, as Chinese aid is not about doing stand-alone projects or directly financing in order to reduce transaction costs, nor about giving more or less ownership to recipient countries, or whether they should intervene into African countries’ governance issues. It is even not just about promoting global educational development. The aim seems very pragmatic- ‘win-win’, particularly economic ‘win-win’. As King (2010: 86) concluded, ‘ultimately all the many elements of China’s cooperation with Africa are inseparable from the political, economic and trade engagements with Africa’. This may remind us that it may not be appropriate to put China into any category of ‘aid modality’, because it is not like Western ‘aid’ from the beginning. This blended model of aid, investment, trade, and technology as levers for development, while less common in Western approaches, embeds education into the wider and more complex political economic context.

Bibliography


