‘Teaching to fish’ rather than ‘giving a fish’: Is China contributing to the global sustainable futures?

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ABSTRACT

‘Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime’. This proverb now becomes the slogan of China’s international aid. This paper is based on my previous empirical studies on China’s ‘donor logic’ of aid. Rather than looking at the motives of Chinese aid and how it is challenging the Western ideas, this paper focuses on policy discourse and tries to seek the recent trends and knowledge transformations of China’s international cooperation of education.

Through examining China’s Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) pledges historically and recent policy documents, three key trends are firstly discussed- the trend of one-to-one top university cooperation, cooperation in research projects, academic publications and think tanks; and the enhancement in the cooperation on technical and vocational education and training at tertiary level.

The paper then looks at ‘what’ are transferred through the above approaches. These include knowledge on developing university subjects that are key to economic growth; knowledge on developing applied research and tertiary vocational education; and knowledge of China’s understandings and experience of development.

The paper argues that China has been continuously progressing on the modality and quality of the educational cooperation. Chinese approaches of teaching ‘how to develop’ based on its own experience may help strengthen the independence of developing countries and build win-win partnerships for long term development.

1 EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION: DIPLOMA SERVES DIPLOMACY

There has been considerable discussion of China as a rising power in the global arena. Since the country became a significant provider of foreign assistance through South-South cooperation in Asia, Latin America, and especially in Africa, a lot of discussion has considered how different Chinese aid is from Western aid. It is of note that there are increasing ideas that suggest that China has brought something different. Rather than continue the comparison between China and the West, this paper asks, based on recent policy discourse, is China progressing in its method of educational cooperation in the South?

With growing attention paid to China’s soft power in relation to its aid modalities, education has been noted as an important component and even an inseparable part of Chinese South-South cooperation. King (2013) has pointed out that ‘China has an increasing role as an education

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collaborator with Africa, and this may be significant both economically and politically’. My paper ‘diploma serves diplomacy: China’s “donor logic” in educational aid’ argues that, China gives ‘aid’ while seeking cooperation and exchange (Yuan, 2014). This is why the Chinese government uses the phrase ‘China-Africa cooperation’ more frequently than ‘Chinese aid to Africa’. It is therefore as Brautigam (2011) has mentioned, difficult to calculate and evaluate Chinese aid according to the Western logic and modality framework as it is a developmental process for both of the donor and recipients rather than a ‘prescription’ operated by professional agencies/donors. In the educational field, China also prefers to use ‘educational exchange’ rather than ‘educational aid’. Educational discourse and practice from China are offered with the focus on building two-way relationships rather than professionally suggesting development modalities. It is more than setting up a ‘China model’ but rather a process for lasting cooperation in the long run. The Chinese media likes to use a proverb to describe the logic of China’s educational assistance for Africa: ‘give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach him how to fish and you feed him for a lifetime’ (Yuan, 2010: 60). Based on a series of fieldwork exercises taken in China and Tanzania in 2008, my previous empirical study revealed that, China’s educational aid and its features in practice, based upon diplomatic policies and China’s distinctive win-win logic of foreign aid, is serving bilateral relations rather than orthodox aid relations (which is based on a ‘catching up’ logic). Does this mean China’s educational cooperation comes with too much political rhetoric but lacks professional transformation of knowledge to African people? The above fieldwork did find some teaching and learning contradictions on the ground, and noted that the cooperating universities selected by China were good but very few were from the top line in China. Therefore I concluded in the paper that, ‘if quality transformation and communication can be ensured in Chinese universities, education will contribute to a lasting and cooperative relationship between China and Africa’ (Yuan, 2014).

Notably, with my recent examination into the policy discourse from the Chinese government, signs of quality improvement in China’s educational cooperation were presented in the action plans of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) from 2009. This can be seen from the strengthened one-to-one top university cooperation and cooperation in research projects, academic publications and think tanks; as well as the improving and enlarging cooperation on vocational education and training especially at the tertiary level. Such trends were also noted by Reilly (2015): ‘China continues to place strong emphasis upon provision of university scholarships and vocational and professional training—both of which are primarily conducted within China and led by Chinese experts’. In this paper, I will examine the discourse evidence historically to identify the above trends and also ask: what type of knowledge transformation is going on within such educational cooperation; and apart from being beneficial to bilateral relations, whether it will contribute to our sustainable futures.

2 STRENGTHENED UNIVERSITY COOPERATION

China has held five FOCAC since 2000, every three years. The earliest FOCAC ‘programme’ (which came to be an ‘Action Plan’ from the 2006 FOCAC onwards) in 2000 had not yet clarified any specific number on educational action in ‘education’ section, but set clear ideas in two main areas of what China would promise in the field of education: scholarship and training. It also showed China’s interests in strengthening university cooperation in the future: ‘set up channels of communications between universities of the two sides for the study of the Chinese and African civilizations.’

From the 2006 Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009), China started to use a more straightforward language to announce and detail its promises. The 2009 FOCAC Action Plan (2010-2012) strengthened the focus on higher levels of education and especially university cooperation, which
was highlighted in the ‘20+20’ Cooperation Plan: ‘this proposes implementation of the 20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education to establish a new type of one-to-one inter-institutional cooperation model between 20 Chinese universities (or vocational colleges) and 20 African universities (or vocational colleges)’ (FOCAC, 2009). Remarkably, a number of the selected cooperative universities from both China and Africa (in 17 African countries) were their top ranking institutions. They used a one-to-one ‘paired’ form to cooperate, e.g. Peking University paired with Cairo University, East China Normal University paired with University of Dar es Salaam, and the Beijing Language and Culture University paired with Suez Canal University (UNESCO, n.d.a). In particular King (2014) discussed the 20+20 cooperation which from its mechanism could be seen as an aid project, however was perceived as ‘symmetric’ and ‘long-term’ by some Chinese staff on the ground. In terms of the understanding of ‘long term’, he said, ‘several of the university partnerships initiated by China in the 1990s are still running and being supported by Chinese staff, many of whom have been in Africa for twenty years. There is therefore a strong understanding amongst Chinese staff both in the Confucius Institutes and 20+20 partnerships that they are engaged in a long-term commitment to their partner university in Africa’. This is also backed up by my 2008 field work in Tanzania Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT) which has been cooperating with Xi’an Jiao Tong University since 1991. It has received diverse types of educational support from China, including Chinese teacher secondments, computer lab construction, as well as postgraduate scholarships. Up to 2009, the approaches to Chinese educational cooperation could be summarised across seven categories: (1) government scholarships; (2) short-term training; (3) cultural exchanges; (4) the Confucius Institute; (5) school building and donations; (6) teacher secondments; and (7) university cooperation (Yuan, 2011). Since 2009, The FOCAC pledges showed increasing interests to the last approach which actually is integrated with the first, second, fourth approaches.

The latest FOCAC Action Plan (2013-2015), announced in 2012, continued to promote the 20+20 plan. It is interesting to note some of the changes from the 2009 Plan that in terms of the commitment to education there is a clear focus on higher education. Under the heading ‘education’, little can be found specifically about rural school construction which was listed in the 2006 pledge (FOCAC, 2006). However school construction was stated in China’s white paper on foreign aid (Information Office of the State Council of PRC, 2014) as a part of China’s aid on teaching and learning conditions. Does this show that China tries to distinguish between its two-way cooperation and one-way donations? As a ‘cooperation’ platform, FOCAC would prefer to work on higher education which can provide more types of practice connected to bilateral relations. Moreover, the 2012 Plan added an item on China’s contribution to the UNESCO trust fund for education development programs in Africa, emphasizing particularly the field of ‘higher education’. The UNESCO (n.d.b) also announced the ‘UNESCO-China-Africa Tripartite Initiative on University Cooperation’ in 2011, including the 20+20 plan as ‘an integral part of the initiative’.

3 THINK TANK AND ADVANCED RESEARCH COOPERATION

From the recent FOCAC pledges we can see more forms of cooperation at a higher level of education with universities as a platform. Not only by providing scholarships and training, China is also making stronger commitments towards sharing research knowledge with African countries through university and think tank cooperation.

In the 2012 Plan, under the sub-heading ‘education’ in the section ‘cultural and people-to-people exchanges and cooperation’, the Chinese government added another sub-heading: ‘exchanges between academia and think tanks’. China promised to launch the ‘China-Africa Think Tanks 10+10
Partnership Plan’, with the objective to: ‘sponsor 100 programs by academic institutions and scholars from the two sides over the next three years covering topical research, international symposiums, mutual visits by scholars and the publication of studies’; and to ‘encourage and support scholars from the two sides to conduct joint research and publish the results of their joint research in international academic journals and other publications’. Similar to the 20+20 plan, the 10+10 plan also seeks to establish ‘long term paired cooperative relationships’ (FOCAC, 2012).

The 10+10 plan is very meaningful to research in China and Africa as well as their relationships. State Councillor Yang Jiechi, formerly China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs has argued that, this kind of research collaboration has started late by both sides and consequently much of the work has previously been conducted by ‘outsiders’ to the relationship, and Africa and China have had to rely on existing theoretical frameworks; however it was now time for both China and Africa to explore their own theoretical frameworks (SAIIA, 2013). Most of the selected think tanks are renowned Chinese and African universities, and are especially powerful in international relations studies. For example, the International Relations Institute in Cameroon (paired with China Foreign Affairs University), the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch (paired with Shanghai Institutes for International Studies), and the Institute for Peace and Security Studies at the University of Addis Ababa (paired with Chinese Communist Party School).

The chief executive of the South Africa Institution of International Affairs (SAIIA), Elizabeth Sidiropoulos stressed at the launching ceremony of the plan that, ‘helping China better understand Africa, and the regional context within which we make our choices is a critical dimension of research cooperation’. SAIIA’s partner in the initiative is the China Institute of International Studies, a think tank of the Chinese foreign ministry (ibid). Moreover, the plan also provided a platform for experts from both sides to explore ‘development’ under the Southern context. In the Initiative Plan it was stated that both sides, ‘can strengthen exchanges and learn from each other to exchange experience in governance and socio-economic development, to absorb wisdom from each other’s experiences, and to jointly explore ways to boost development, maintain stability and achieve the renaissance of their respective cultures and societies… [which] can contribute to the uplifting of the discourse power of developing countries in international affairs… [in order to] make their own voice heard on the international stage’ (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).

Apart from the new 10+10 plan, FOCAC pledges also place an emphasis on the research level of ‘science and technology cooperation and knowledge sharing’, sharing scientific knowledge especially applicable technology studies. The 2012 Plan promised that ‘China will continue to implement joint research and technology demonstration projects, invite African personnel to China for postdoctoral research and offer research instruments to African scientific researchers, who will return to their home countries to work upon completion of their long-term joint research tasks in China. On its part, Africa will welcome Chinese visiting scientists to African research centres for higher-level teaching and research activities’; in addition ‘China will continue to encourage and promote knowledge sharing and the transfer of advanced and applicable technologies with African countries, host training sessions on applicable technology and science and technology management, share experiences on the development of science parks and help to raise African countries’ capacity in R&D (research and development) innovation’ (FOCAC, 2012).

4 QUALITY IMPROVEMENT OF TRAINING PROGRAMS

Another focus of China’s South-South educational cooperation is on vocational education and training, where China promised to improve the quality of its training programs to Africa.
The mechanism of this approach is not new to China. In China, the Ministry of Education usually authorizes tasks for local universities and allows these institutions to organise and arrange the specific practice with African participants. Thus the notice of training is delivered to the African side in a diplomatic way, and then the training activities are conducted by the universities. In terms of educational cooperation with Africa, these universities also have the chance to educate African students who received Chinese scholarships, and to establish Confucius Institutes in African countries, though this depends on the main subjects of the university and its reputation and performance. Universities such as Jilin University, China Agriculture University, Zhejiang Normal University, Tianjin University of Technology and Education are designated by ministries to do workshops and conduct seminars for Africa.

The 2003 FOCAC document, stepped up China’s support for human resource development (HRD) in Africa, aiming to train ‘up to 10,000 African personnel in different fields’ in the next three years, and emphasized: ‘We are fully aware of the vital importance of talent training and capacity building to sustainable development in Africa and of the great potential for cooperation between the two sides in human resources development’. This document announced ‘exchanges’ of teachers and new scholarships between institutions of higher learning and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) from the two sides (FOCAC, 2003). The 2009 Plan, apart from promising cooperation among universities, also admitted ‘200 middle and high level African administrative personnel to MPA programs in China’ and promised to ‘help African countries train 1,500 school headmasters and teachers’ over the next three years (FOCAC, 2009). Based on these increased numbers, the Chinese government placed particular emphasis on the ‘quality’ of its training: ‘the Chinese Government will continue to provide training for people from different sectors in Africa as the need arises, and pay special attention to raising the quality of such training. The Chinese Government undertakes to train a total of 20,000 people from African countries across various sectors over the next three years (ibid).

The 2012 Plan made a stronger promise regarding ‘training professionals’ and the quality of the training. Under the heading of HRD cooperation, China decided to ‘train 30,000 African professionals in various sectors, offer 18,000 government scholarships and take measures to improve the content and quality of the training programs’ within its ‘African talents program’ (FOCAC, 2012). However, it is a question remain to us whether China can make such progress in three years’ time on both of the quantity and the quality.

5 WHAT ARE TRANSFERRED THROUGH EDUCATION AND TRAINING?

It is interesting to note that in the previous action plans, ‘Education’ as a sub-heading was found under ‘Cooperation in the field of development’ (in 2009 Plan) or ‘Cooperation in social development’ (in 2006 Plan). In the 2012 Plan, the section ‘Cooperation in the field of development’ was divided into different areas of developmental cooperation such as ‘Human resource development’ (HRD) and ‘Science and Technology Cooperation and Knowledge Sharing’ (STCKS). Educational promises were also mentioned very often under HRD and STCKS; however, the subsection titled ‘Education’ was moved under ‘Culture and People-to-people Exchange and Cooperation’. What does this move mean to us? It could be interpreted that, to the Chinese government, education firstly is serving cultural cooperation and people-to-people exchanges. This sets the official aim and the nature of China’s cooperation in the field of education. The key is ‘people’. Then what is being exchanged from people to people through educational practice? The ‘Developmental cooperation’ section describes what knowledge is transferred through the above mentioned university education, training, and research collaboration.
As aforementioned, education under this context not only brings knowledge contribution to the development of individuals, but also brings knowledge which can contribute to a win-win relationship (the development of both sides). To gain a lasting relationship between China and African countries and among people in the South, China’s education and training as a tool of public diplomacy is bridging the Chinese government and the African public. However this needs to meet the demands of the partner countries and their ‘people’. Based on FOCAC pledges and official documents, the three priorities of China’s knowledge transformation can be summarised as follows:

(a) Knowledge in certain areas: developing subjects key to economic growth. The 2012 Plan promised to make further contributions to African HRD in areas including ‘agriculture, industry, health, education, communication, media, science and technology, disaster prevention and reduction and administration’, through ‘scholarships, workshops and training programs’ (FOCAC, 2012). These areas are China’s key areas of foreign aid and cooperation in Africa, which are stated in the white paper on China’s foreign aid (2014), under the heading of ‘promoting a new China-Africa strategic relationship’. The white paper declared that priority should be given to: agricultural development; infrastructure construction and integrated development; medical and health care cooperation; capacity building and coping with climate change. Therefore we can see that the subject/discipline priority in education and training are closely linked to the main areas of China’s foreign aid in Africa. This again illustrates how ‘education’ in the FOCAC context cannot be easily understood without knowledge of China’s general aid policies and China’s HRD support to Africa.

(b) Knowledge at a certain level: developing applied research and tertiary vocational education. As previously described, in the FOCAC plans it can be seen that China reduced its promises regarding primary education but strongly strengthened its efforts with higher education and research. In the vocational section, China also has a focus on vocational education at a tertiary level. It is to be noted that China used the term ‘TVET’ in its 2003 pledge but has not used this since the 2006 Plan which only promised to train ‘professionals’ in different areas. It can be seen that the reason for this is that China has an increasingly clearer idea on what it wishes to focus in ‘vocational’ section to Africa: it is vocational training rather than vocational education. The 2012 Plan promised ‘vocational skills training’ in the HRD section; this is described as: to ‘provide assistance for Africa's vocational skills training facilities, train professionals and technical personnel for African countries and, in particular, help African young people and women enhance their job skills’ (FOCAC, 2012). It does not specify the level of education here, but we can see discourse under the headings of HRD, STCKS and education all providing great interest in the field of higher education (e.g. ‘government scholarships’ and university based short term and long term training).

From another perspective, the World Bank Vice President for the African Region, Diop (2015) talked about the importance of lessons from China in educational development at the tertiary level in Africa: ‘Africa needs a skilled labour force in order to experience growth like China’s…there is room to learn from China, where more than 40 percent of all tertiary degrees are awarded in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (the so-called “STEM” fields)...China’s success in developing the skills needed to adopt technology has created the conditions to attract investment in manufacturing.’

Moreover, one distinctive character of China’s support for tertiary vocational education is that China also has its own ‘higher TVET’ transformation underway. This is to transfer local higher institutions to applied technology university (or college) (ying yong ji shu da xue). According to a speech at the
World Federation of College and Polytechnics (WFCP) 2012 World Congress from the Secretary-General of the China Education Association for International Exchanges (CEAIE), in China in 2011, a total of 7.44m students enrolled at 1,280 TVET institutions nationwide, which is almost half of the total number of higher education receivers. We call this higher TVET, which has the dual functions of both higher education and vocational/technological education, which bears the responsibility for cultivating advanced skilled people who are capable of competing in the international market’ (Jiang, 2012). This has given China’s cooperation the characteristic of two-way ‘sharing’ (and developing together) rather than simply a one-way ‘transformation’.

(c) Direct knowledge of China’s understandings and experience of development. In fact, the forms and disciplines of educational cooperation may not be different from education in many other donors or partner countries. However, the knowledge transformation from China contains ‘Chinese characteristics’ which in many ways are fundamentally different from the West. The Chinese way of ‘boosting productivity and the associated emphasis on rapid and large investments in human and physical capital, high savings rates, and an overarching ability to consistently drive toward long-term objectives’, as Diop (2015) has argued, is attractive to both Africa itself and also international institutions such as the World Bank who has been systematically working on African development for decades. Therefore China’s educational cooperation also has a focus on transferring its own developmental experience, which in terms of the logic is focused on ‘what I did’ rather than ‘what you need to do (to catch up with me)’.

We can see how China prefers to share its own experience of some training topics from an interview conducted during my fieldwork in 2008 at the Tianjin University of Technology and Education (TUTE). They offer a training course in vocational education to African institutional administrators. The seminar topics of the training include the following: ‘curriculum and teaching reforms of vocational education: based on a direction of employment’, ‘vocational education in developing countries: a comparative view’, ‘Educational development in China’, ‘vocational skill certification in China’, ‘administration models of vocational institutions in China’, and ‘developing vocational education in China’. In addition, there are some visiting activities to historical locations and to primary/secondary/vocational schools in China. Recently TUTE also held a 14 day short term ‘culture workshop’ (wen hua yan xiu ban) for African Union young leaders. 11 young leaders from AU headquarters attended this workshop in June, 2015 (TUTE, 2015). The workshop covered not only Chinese traditional culture, but also 30 years’ experience of opening-up, including Chinese traditional culture, Chinese vocational education development and reform, social development and youth employment, China-Africa economic cooperation and trade, etc. (State Council Information Office, 2015). This case also indicates the broad concept of ‘culture’ in China’s foreign policy, and China’s preference for categorising ‘education’ in the scope of culture.

The People’s Daily (2015) published an article by Professor Humphrey Moshi from the University of Dar es Salaam who pointed out that, China’s rapid economic development and sustainable development has provided the world with valuable experience of the factors for economic growth, including strengthened HRD, balanced growth in agricultural and manufacture, infrastructure development and so on. As he said, as China’s development model has clearly showed, it is possible to catch up developed countries without Washington Consensus (FOCAC, 2015). As this was published very recently on 28th July this year, can we say that Moshi’s words have provided some hints as to China’s contribution and position in terms of the post-2015 agenda?
6 WASHINGTON CONSENSUS, BEIJING CONSENSUS TO SHANGHAI CONSENSUS: IS CHINA CONTRIBUTING TO OUR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES?

To summarise, firstly from official discourse we can see that China is engaging in a more high ‘quality’ South-South cooperation where education and especially the higher level of education plays an important role in enhancing the sustainability of China’s bilateral relationships. Universities as platforms are linking vocational training, formal higher education, academic research and think tanks from the two sides together, transferring China’s development lessons to Africa. We would like to ask in the end, apart from the contribution to the two sides’ relationships, can China’s educational cooperation also contribute to the global goals on sustainable development in the post-2015 era?

Sustainable development is not a new term to China. China has made an effort in solving contradictions in the way of developing its ‘socialist market economy’. Ramo (2004) describes ‘repositioning the value of innovation’, ‘improving quality of the development where sustainability and equality becoming first considerations’ and ‘a theory of self-determination’ as the three theorems of his famous ‘Beijing Consensus’ which contrasts with the Washington Consensus. In terms of the second theorem, he has pointed out that based on reflections on the chaos of the development of the socialist market economy and the demands for the measurement of the ‘green’ and ‘transparent’ GDP, the Beijing consensus is about ‘trying to create an environment for development that is sustainable and equitable’. He has quoted Deng’s famous speech: ‘it doesn’t matter if the cat is black or white…all that matters is that it catches mice’ and has said that ‘…Hu’s GDP tools, which I’ve heard leaders all over the country begin to talk about, reflect the government’s new belief: the colour of the cat does matter. The goal now is to find a cat that is green, a cat that is transparent’ (Ramo, 2004: 23). If Ramo revealed some characteristics of developmental situation in China, the Chinese experience transferred to Africa may deliver the lessons on ‘finding a green cat’.

I am not sure whether we should call it the ‘Beijing consensus’ or the ‘Chinese experience of development’ as China has tried to avoid a ‘prescription’ model like the Washington Consensus, but China-Africa cooperation has definitely pushed the ‘China model’ to be perceived more broadly and deeply. If the so-called Beijing Consensus is more about China’s domestic development; then based on recent trends of China-Africa cooperation we may see the appearance of a ‘post-Beijing Consensus’ regarding the Chinese model of international relations. There is a ‘Shanghai Consensus’ suggested by Guimaraes (2011), the founder and CEO of the Asia-Pacific Youth Organization (APYO), contrasting the Beijing Consensus: ‘Depicted by Francis Fukuyama as a ‘mixture of authoritarian government with market economics’. In this case the Beijing Consensus is limited in its scope and is not designed to offer a framework for the understanding of certain aspects of the Chinese government, including foreign policy’. Three key patterns are important to the Shanghai Consensus: ‘the centrality of commerce in Chinese diplomacy’, ‘the international reach of Chinese diplomacy’ and ‘maturity and stability of diplomacy beyond political rhetoric’. He has made an interesting point on China strengthening its commercial diplomacy by ‘employing non-commercial means to secure its interests in Africa’. Though he was more interested in China’s energy security rather than the role of cultural activities, he has indeed revealed China’s changing focus in terms of international relations. Education is no longer a tool to help maintain China’s political interest (e.g. political alignment, socialist brothers, territorial integrity and sovereignty) based relationships, but is used to achieve economic win-win based strategic relationships in the 21st century.
In terms of education, this paper summarised some of the recent trends of China-Africa educational cooperation. It will be interesting to compare these with the education targets in MDGs and Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations, n.d.). King (2007: 343) earlier made comments on a Beijing Declaration announced during the China-Africa education minister forum in 2005 that, although this forum was ‘piggy-backed on the High Level Meeting on EFA, it struck out on its own’, focusing more on the ‘prudent policies for vocational education and technical education, as well as to encourage higher education and cultural diversity’. This may be seen as still a valid way to summarise China’s position in terms of the post-2015 agenda. As the latest version of education targets in SDGs are more specific than for UPE in the MDGs, we can see more consistency between China's educational pledges and SDG targets. Examples include the pursuing of ‘affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university’ (in 4.3), the expansion of the number of scholarships for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and information and communications technology, technical, engineering and scientific programmes, in developed countries and other developing countries (in 4.b), as well as the appreciation of culture’s contribution to sustainable development (in 4.7) (United Nations, n.d.: 14). Although there are no country specified targets in SDGs, we can see China’s general position from its ‘Position paper on the post-2015 development agenda’ which not only announced China’s appreciation and support for UN principles but also declared the principles of ‘respecting diversity in development models’, ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ and ‘win-win cooperation’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 2015). These ‘guiding principles’ clearly show the world China’s decision in terms of progressing with its method of development and its cooperation and non-prescription based policy discourse.

We may not be able to draw a conclusion here to see how much exactly China can contribute to the SDGs, especially since many of China’s domestic development problems have not been discussed in this paper. We also need to distinguish what was declared and what was actually practiced by China. However we can see a changing discourse from a more abstract political rhetoric to a more straightforward development oriented promise by China. The 2014 white paper on China’s foreign aid stated in the section on capacity building: ‘believing in the ancient Chinese wisdom that "teaching one to fish rather than giving one fish", China shares its experience and technology with other developing countries through human resources and technical cooperation, as well as through volunteer service, to help other developing countries build their own professional teams and enhance their capacity for independent development.’ At the end of this paper, we may argue that, only a quality educational cooperation can contribute not only to the bilateral relationship but also to the needs of general public and a sustainable future. China’s educational cooperation, increasingly focusing on a combination of top university cooperation, research and think tank cooperation, and training programs particularly at a tertiary level featured with knowledge transformation of Chinese experience based applied technology and science, are making progress in terms of their modality and content, on both of the internal role (educating) and external role (bridging) of education, and working towards a sustainable future in an independent way. To extend the ‘fish’ proverb, when both teachers and learners depend on the ‘fish’ to live, the ‘teaching’ approach becomes a ‘sharing’ approach, which seems more meaningful.

7 REFERENCES


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